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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION

The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction of this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1988 Supp.)-

1

STATEMENT SHOWING NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

This appeal is from a final Judgment and Order of the Third
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, dated
December 23, 1988. A copy of said judgment is attached hereto in
the Addendum.

2

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
IS THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE GRAHNS AND GREGORY VOIDABLE
BY GREGORY AND IS REFORMATION OF THE CONTRACT IMPROPER
WHERE THE PARTIES MADE A MUTUAL MISTAKE OF A MATERIAL
FACT WHICH WAS A BASIC ASSUMPTION OF THE CONTRACT AND
MATERIALLY AFFECTS THE AGREED PERFORMANCES OF THE
PARTIES, AND ADVERSELY AFFECTS GREGORY?
IS THE CONTRACT BETWEEN GREGORY AND GRAHNS VOIDABLE BY
GREGORY WHERE GREGORY MADE A UNILATERAL MISTAKE AND
WHERE IT IS UNCONSCIONABLE TO ENFORCE THE CONTRACT,
WHERE THE MISTAKE RELATES TO A MATERIAL FEATURE OF THE
CONTRACT, THE MISTAKE OCCURRED NOTWITHSTANDING
GREGORY'S EXERCISE OF ORDINARY DILIGENCE, AND WHERE THE
COURT CAN GRANT RESCISSION WITHOUT SERIOUS PREJUDICE
TO GRAHNS EXCEPT THE LOSS OF THEIR BARGAIN.
WAS REFORMATION OF THE DEED IMPROPER BECAUSE THE
CONTRACT BETWEEN GRAHNS AND GREGORY WAS MERGED INTO THE
DEED TO THE 1.11 ACRE PARCEL BY A METES AND BOUNDS
LEGAL DESCRIPTION?
WHERE THE DEED REFERS TO METES AND BOUNDS AND WHERE THE
PARTIES ORALLY MADE REFERENCE TO A ROAD, DOES THE METES
AND BOUNDS DESCRIPTION PREVAIL WHERE THE TWO
MEASUREMENTS ARE INCONSISTENT, AND ITS REFORMATION OF
THE DEED IMPROPER?

3

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES. ORDINANCES, AND RULES

There

are

no

determinative

constitutional

provisions,

statutes, ordinances, or rules which this defendant/appellant
cites in his brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS,
AND DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW

Defendant appeals from the judgment entered in the Third
Judicial District Court on December 23, 1988 by the Honorable
John A. Rokich.
property.

The case is a dispute about the sale of real

The court below ordered

specific performance and

reformation of the contract for sale of Parcel 1 to include the
Private Drive and ordered that the Grahns pay an additional sum
for the additional acreage. (See Judgment and Order, Record p.
543, a copy of which is attached hereto in the Addendum)
B.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS RELEVANT
TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

ORIGINAL DIVISION OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION
This Statement of Facts is generally consistent with the
Findings of Fact which are reproduced in the Addendum.
1.

On or about July 15, 1930 Albert and Caroline Eccles

acquired by deed a parcel of property containing approximately
2.7 acres of land. (See Record, p. 41) (See Transcript, p. 415,
L. 25 - p. 416, L. 24)
2.

In about 1961, Caroline Eccles and her husband Albert

divided the property, without applying for subdivision approval,
and sold part of that land, retaining approximately 1.67 acres.
(See Record, p. 41)
3.

On or about May 17, 1978 Caroline Eccles conveyed the
5

remaining approximate 1.67 acres, which is the subject of this
matter,

for

estate

planning

purposes, to Herold

L. Gregory

Trustee of the Marital and Family Trusts of the Albert Eccles
Family Trust (hereinafter "Gregory" or "Gregorys").

The 1.67

acre parcel is commonly known as 2811 Brookburn Road.

(See

Record, p. 41).
4.

The Eccles made improvements to the property including

construction of a home, referred to hereinafter as the "Home".
(See Record, p. 41)
5.
property

The Eccles also constructed a private drive on the
for

access

to

the

Home.

The

private

hereinafter referred to as the "Private Drive."

drive

is

The Private

Drive is the only existing access to the Estate. (See Record, p.
41, 42)
6.

Approximately five years ago, the Gregory divided the

1.67 acre parcel to create two separate contiguous parcels so
that Barbara Danielson, a beneficiary of Gregory, could build a
residence on the adjoining parcel to be divided from the 1.67
acre parcel.

Gregory hired Scott McNeil of McNeil Engineering,

(hereinafter

"Defendant McNeil"), to survey the property and

divide it into the two separate parcels. (See Record, p. 42) (See
Transcript p. 418, L. 18)
7.

Barbara Danielson instructed Defendant McNeil to create

on the southeastern side of the property a parcel comprised of at
least one-half acre.

She also instructed Defendant McNeil to

create a legal description for the 1/2 acre parcel of property,
6

hereinafter referred to as "Parcel 2." (See Record, p. 42) (See
Transcript, p. 222, L. 4-21)

the

8.

Mrs, Danielson

1.67

acre parcel

instructed

and

Defendant McNeil to survey

determine

whether

there would

be a

usable, buildable lot of one-half acre or more if the survey used
the

southeast

side

of

the

Private

Drive

as

a boundary.

(See

Record, p. 42) (See Transcript, p. 235, L. 16-25; p. 236, L. 1-4;
p. 222, L. 9-12)
is attached

The survey was Exhibit 1-P at trial, and a copy

hereto

in the Addendum

and

incorporated herein by

reference.
9.
parcel,
Ordinance

In instructing
Gregory

was

Defendant McNeil to create a 1/2 acre

aware

that

a

a minimum

property

to construct

for

a party

transcript, p. 300, L. 9-12)
sold

contained

Lake

County

Zoning

(§ 22-14-4 for Zone R121, which is where the property

is located) , required

and

Salt

parcel
at

2

lease

as

a

a personal

residence.

(See

Gregory then divided the property

separate

one-half

in order

of a 1/2 acre parcel of real

acre

parcel,
in

intending

order

to

that

meet

is

zoning

requirements

and

for the parcel to be big enough tc

build upon.

At the time they sold Parcel 1 to the Grahns, they

did not intend to convey to them more than the acreage contained
in the description upon which they were relying, (1.11 acres) anz
that description had been derived from the erroneous survey. (See
Transcript, p. 300, L. 3-25; p. 301, L. 1-15)
10.
surveyed

During
the

1.67

the

month

of

acre parcel

June
and

7

1984,

created

Defendant

a survey

and

McNeil
legal

description

for Parcel

2.

The

survey dated

July

10, 1984

included a certified legal description for Parcel 2 purporting to
include 0.56 acres. (See Record, p. 42, 43) (See Transcript, p.
223, L. 2-21)
11.

Defendant McNeil intended and believed that the legal

description he created for Parcel 2 described a parcel of real
property approximately 0.56 acres in size and that the property
so described was situated south and east of the Private Drive,
and did not include in the description any part of the Private
Drive. (See Record, p. 43)
12.

According to the survey the remaining parcel on which

the Home was located contained approximately 1.11 acres.

This

parcel is referred to as Parcel 1.
13.

Gregory deed Parcel 2 to Barbara Danielson but she

decided not to build on Parcel 2 and deeded the parcel back tc
Gregory. (See Transcript p. 420, L. 1-11; p.157 L. 10-12)

SALE OF PARCEL 1
14.

During the Summer of 1984, Gregory listed

for sale

Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 (See Record, p. 43)
15.

Beginning on or about January 1986, Grahns began tc

negotiate

with Gregory

to purchase

Parcel

1.

During

these

negotiations, Grahns inquired of Herold L. Gregory trustee of the
Trust, and his wife Mary Ethel Gregory, about the relation of the
Private

Drive

to

the property

line

between

the

lots.

The

Gregorys told Grahns the east side of the Private Drive was
8

approximately

the

dividing

line

between

the

lots

based

on

McNeil's survey (See Record, p. 43, 44) (See Transcript p. 161,
L. 6-10)
16.

The Gregorys represented to Grahns that they had asked

the surveyor, Defendant McNeil, to create a legal description for
Parcel

2

(referring

to

it as the half-acre

lot) , and that

Defendant McNeil had prepared a survey designating a boundary
line as approximately

the southeasterly

edge of the Private

Drive. (See Record, p. 44)
17.

The Grahns relied on those representations, among other

things, in purchasing Parcel 1. (See Record, p. 44)
18.

On or about March 18, 1986, Grahns and Gregory entered

into an Earnest Money Sales Agreement for the purchase of Parcel
1.

The parties also agreed to (1) an

option to purchase, first

right of refusal applicable to Parcel 2, and

(2) a written

restrictive aesthetic and geologic easement on Parcel 2 across
the fifteen feet nearest the Private Drive, "as an aesthetic
break between the properties as well as a geologic protectlON
against erosion onto the

(Parcel 1) property".

Said Earnest

Money Sales Agreement was Exhibit 2 P at trial, and is attached
hereto in its entirety in the Addendum and incorporated herein by
this reference. (See Record, p. 44)
19.

Grahns accepted the existing survey upon purchasing

Parcel 1 and, in fact, never requested to see a copy of the
existing survey. (See Transcript, p. 303, L. 1-8)
20.

As part of the negotiations, Gregory rejected a request
9

from Grahns for an affirmative covenant that the property had
been divided in compliance with law.

Gregory through its Trustee

explained that the properties were described on separate tax
notices, and seemed already to be divided according to the legal
descriptions of the two parcels. (See Record, p. 44, 45)
21.

During the negotiation Grahns requested Gregory to

grant them a 25-foot easement on Parcel 2 alo.ng the Private
Drive.

Gregory denied Grahns request but agreed to give Grahns

the 15-foot easement. (See transcript, p. 182, L. 19 - p. 184, L.
23)
22.

On or about August 1, 1986, Grahns and Gregory closed

on the transaction for the sale of Parcel 1.
the

legal

description

attached

Agreement dated March 18, 1986.

to

the

The parties used

Earnest

Money

Sales

Josephine Grahn obtained the

legal description for Parcel 1 from the records of Salt Lake
County.

Apparently the county derived its legal description for

its records by taking the description of Parcel 2 from the
description of the entire 1.67 acre parcel.

This description

included a reference to 1.11 acres of land. (See Record, p. 45)
23.
Private

Grahns
Drive

and

Gregory

(excepting

were

that

under

portion

the

which

impression

the

constitutes

an

easement over a corner of a neighboring lot which is not the
subject of this lawsuit) was included within Parcel

1.

(See

Record, p. 45)
24.

Parcel 1 contains 1.11 acres as referred to in the

legal description of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement although
10

it does not include the Private Drive as both parties, innocently
and mistakenly understood. (See Record, p. 117)
25.

There was no overlap in the descriptions of the deeds

for Parcels 1 and 2. (See Transcript, p. 239, L.l-5; p. 327, L.
1-13; p. 197, L. 4-10)
26.

When Gregory entered into their contract with Grahns tc

sell Parcel 1, Gregory intended to sell Parcel 1 which contained
approximately one acre so that Parcel 2 would contain at least
1/2 acre in order to be buildable and marketable.

Had Gregory

known about the mistake in the survey, he never would have sold
Parcel 1.

(See Transcript, p. 301, L. 5-26; p. 316, L. 8-17; p.

238, L. 18-20; p. 246, L. 8-18)

SALE OF PARCEL 2
27.

On September 1, 1986, Defendant Bradshaw entered into

an Earnest Money Sales Agreement with Gregory for the purchase of
Parcel 2.

Said Agreement was part of Exhibit 7-P at trial, a

copy of which is attached hereto in the Addendum.
was

a

legal

and

binding

agreement.

Said Agreement

(See Exhibit

7-P)

(See

Transcript, p. 176, L. 21, 22)
28.
to

On September 1, 1986 Dean Bradshaw offered to Gregory

purchase

Agreement.

Parcel
A copy

2

pursuant

to

an

Earnest

Money

Sales

of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement is

attached hereto in the Addendum and by reference made a par*:
hereof.

Gregory

accepted

Bradshaw!s

offer

to

purchase

en

September 2, 1986 subject to the Grahn's option and right c:
11

first refusal.
29.

On September 1, 1986, pursuant to the "First Option to

Purchase" contained in the March 18, 1986 Earnest Money Sales
Agreement, Gregory gave written notice to Grahns of his intent to
sell Parcel 2 to Bradshaw, and extended to Grahns the first right
of refusal to purchase Parcel 2. (See Record, p. 45)

The letter

providing notice to the Grahns was Exhibit No. 7-P at trial, and
a copy is attached hereto in the Addendum and incorporated herein
by this reference.
30.,

Grahns did not exercise their right of first refusal to

purchase Parcel 2 in accordance with the terms of the March 18,
1986 Agreement and the option expired on September 8, 1986. (See
Record, p. 45)
31.

Bradshaw

relied

upon

the

1984

McNeil

survey

in

tendering his September 1, 1986 offer which was accepted by
Gregory.

The survey indicated that Parcel 2 contained

0.56

acres of land with certain calls and dimensions shown on the
survey to extend generally to the southeasterly
Private Drive.
32.

line of the

(See Record, p. 46) (p. 369, L. 6-13)

On or about September

3, 1986, Josephine M. Grahn

telephoned Christi Bradshaw, Dean Bradshawfs wife, and informed
her that Bradshaws might not be able to build on Parcel 2 because
Gregory had not complied with the Salt Lake County subdivision
ordinances.

As a result of the phone call, Bradshaw told Gregory

about the conversation.

On September 5, 1986, as a result of the

phone call Gregory filed a request with Salt Lake County Planning
12

Commission for permission to divide the 1.67 acre parcel into a
1.11 acre and a 0.56 acre parcel according to the calls and
dimensions set forth
property

tax

on the 1984 McNeil survey and the 1985

notices.

The

descriptions

and

request were

consistent with the description previously conveyed to Grahns.
(See Record, p. 46)
33.

On

October

11, 1986,

Dean

Bradshaw

discovered

by

measurement on Parcel 2 that the Private Drive apparently was not
located where

indicated

on the 1984 McNeil survey and as a

consequence there was inadequate land between the Private Drive
and the southeasterly boundary to locate the Home which he had
designed and planned to build on Parcel 2.

Bradshaw immediately

advised Gregory of the problem and Gregory contacted Defendant
McNeil.
34.

(See Record, p. 46, 47)
Bradshaw was not aware of any problem with the survey

at the time he made his offer to purchase the .56 acre lot or at
any time prior to October 11, 1986. (See Record, p. 48, Record,
p. 190)
35.
the

By the time Bradshaw discovered the discrepancy with

survey

measurements,

he

had

already

become

extremely

emotionally attached to Parcel 2 and had expended considerable
time and money in designing and preparing for construction of his
home on the property, and arranging
property.

for subdivision of the

He had sold his home and moved to a rental property

on Brookburn Drive across the street from Parcel 2.

He had

entered into a lease agreement for approximately six months to
13

allow him to complete construction of his home.
1987

Bradshaws

had

to

move

from

the

rental

On April 15,
property.

(See

Transcript, p. 385, L. 13-22; p. 397, L. 17-20; p. 400, L. 7 - p.
401, L. 2)

He contracted with an architect to obtain plans for

the home.

(See Transcript, p. 398, L. 6-18)

He and his wife

built a scale model of the home. (See Transcript, p. 397, L. 25p. 398, L. 2; p. 372, L. 14 - p. 373, L. 5)

He contracted with

Rocky Mountain Refractory for certain materials for the house.
(See Trcinscript, p. 401, L. 13 - p. 403, L. 8)

He made sketches

of the house and property in evenings and on weekends. (See
Transcript, p. 364, L. 20-24)
36.

In

October,

1986

McNeil

reviewed

his

survey

and

subsequently confirmed that he believed he had made an error in
the location of the Private Drive on the survey.

The dimensions

of Parcel 2 extended across the Private Drive and a major portion
of the Private Drive is actually within the description of Parcel
2 and not Parcel 1. (See Record, p. 47)
37.

At the time the mistake was discovered, and even at the

time the Complaint was filed in this lawsuit, the Grahns had not
moved into the Home on Parcel 1.

The Complaint was filed in

November of 1986 and the Grahns did not move into the home until
June 13, 1987. (See Transcript, p. 55, L. 12-16)
38.

Even at trial, Gregory did not understand the true

relationship between the location of the Private Drive and the
boundaries between Parcels 1 and 2. (See transcript, p. 198, L.
11-17)
14

39.

On October 23, 1986, McNeil prepared a revised drawing

showing what he believed to be tne relationship of the Private
Drive to Parcel 1 and Parcel 2. (See Record, p. 47)

The revised

drawing was Exhibit 9-P at trial, and a copy is attached hereto
in the Addendum and by reference made a part hereof.
40.

Defendant

McNeil

subsequently

survey, showing the correct boundaries.

prepared

a

revised

Said survey was Exhibit

12-P at trial and a copy is attached hereto int he Addendum and
incorporated herein by reference.
41.

Gregory did not notify Grahns of the problem until

November 21, 1986 because Gregory awaited subdivision approval by
the County.

The county postponed the decision until November 19,

1986 when they granted the Gregory's request to subdivide the
property. (See Record, p. 47)
42.

On November 20, 1986, on demand of Bradshaw, Gregory

conveyed Parcel 2 to Dean and Christi Bradshaw according to the
September 1, 1986, Earnest Money Sales Agreement. (See Record, p.
47)
43.

On November 21, 1986, Gregory informed Grahns in a

letter of the problem survey and offered to Grahns a choice to
rescind the Agreement due to mutual mistake, or to have Gregory
build

a replacement driveway

Exhibit 8-P

on Parcel 1.

That letter was

at trial, and a copy is attached hereto in the

Addendum and by reference made a part hereof.

Gregory did not

inform Grahns until November 21, 1986 because Gregory did not
understand what the full implications of the survey problem were.
15

(See Record, p. 48)
44.
relied

All parties to the purchase of sale of Parcel 1 and 2

on

the

Additionally,

original
the

survey

Planning

and

prepared
Zoning

by

Defendant

Commission,

McNeil.

during

the

process of legally subdividing the property, relied on that same
survey.

(See Transcript, p. 81, L. 20 - p. 82, L. 19; p. 83, L.

7-16; p. 168, L. 2-23; p. 369, L. 6-13)
45.

At no time prior to October 11, 1986 were any of the

parties, Grahns, Gregory, Bradshaw or McNeil, aware of the mutual
mistake

regarding the location of the Private Drive in relation

to Parcels

1 and

2.

(See Record,

p. 48)

At trial the Court

ordered specific performance and reformation of the contract for
Parcel 1 to include the Private Drive and ordered that the Grahns
pay an additional sum for the additional acreage. (See Record, p.
536)
46«

Leaving

Parcel

2 with

less than one-half

acre would

render that parcel unbuildable due to the steep terrain which
much of Parcel 2 contains.

(See Transcript, p. 268, L. 6 - p.

269, L. 2; p. 185, L. 22 - p. 186, L. 6)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The parties to this action, Gregory, Grahns, and Bradshaws
all entered into contracts for purchase and sale of real property
based on a mutual mistake of a material fact which was a basic
assumption of the contract, which materially affected the agreed
performances of the parties and adversely affects Gregory and the
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Bradshaws.

If all the facts had been known to Gregory, he would

not have entered into the contract with the Grahns.

It is

unconscionable that the trial Court ordered specific performance
and

reformation

of

the

contract

which

causes

serious

and

irreparable injury to Gregory and the Bradshaws.
The only remedy available to the parties is rescission.

As

a result of the mutual mistake, both contracts for sale of Parcel
1

and

2 are voidable by Gregory.

Rescission

appropriate remedy under these facts.

is the only

There were two material

facts which were the basic assumptions of the contract.

The

first fact was the parties believed Parcel 1 contained 1.11 acres
and Parcel 2 contained .56 acres.

The second fact was that the

boundary between the two parcels was the Private Drive.

The

basis for the parties assumption was an erroneous survey on the
property.

No property existed which consisted of two parcels

which contained 1.11 acres and .56 acres and which were divided
by the Private Drive.

Because no such property existed, there

was no meeting of the minds of the parties and therefore no
enforceable contract.
The trial court granted a reformation of the sale of parcel
1 to Grahns and rescinded the sale of Parcel 2 to the Bradshaws.
In reforming the contract for sale of Parcel 1, the Court ordered
the additional land necessary to include the road be included in
the legal description of Parcel 1.

In addition to giving the

Grahns the additional acreage, the Court ordered Gregory to grant
the Grahns an easement for 15 feet beyond and adjacent to the
17

additional

acreage.

The

Court

required

the Grahns pay an

additional sum for the additional acreage.
The Court cannot remake for the parties a contract which
they themselves did not make.

By taking the additional acreage

from Parcel 2, Gregory was left with an odd shaped, unbuildable
parcel of ground and lost a contract for the sale of Parcel 2.
The Court has ordered the parties to accept a contract which
materially affected the agreed performances of the parties and
adversely affects Gregory*
Even if the Gregory had made a unilateral mistake the Courts
hold that unilateral mistake is grounds for rescission where the
mistake causes an unconscionable result.
Reformation of the deed was improper on another basis.

The

contract for the sale of Parcel 1 between the Grahns and Gregory
was merged into the deed containing a metes and bounds legal
description which referred to 1.11 acres.

It is improper for the

Court to reform the agreement between the parties.
Reformation is also improper where the parties agreed upon a
deed which refers to a metes and bounds description and the
parties orally referred to a driveway where the two measurements
are

inconsistent

because

the

metes

and

bounds

description

prevails where the two measurements are inconsistent.
The trial court therefore erred in reforming the contract.
The proper equitable remedy in this case is avoidance of the
contract, not reformation of this agreement into one which the
parties would have never made for themselves.
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For the above

reasons, this court should reverse the judgment of the court
below, and grant rescission of the contract.

ARGUMENT

POINT I.

THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE GRAHNS AND GREGORY IS
VOIDABLE BY GREGORY AND REFORMATION OF THE
CONTRACT IS IMPROPER WHERE THE PARTIES MADE A
MUTUAL MISTAKE OF A MATERIAL FACT WHICH WAS A
BASIC ASSUMPTION OF THE CONTRACT AND MATERIALLY
AFFECTS THE AGREED PERFORMANCES OF THE PARTIES AND
ADVERSELY AFFECTS GREGORY.

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF

CONTRACTS

§

152

describes

the

situation where a party may rescind an agreement based upon a
mutual mistake of fact:

"Where a mistake of both parties at the

time the contract was made as to a basic assumption on which the
contract was made and has a material affect on the agreed
exchange

of

performances,

the

contract

is voidable

by

the

adversely affected party unless he bears the risk the mistake..."
Utah courts have adopted the RESTATEMENT position.
G.R.

and

Associates,

746

P.2d

1174, 1179

See Mooney v.

(Ut. App.

1987).

Kiahtioes v. Mills, 649 P.2d 9, 13 (Utah 1982), Renner v. Kehl,
722 P.2d 262, 264-265 (Ariz. 1986).

See also Tanner v. District

Judges of the Third Judicial District Court, 649 P.2d 5 (Utah
1982).
A.

Distinction Between Reformation and Rescission Mistake
as to a Basic Assumption on Which the Contract is Made.

Reformation and rescission are related but distinct concepts
in contract law.

Reformation is appropriate where a written
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contract does not accurately reflect the intent or agreement of
the parties, and is re-formed to reflect the real agreement.
Rescission is appropriate where there was no complete, antecedent
agreement and no meeting of the minds due to the failure of a
basic assumption of the parties, critical to that agreement.

It

is "the unmaking of a contract or the undoing of it from the
beginning,

and

not merely a termination...

."

Black*s Law

Dictionary 1174 (5th ed. 1979).
A party may rescind a contract when at the time the contract
is made the parties make a mutual mistake about a material fact,
the existence if which is a basic assumption about the contract.
The

Court

allows

reformation

in

mistake as a result of a drafter error.
684 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1984).

instances

of

a mutual

See Hottinaer v. Jensen,

Reformation is clearly appropriate

when there is a variance between the written deed and the true
agreement of the parties caused by a draftsman.
The mutual mistake under the contract before this Court is
not merely a question of a variance between a written deed and
true agreement of the parties caused by a draftsman.

But rather

it goes to the very assumption under which the parties agreed.
Not only was the road to be included in parcel 1, but that Parcel
1 was to include only 1.11 acres. The Court held reformation was
appropriate and added additional acreage to Parcel 1.

This also

had a material affect upon the agreed exchange of performance and
upset the very basis for the contract.
The distinction between reformation and rescission is set
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forrh in Harley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co,, et al, 37 N.E.2d 760
(111.

1941)

which

has

been

followed

by

many

courts

as

establishing the standard for distinguishing between these two
equitable remedies.

In Harley the Court stated:

Mistakes are generally divided into two
groups, first those fundamental in character,
relating to an essential element of the
contract which prevent a meeting of the minds
of the parties and so no agreement is made.
These generally have to do with such matters
as the existence and identity of the subject
matter, areas as to price, quantity, and the
like.
In the other class of mistakes an
actual good faith understanding is reached,
but through some error, not expressed, the
agreement reduced to writing is not the
actual agreement.
The former of these
classes constitutes around for rescission,
but not reformation, while the latter may be
reformed.
Id., at 765.

(emphasis added).

Grahns argued and the court below partially agreed that
there was a mistake in the contract, and the deed as drawn up by
the Plaintiff's scrivener, in that it did not include the Private
Drive with parcel 1 as was intended by both parties.
was much more than merely in the writing itself.

The mistake

The mistake was

more than not being an accurate expression of the true agreement.
The mistake of the parties in the case went not to the mere
memorialization of their agreement, but went to the very nature
of the subject of their negotiation.

The original parcel was

divided into parcels 1 and 2 prior to negotiations to sell parcel
1 to the Grahns.

Grahns did not request that Gregory subdivide

the original parcel in a certain manner.

Indeed, Grahns relied

on the legal description from survey as previously made, rather

than have a new survey prepared.

In fact, Mrs. Grahn obtained

the lecjal description from Salt Lake County, which description
the county based on McNeil's survey.

Therefore, in making the

contract, the parties both relied on an erroneous survey and
description.

All parties made a mistake with regard to a basic

assumption of the contract that the driveway was included as part
of parcel 1.
The mistake of the parties was not in reducing the parties'
intent to writing but in the very nature of the property itself.
There was actually no mistake made in the writing itself.

The

contract accurately reflected the intent of the parties, which
was to transfer parcel 1.

Gregory did transfer parcel 1 as they

understood parcel 1 to be.

Their mistake was in their mutual

basic assumption that the property description and dimensions of
parcels 1 and 2 according to the survey also used the road as the
boundary when in fact the road was not the boundary.

This

assumption was a mistake, "fundamental in character, relating to
an essential element of the contract"; prevented the meeting of
the minds of the parties; and therefore no contract was ever
made. (See Harley, supra.)
66 AM. JUR. 2d Reformation of Instruments § 13 (1973) sets
forth the elements for reformation of a contract on the ground of
mistake and explains when rescission is appropriate:
There must be an antecedent agreement which
the written instrument evidences, and the
mistake must have been in the drafting of the
instrument, not in the making of the
contract. An instrument will not be reformed
on the ground of a mere misunderstanding of
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facts, or a mistake as to an extrinsic fact
which, if known, would probably have induced
the making of a different contract or no
contract at all.
If there has been any
misunderstanding between the parties, or a
misapprehension by one or both, so that their
minds have not met, no contract has been
entered into, and the court will not make for
them a contract which they did not make.
As shown above, the mistake in the instant case was not in
the drafting of the instrument, but was in the making of the
contract.

It was a mistake as to an extrinsic fact (the nature

of the subject property), which was the basis of the agreement.
In the case of Metzler v. Bolen, (DC ND) 137 F. Supp. 457,
(1956), the court stated:
A mistake which leads one or both parties to
enter into a contract which they would not
have entered into had they known the facts
will not justify reformation.
The contract was based upon a mutual mistake of material
fact, which if known by the parties, would have prevented any
agreement.

Parcel 2 is located on a steep hill.

If the contract

for sale of parcel 1 is enforced the driveway and easement to
parcel 1 not only reduces parcel 2 to less than 1/2 acre, but
makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to build on it, and
severely affects the marketability of parcel 2.

The parties

would not have intended to enter into an agreement to divide a
piece of land into two parcels and then to transfer one parcel,
leaving the other parcel so small as to be effectively unusable
and unmarketable.
A case from the Court of Appeals of Maryland is very close
on point with the instant case.
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In Chesapeake Homes, Inc. v.

McGraff, 240 A.2d 245 (Md. App. 1968), the vendor of a parcel of
property innocently misrepresented the rear boundary to include
more area than actually included.

The Court granted rescission

rather than reformation of the contract.
with the instant case.

The case was similar

Both parties were mistaken as to the

correct boundary of a lot that had been divided previously from a
larger parcel.

The Court in Chesapeake Homes could have viewed

the mistake as variance between the written deed and the true
agreement of the parties caused by a draftsman or a mistake of a
material

fact which was a basic assumption of the contract.

Grahns advanced this same argument in our case.

In Chesapeake,

the Court held that:
"Where the facts show the mutual mistake to
be actually a product of false, although
innocent, representations as to the subject
matter of the contract, the result is that
the parties have not in fact come to any
agreement, and reformation will not correct
the effort. This is easily absorbed within
the facts of the present case. It is not the
description of the land in the contract which
is a mistake, but the identity of the lot
itself. Therefore, reformation was not the
proper remedy."
The mistake in the instant case, as in Chesapeake Homes did
not occur in the drafting of the instrument, but involved the
identity of the property in question, the actual boundaries as
then divided, and the overall ability of the original parcel to
be divided into two smaller parcels as the parties intended.

As

in Chesapeake Homes, the parties in the instant case accurately
identified the parcel in question on their contractual agreement.
They were incorrect in their perception of the boundaries of that
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parcel.
The Utah Supreme Court further confirms this point int he
case of Ingram v. Forrer. 563 P.2d 181 (Utah 1977).
held

"an honest difference of understanding

The Court

as to what the

contract was is fatal to reformation for in such case there is no
such meeting of the minds of the parties and no pre-existing
agreement to which the written instrument can be conformed."
In the case of Eiland v. Powell, 136 W.Va. 25, 65 S.E.2d
737, the Court stated:
Under the cloak of reformation of a contract
or deed, a court of equity cannot convey
property which the parties themselves did
not, in fact, sell and purchase or intend to
sell and purchase.
In making their contract for the sale of real estate, the
defendants in the instant case intended to sell, and Grahns
intended

to

purchase,

a

parcel

of

land

under

assumption as to its boundaries and measurements.

a

mistaken

They would not

have intended to transfer part of the land, leaving the rest too
small to be buildable or marketable.
The Court in Lemocre Electric v« County of San Mateo, 4 6
Cal.2d 659, 297 P.2d 638 (1956), stated that:
A court cannot rewrite the contract which the
parties have made so as to express an
argument which they did not enter into.
When the court below ruled that the contract be reformed to
include the driveway in parcel 1, and for the Grahns to pay
additional monies to cover the extra land they were receiving,
the effect was to force the parties into an agreement which they
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had not made.

The Court, in effect, wrote a new contract for the

parties since Gregory had not intended to enter into a contract
which would render parcel 2 too small to be buildable and the
Grahns had not intended to pay extra monies.
As set forth above, 66 AM JUR 2d Reformation of Instruments
§ 13 (1973) states:
If there has been any misunderstanding
between the parties, or a misapprehension by
one or both, so that their minds have not
met, no contract has been entered into, and
the court will not make for them a contract
which they did not make.
The parties in the instant case were mistaken as to an
extrinsic fact, essential to the agreement.

If the facts had

been known, the parties would likely not have entered into a
contract, or at most would have entered into a totally different
contract.

Their minds therefore did not meet; no contract has

actually occurred, and the court below erred in making for them
one which they did not make.
RESTATEMENT § 155 Comment B states that if "the parties make
a written agreement that they would not otherwise have made
because of a mistake other than one as to expression, the Court
will not reform a writing to reflect the agreement that it thinks
they would have made.

The remedy in that case is avoidance.11

Illustration No. 5 to Section 155 demonstrates that courts should
not reform agreements transferring a tract of land when the
parties are mistaken as to the size of that tract of land, as is
the situation in the instant case.
follows:
26

That illustration is as

A contracts to sell and B to buy a tract of
land, described in the contract as containing
one hundred acres, at a price of One Hundred
Thousand Dollars. Both parties believe that
area is one hundred acres, but in fact, it is
only ninety acres. The Court will not, at
the request of B, reform the writing because
the mistake of the parties was not one as to
its contents or effect.
The parties in the instant case were not mistaken as to the
contents or effect of their contract.

They negotiated for, and

executed the transfer of parcel 1 as then constituted.

Their

mistake was in an extrinsic fact on which the agreement was based
- the

sise

and

attributes

of

the

subject

property.

As

RESTATEMENT reiterates above, the Court then should not have
reformed the writing at the request of trie purchasers since the
mistake was not one as to the contents and

effect of the

contract.
A mistake resting upon an extrinsic fact should not justify
reformation of a contract; only a mistake going to the writing
itself will justify reformation (King v. Factory Direct, Inc. ,
639 S.W.2d 627, 636 (Mo. App. 1982).
B.

Affect of the Mistake Upon the Agreed
Performances of the Parties.

Exchange of

Reforming the contract in the instant case would seriously
affect the parties' rights.

RESTATEMENT fSECOND) OF CONTRACTS §

152(1) states that a mutual mistake makes a contract voidable
when "a mistake of both parties at the time a contract was made
has a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances....11
If the attributes of the property in question were fully known by
the parties involved, the small size irregular shape and steep
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terrain of what is left of Parcel 2 may indeed have necessitated
the sale of the entire property as a whole, since the value,
usefulness and marketability of Parcel 2 was severely affected.
In that event, the Grahns could not have purchased the entire
1.67 acre parcel.

By so ruling the Court has severely affected

the value of Gregory's asset.
Grahns and the court below, interpreted the mistake to be a
mistake in the writing of the instrument.

By doing so they have

ignored the fact that it was Defendants1 original intention to
separate a one-half acre lot from the original parcel and sell to
Grahns the remaining 1.1 acre lot.

This would have left a

buildable, marketable half-acre lot, thus enabling the original
parcel to be sold as two separate smaller parcels, rather than
necessitating its sale as a whole.
By allowing the lower court's ruling to stand the value,
usefulness and marketability of Parcel 2 is severely restricted.
C.

Rescission is the proper remedy.

The

Utah

courts

have

recognized

in

Mooney

v.

G.R.

Associates. 746 P.2d 1174 (Ut. App. 1987), Kiahtipes v. Mills,
649

P.2d 9 (Utah 1987) and Tanner v. District Judges of Third

Judicial District. 649 P.2d 5 (Utah 1982) that an agreement as
the one before this Court is subject to equitable rescission.
The

Court

of

Appeals

of Utah

rescission

of

a contract based

recently

ruled

for equitable

on mutual mistake

in Robert

Lanqston, Ltd. v. McOuarrie, 741 P.2d 554, 557 (Utah App. 1987),
a case closely on point with the instant case.
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Lanqston involved

a contract for the sale of cattle and certain grazing permits.
The parties were mistaken as to the exact boundaries of the
grazing permits*

In addition, although they had agreed on a

price per head for the cattle, they were mistaken as to the total
cost and price for the cattle,

Id.. 741 P.2d at 556.

The court

in Lanaston could have reformed the contract to reflect the
proper grazing permit boundaries without affecting the rights of .
the parties to the contract or any third party, and also had a
clear standard for reforming the price per head for the cattle.
Instead, the court in Lanaston properly recognized

that the

contract between the parties was based on mutual mistake, a
misconception about a basic assumption or a vital fact upon which
they based their bargain, and ruled that rescission rather than
reformation was the proper remedy in that type of situation.
E.

Elements of Rescission

RESTATEMENT § 152, referred to above, sets forth a standard
determining
contract.

when

mutual

mistake

justifies

rescission

of

a

That section is set forth here in full:

When Mistake of Both Parties Makes A Contract
Avoidable.
1. Where a mistake of both parties at the time a
contract was made as to a basic assumption on which the
contract was made has a material affect on the agreed
exchange of performances, the contract is voidable by
the adversely affected party unless he bears the risk
of the mistake under the rules stated in Section 154.
2.
In determining whether the mistake has a
material affect on the agreed exchange of performances,
a count is taken of any relief by way of reformation,
restitution, or otherwise.
Section 152 is broken down into three basic elements by
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Comment A to that section:
1.

The mistake must relate to a "basic assumption on which

the contract was made."
2.

The party seeking avoidance must show that the mistake

has a material affect upon the agreed exchange of performances.
3.

The mistake must not be one as to which the party

seeking relief bears the risk.
i_, Basic Assumption.
The size of parcel 1, and consequently the size of parcel 2,
ware

basic

Gregory.

assumptions

of

the

contract

between

Grahns

and

Not only was the acreage of parcel 1 listed in the

contract for sale between Grahns and defendant, but, as stated
above, the viability of parcel 2 as an independently marketable
parcel was critical to the negotiation for the sale of parcel 1.
The price of parcel 1 was based on the premise that Gregory could
sail parcel

2 independently.

In addition, Grahns purchased

parcel 1 under the assumption that someone else would purchase
parcel 2 and construct a home thereon, impinging on his privacy
and aesthetic enjoyment of the overall parcel.

Due to the

terrain of parcel 2, the dispute regarding the size of the parcel
i£ critical to the marketability of parcel 2.

Much of parcel 2

has a severe slope, while that portion which abuts parcel 1 is
more level and is critical in any attempt to build on parcel 2.
Grsthns allege that they were not concerned with the size of
parcel 2, nor with the actual acreage of parcel 1, only that the
driveway in question was to be included
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with parcel 1.

Comment

B to RESTATEMENT § 152 notes that
The parties may have had such a 'basic assumption1 even
though they were not conscious of alternatives,..where, for
example, a party purchases an annuity on the life of another
person, it can be said that it was a basic assumption that
the other person was alive at the time, even though the
parties never consciously addressed themselves to the
possibility that he was dead.
Commenting on what constitutes a basic assumption under this
section of the RESTATEMENT, Professor Farnsworth notes that "a
party may have such an assumption even though he is not conscious
of alternatives.

A person walking into a room may, in this

sense, assume that the room has a floor without thinking about
it."

Farnsworth, Contracts 654 (Little, Brown, and Co. 1982).

All parties to the contract in the instant case assumed that
Grahns were purchasing one of two parcels which were properly
divided and independently viable, as separated from the original
parcel.

The size of both parcels was a basic assumption relied

on by both Grahns and Gregory in this case.
RESTATEMENT § 152, Illustration 2 is directly on point with
the instant case:
2. "A contracts to sell and B to buy a tract of land, on
the basis of a report of a surveyor whom A has employed to
determine the acreage. The price is, however, a lump sum
not calculated from the acreage. Because of an error in
computation by the surveyor, the tract contains ten percent
more acreage than he reports. The contract is voidable by
A."
(Citations

omitted.)

Unlike

many

situations

involving

the

transfer of residential property, the description of parcel 1 as
containing

1.1

acres

was

not

merely

descriptive,

but

was

controlling since it was critical how much land was left for
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parcel 2.
Grahns agreed in their Earnest Money Sales Agreement to rely
on the prior survey rather than to commission a new one.

Under

paragraph B of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement Grahns bought
the property "as is" thereby assuming the risk of mistake.

Since

Grahns assumed that risk, they should be estopped from reforming
the contract.
2. Material Effect of the Mistake on the Agreed Exchange
Performances and the Adversity Affected Party.

of

That the mutual mistake in this case has a material affect
on the agreed exchange of performances.

If Gregory had known

about the mistake he would not have sold the property.

Comment C

to RESTATEMENT § 152 notes that a party disadvantaged by the
mutual

mistake

cannot

be

fairly

required

to

carry

out the

contract "if the exchange is not only less desirable to him but
is also more advantageous to the other party."

In the instant

case, defendant is left with severely restricted value while the
Grahns have effectively prevented Gregory from selling or using
Parcel 2.
3.

Bearing the Risk of the Mistake
Gregory should not bear the risk of the mutual mistake.

RESTATEMENT § 154 outlines three instances in which a party bears
the risk of a mistake.

Those instances are:

A. the risk is allocated to him by agreement of
the parties, or
B. he is aware, at the time the contract is made,
that he has only limited knowledge with respect to the
facts to which the mistake relates but treats his
limited knowledge as sufficient, or
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C. the risk is allocated to him by the court on
the ground that it is reasonable in the circumstances
to do so.
The first of the grounds for allocating the risk to a party
is applicable to the defendant in this case.
Grahns, r.ol liregorVi bore the risk nt
a

survey

pursuant

Agreement•
survey.

to

As noted above,

h.\;i <JLIP * i i mistake from

the terms of the Earnest Money

Grahns bought the property

Sales

f,

as is" relying on the

It has been estab] I shed by the record that neither party

was aware he or she was acting under limited knowledge.

The only

manner by which the Gregory may bear the risk of loss due to the
mutual mistake in this case is if the Court finds it reasonable
to so allocate that risk to them.
these

facts

appropriately
divided,
property

to

allocate

contracted

and was

not

this
to

have

It is not reasonable under
risk
the

to

Gregory.

property

an expert on surveying

It: is reasonab

Gregory

surveyed
and

and

describing

Gregory to rely on the survey in

making assumptions about the property.
In light of the strong tradition in construing instruments
strictly against the drafter of the instruments, if allocated to
either party, the risk of this mutual mistake should be allocated
to the Grahns rather than Gregory.
In re Barrister's Land Company, Inc., 17 B , R , 8 b J (Bkrtcy.
N.D. Miss. 1985) was a case in which the Court dealt with the
allocation of risk of mistake regarding the size of a parcel of
land transferred according to the parties1 contract.

In that

case, as in the instant situation, neither party was aware that
33

it was acting under limited knowledge.

The Court held that:

It is clear, also# neither party accepted the risk of
the mistake, nor is it proper in these circumstances
for the court to allocate the burden of risk. Neither
party to the attempted transaction sought to rely on
limited knowledge, knowing that such knowledge was
limited. Each party thought that it was acting with
full knowledge of the facts.
Id., 57 B.R. at 866-67.

That same court cited with approval the

same sections of the RESTATEMENT cited in this brief.
A recent case before the court of appeals of Idaho, Thieme
v. Worst 745 P.2d. 1076 (Idaho App. 1987) dealt with a situation
wherein

both

vender

and

purchaser

were

mistaken

availability of water on the property in question.
the

contract

was

not

rescinded

because

the

as to the
In that case

party

seeking

reformation over rescission was willing to alleviate the effect
of the mistake.

Id. . 745 P.2d. at 1080.

Grahns have rejected defendants1

In the instant case,

offer to move the driveway,

which is the cause of Defendant's contention in this matter.
Grahns should not be allowed reformation over rescission when
they

are

unwilling

to

accept

a

reasonable

resolution

of a

difficult problem.
A similar situation occurred in Runner v. Kehl, 722 P.2d
262, 264-65 (Ariz. 1986).
there was

an

adequate

The parties in that case believed

supply

of water

which

was

assumption on which both parties made the contract."

"a basic
Citing

RESTATEMENT § 152 the court granted rescission of the contract
and held "the mutual mistake had such a material affect on the
agreed exchange of performances as to upset the very basis of the
34

contract."

Id.
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POINT II. MUTUAL MISTAKE IS A DEFENSE TO REFORMATION OF
THE CONTRACT.
In Manny Lumber Co. v. Vocret. 216 P.2d 674 (Or. 1950) the
Supreme Court of Oregon, in a case dealing with the transfer of a
logging operation, declined to reform the contract to reflect the
mistakes in estimating the amount of timber involved with the
transfer.

Even though it would have been relatively simple for

the court to deduce the cost per foot of timber had the parties
agreed to that, the court declined to fill in the missing term
for the parties, recognizing that:
in order for a written instrument to be reformed in
equity, it is necessary that the parties thereto shall
previously have reached a complete mutual understanding
with respect to all of the essential terms of their
agreement, for otherwise there would be no standard by
which the writing could be reformed.
Id.. 216 P.2d at 680.
RESTATEMENT § 155, Comment A recognizes that, in order to
reform ci contract there must have been some agreement between the
parties prior to the writing.

Further, that Comment notes that

fl

[t]he agreement must, of course, be certain enough to permit a

court

to

frame

themselves,
disputed
lacked

when

relief

in

assessed

terms
an

of

reformation."

additional

$12,604.04

Grahns
for

the

area, argued that the contract between the parties

the

certainty

to

make

the

assessment.

certainty, reformation is inappropriate.
dealt with a similar issue.

Without

the

The Vermont high Court

In Bourne v. Laioie, 540 A. 2d 359

(Vt. 1987) the parties contracted for the sale of a 248 acre
farm.

The deed omitted two ten-acre lots as the parties had
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agreed,

The court recognized Ihal" ' the deed cannot Le reformed

in accordance with this agreement, however, because it cannot be
determined

from the record whether providing Bourne with the

acreage would simultaneously deprive the Lajoies of the tillable
acreage

they

expected

to receive."

Id. , 540 A.2d at 363.

Moreover, the court in Bourne reiterated that "a party seeking
reformation has the burden of establishing beyond reasonable
doubt that there existed, previous to the deed, a valid agreement
represent :i .ng a standard to wh J ch the erroneous writing can be
reformed, so as to express the true transaction between the
parties."

Id. , 540 A.2d at 361, (citations omitted).

It would

have been relatively simple to determine a price per acre for the
farm in the Bourne case,

However, it is very difficult, if not

impossible, to determine and appropriate standard by which to
reform
property

the

price

c

igreemej.

sferring

residential

That situation is further complicated because it is

impossible to the drafters of the RESTATEMENT in Comment B to
Section 155, which states, that i f " the parties make a written
agreement that they would not otherwise have made because of a
mistake other

th*n one as to expression, the court will not

reform a writing t ~ effect the agreement that it thinks they
would have made.

POINT III.

THE CONTRACT BETWEEN GREGORY AND GRAHNS IS
VOIDABLE BY GREGORY WHERE GREGORY MADE A
UNILATERAL MISTAKE WHERE IT IS UNCONSCIONABLE
TO ENFORCE THE CONTRACT. WHERE THE MISTAKE
RELATES TO A MATERIAL FEATURE OF THE
CONTRACT,
THE
MISTAKE
OCCURRED
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NOTWITHSTANDING GREGORY'S EXERCISE OF
ORDINARY DILIGENCE AND WHERE THE COURT CAN
GRANT RESCISSION WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO GRAHNS
EXCEPT THE LOSS OF THE BARGAIN
Even assuming the Grahns in this case did not make a mistake
regarding the size and attributes of the parcels in question, a
unilateral mistake on the part of Gregory according to the facts
of this case still presents sufficient equitable grounds for
rescission of the contract.
A contract may be equitably rescinded
unilateral

mistake

when

certain

elements

on the ground of
are present.

The

general rule and elements necessary are set forth in 59 A.L.R.
809 in a note to the case of Hurst v. National Bond & Investment
Co,, 98 Fla. 148, 117 So. 792, 59 A.L.R. 807 (1928) as follows:
Essential conditions to such relief are: (1)
The mistake must be of so grave a consequence
that to enforce the contract as actually made
would be unconscionable. (2) The matter as
to which the mistake was made must relate to
a material feature of the contract.
(3)
Generally the mistake must have occurred
notwithstanding the exercise of ordinary
diligence by the party making the mistake.
(4) It must be possible to give relief by
way of rescission without serious prejudice
to the other party except the loss of his
bargain. In other words, it must be possible
to put him in status quo.
The Utah Supreme Court, as early as 1951, recognized this
general rule of equity.

In Ashworth v. Charlesworth, 119 Utah

650, 656, 231 P.2d 724, 727 (1951), this Court quoted verbatim
the A.L.R. excerpt set forth above, thus embracing this rule of
law for Utah.

This court again reiterated these elements in 197 0

in Davis v. Mulholland. 25 Utah 2d 56, 475 P.2d 835 (1970) and
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more recently

in Briaas v. Liddelj., 699 P. 2d 770, 773

(Utah

1985).

These elements, which must be present in order to rescind a
contract on the grounds of unilateral mistake, an e presen t in the
instant case.
1.

Unconscionability.

Grahns have argued that it is not

unconscionable to require Gregory to transfer

riveway as

part of parcel 1, leaving Gregory with less than a half acre for
parcel 2

It: nut , I ndeed be possible for Gregory to obtain a

zoning variance allowing them to construct a residence on parcel
2.

The very purpose of the division of the original parcel was

to split off parcel 2 as a viable

i u irestricted parcel on which

Gregory could construct a residence for a beneficiary of the
Trust.

It would be

practically impossible to construct a

residence on parcel ;. after conveying the driveway to Grahns and
granting a 15 foot easement past the driveway, in light of the
actual dimensions of parcel 2.

Granting reformation of the

contract

Aesthetic

Gregory

and

conveyance

of

the

: the value of Parcel 2.

easement

deprives

The Trial Court's ruling is

an i..., _r.- onable act depriving Gregory of the essential value of
its asset.
2.
regarding

Materiality.
tiin SI/.M rf

material

nature

of the mistake

parcels and the location of the

driveway has been set forth above,

Grahns allege they were

unaware and unconcerned with the siz$ and boundaries of parcel 2.
It seems unlikely that someone purchasing a parcel of real estate
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would be unconcerned with the size and boundaries of that parcel.
Nevertheless, even if Grahns were not concerned about the size
and boundaries, that does not stop that same issue from being a
material consideration of the contract for Gregory, constituting
a basis for rescission on the grounds of unilateral mistake.
Court
11

of

Appeals

in

California

framed

the

A

issue this way:

[W] here rescission on the ground of mistake

is considered,

...,the outward manifestations of the parties, which resulted in
the formation of the contract, are not controlling.
in the RESTATEMENT

As specified

(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 151, Comment A, a

party's erroneous belief

f

need not be an articulated one....1

Schultz v. County of Contra Costa. 203 Cal. Rptr. 760, 765
(Cal.App.

1

Dist.

1984).

Therefore,

even

if

Grahns

were

completely unaware or unconcerned with the overall size of the
original parcel or parcels

1 and 2 as divided therefrom, a

mistake on the part of the defendant as to that issue is still
justification for rescission of the contract on the basis of
unilateral mistake.

That mistaken belief need not have been

articulated to the Grahns.
3.

Ordinary

diligence.

Gregory

exercised

diligence regarding the subdivision of property.
a

professional

appropriate
agencies.
diligence.

to

survey

approvals

from

the

property,

various

and

ordinary

He commissioned
obtained

controlling

the

government

Gregory has not failed in the exercise of ordinary
The Trial Court found that the negligence of the

surveyor is not attributable to Gregory.
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4.

Status quo.

serious prejudice

The Cour t cai ino t: grant relief which causes

to the other party, except the loss of his

bargain. Id , 699 F.2d at 773.

Grahns have argued that the loss

of elements of the bargain itself prevent the par ties from being
placed in their status quo
equity

to

put

the

parties

The Court below has the authority in
back

in

the

status

rescinding the contract, then requiring Gregory
monies paid, plus interest, pursuant
into based upon the mistaken, su - •

quo

by

first

to return all

-Me* contracts entered
rtie Court can go further to

place the parties in the status quo by awarding damages on behalf
of the Grahns for efforts they have put into the property before
the mistake was presented to them

Thi s Court, therefore, should

reverse the decision of the court below and remand the case with
instructions to that court to do so.
then be responsible

mitigation

However, the Grahns would

;)t" their damages- after they

learned of the mistake, and for compensation to Gregory for use
of the property during the disputed period.
sold their home nor moved

The Grahns had not

into the property

after they filed this lawsuit,

- . six months

They should not be allowed to

argue if Is unreasonable now for this Court to return the parties
to the status quo.
All the elements of rescission based on a unilateral mistake
have been mot
case

should

mistake,

in this case.
be

both

more

the

Although Gregory argues that this

readily

elements

construed

of

suppor t tJ: le Def endants " right

mutual

to
and

be

one

of

unilateral

mutual
mistake

> rescission of the contract in
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question.

POINT IV. REFORMATION OF THE DEED WAS IMPROPER BECAUSE THE
CONTRACT BETWEEN GRAHNS AND GREGORY WAS MERGED
INTO THE DEED TO THE 1.11 ACRE PARCEL BY A METES
AND BOUNDS LEGAL DESCRIPTION.
The Utah Supreme court in the case of Dobrusky v. Isbell,
740 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1987) held that if a deed is described in
metes and bounds and makes no reference to a fence or road as a
boundary line, the deed is the final repository to the agreement
which led to its execution.

Even assuming the contract of the

sale of Parcel 1 from Gregory to the Grahns was enforceable, the
deed

became

the

agreement

enforceable agreement.

of

the

parties

and

is the only

The parties cannot reform that to include

additional acreage which Gregory did not intend to convey.

The

Court made a finding of fact that Gregory intended to convey 1.11
acres which was exactly what they did.

Reformation

is not

available to change the deed.

POINT V.

WHERE THE DEED REFERS TO A METES AND BOUNDS
DESCRIPTION AND THE PARTIES MADE ORAL REFERENCE TO
A DRIVEWAY AS THE BOUNDARY, THE METES AND BOUNDS
DESCRIPTION PREVAILS WHERE THE TWO MEASUREMENTS
ARE INCONSISTENT, AND REFORMATION IS IMPROPER

In the Utah case of Neelev v. Kelsch. 600 P. 2d 979 (Utah
1979) , parties to a sale of land disputed the ownership of land
contained between a metes and bounds description and a road.

The

agreement was for sale of "all land north of the county road" and
was described in a metes and bounds description.
included a reference to the road.
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The description

When the actual boundaries

were determined, the metes and bounds description did not include
all the property to the county road or north of the county road.
The Court resolved the controversy by holding that metes and
bounds

prevail

where

the

two

measurements

are

inconsistent.

Also, on page 982 of the decision, the Court held when the face
of the deed shows the intention was to convey a specific quantity
of

land

and

the

metes

and

bounds

reference to a monument would

give

that

quantity

but a

embrace more or less than

that

quantity, the metes and bounds description should be followed.
Gregory intended to convey a specific quantity of land and
the Court

found

that was Gregory's

intent.

Therefore

Grahns

could not prove by clear and convincing evidence Gregory intended
to convey more or less than 1.11 acres.

Therefore reformation is

improper.

CONCLUSION
Rescission, not reformation,
remedy

in

this

case.

Gregory

is the appropriate
has

established

the

equitable
elements

necessary to obtain rescission on the basis of mutual mistake.
Grahns

have

failed

to

provide

the

Court

with

the

elements

required for reformation.
Even

if

the

circumstances

of

mistake
this

was

case

solely
still

that

meet

of

the

Defendants,

the

requirements

for

granting rescission on the ground of unilateral mistake.
Equity dictates that courts will not write for the parties a
contract which was not their intended agreement.
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In granting

reformation, the court below has improperly forced the parties
into a contract which they did not intend to make.
The

contract

was

also

merged

into

a metes

and

bounds

description containing 1.11 acres and reformation is improper and
Grahns should be left with their bargain in the form of the deed.
Finally, where there is an inconsistency between the metes
and

bounds

and

a

monument

or

road,

the

metes

and

bounds

description prevails.
Defendant Gregory therefore respectfully requests the court
reverse the lower court's ruling of reformation of the contract
and grant rescission.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

day of July, 1989, I

caused four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellant Gregory to be served upon each of the following by
placing the same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid:

John S. Adams
Taylor, Ennenga, Adams & Lowe
Sports Mall Office Plaza
5525 South 900 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84117
Russell S. Walker
19 West South Temple, #700
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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nun ntarratfj COURT
Thwu JwUiCiui Ointrict

\)U 1% 1988
Robert M. Taylor, #3203
John S. Adams, #A0017
TAYLOR, ENNENGA, ADAMS & LOWE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
5525 South 900 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone:
(801) 263-1112

Ov,

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
ALLEN R. GRAHN and JOSEPHINE
M. GRAHN, husband and wife,

JUDGMENT AND ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.
HEROLD GREGORY, Trustee, for
and on behalf of the MARITAL
AND FAMILY TRUSTS OF THE
ALBERT ECCLES FAMILY TRUST,
and DEAN BRADSHAW and CHRISTI
BRADSHAW, his wife, and
SCOTT McNEIL, an individual

Civil No. C-86-8833

Judge:

John A. Rokich

Defendants.
-oooOoooThis matter came

on

for trial

before

Judge John A. Rokich on September 24, 1987.
present,

represented

Defendant
Marital

Herold

and

L.

by Robert M.
Gregory,

Taylor

Trustee,

the

Honorable

The Plaintiffs were
and John

and

S.

Adams.

on behalf

of "".he

Family Trusts of the Albert Eccles

Family Trust,

hereinafter referred to as "Trustee" was present, represented by

1

Jeffrey

K.

Bradshaw,
Walker.

Woodbury.
his wife,

Defendants
were present,

Dean

Bradshaw

represented

and

Christi

by Russell S.

Defendant Scott McNeil was present, represented by his

counsel Allen Sims.
The

Court

having rendered

being

fully

advised

in the

premises

its oral decision and two written

and

Memorandum

decisions and having made and entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing therefor:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Reformation of the deed delivered by the Defendant

Trustee to Plaintiffs is hereby ordered to include the Private
Road.

Plaintiffs are hereby ordered to pay to Trustee the sum of

Twelve Thousand Six Hundred Four and 04/100 ($12,604.04) Dollars
for the property in Parcel One, after reformation, in excess of
1.11

acres. !/Interest

thereon,

interest, shall commence on
2.

at

/O

/ A ^ /-/^^

% per annum,
/y/i~r> / t'*/*'

o&

simple
J27g/^* «^

It is hereby ordered that said reformed deed shall

acknowledge that the fifteen foot aesthetic and geologic easement
shall remain as agreed in the surviving provisions of the March
18,

1986 Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase Agreement,

which easement runs along the southeasterly side of the Private
Road.

2

3.

The sales transaction between Defendant Trustee

and Defendant Bradshaws is hereby rescinded and, except for the
reformation referred to hereinabove, the parties shall be placed
in the same position as before the Bradshaw transaction.
4.

It is hereby ordered that Bradshaws'claims against

Plaintiffs are dismissed

in their entirety

for no cause of

action.
5.

It

is hereby

ordered

that

Plaintiffs'claims

against Defendant McNeil are dismissed for no cause of action.
6.

It

is

hereby

ordered

that

Defendant

Trustees'claims against Defendant McNeil are reserved and may be
pursued

in separate

litigation

in a future action as was

stipulated between Defendant Trustee and Defendant McNeil.
7.

The Court does not award attorneys' fees to any of

the parties but does award costs to the Plaintiffs against all of
the defendants,

except McNeil,

in the sum of Six Hundred

Fifty-Five and 19/100 ($655.19) Dollars.

All other parties shall

bear their own costs and fees.
DATED this

&lr3-

day of g£?<?(r *"**>*^^y^

BY THE COURT:

v Honprable John A. Rokich
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I

hereby

certify

that

on

this

_lhi__

day

of

a true and correct copy of the foregoing
JUDGMENT AND ORDER was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Jeffrey K. Woodbury, Esq.
2 677 East Parleys Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Allen Sims, Esq.
#8 East Broadway, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Russell S. Walker, Esq.
50 South Main Street, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
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Wallace R. Woodbury, #3544
Jeffrey K. Woodbury, #4172
WOODBURY, BETTILYON & KESLER
2677 East Parleys Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Telephone: (801) 485-6963
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ALLEN R. GRAHN and JOSEPHINE
M. GRAHN, husband and wife,
FACTS STIPULATED
Plaintiffs,
vs.
HEROLD L. GREGORY, Trustee,
for and on behalf of the
MARITAL AND FAMILY TRUSTS OF
THE ALBERT ECCLES FAMILY
TRUST, and DEAN BRADSHAW, an
individual, and SCOTT McNEIL,
an individual,

Civil No. C-86-8833

Defendants.

STIPULATION OF FACTS
Plaintiffs, Allen R. Grahn and Josephine M. Grahn, by and
through their attorneys of record, R. M. Taylor & Associates, P.
C , and Defendant Dean Bradshaw by and through his attorney of
record, Russell S. Walker, and Defendant Herold L. Gregory,
Trustee, by and through his attorney of record, Woodbury, Bettilyon
& Kesler, hereby enter into this Stipulation of Facts to assist the
Court and the parties to this stipulation in resolving the issues
relating to the outstanding Temporary Restraining Order and

Plaintiffs1 pending Motion for a Preliminary Injunction against
Defendant Bradshaw

continued for hearing on December 15, 1986.

For purposes of said hearing, the parties represent that they
believe the following facts to be true and that the Court can
accept the following facts as true in determining the issues now
before the Court.

1.

On or about July 15, 1930, Caroline Eccles was deeded

a parcel of property containing approximately 2.7 acres of land of
which the subject property is a part.

On or about 1961, Caroline

Eccles (and her husband Albert) divided the property, without
applying for subdivision approval, and conveyed two parcels
containing approximately one-half acre each, retaining
approximately 1.67 acres.

The remaining approximately 1.67 acres

was subsequently conveyed on or about May 17, 1978 to certain
Marital and Family Trusts of which Herold L. Gregory is the
trustee.

At all times between 1978 and March, 1984, Defendant

Marital and Family Trusts of the Albert Eccles Family Trust, Herold
L. Gregory, Trustee of each, owned said approximately 1.67 acre
parcel, commonly known as 2811 Brookburn, being the address of the
Eccles residence thereon.

The subject property had at that time

certain improvements including but not limited to a residential
structure, a private drive also existed for the purpose of ingress
and egress from Brookburn Road to the family residence on the
subject property.
"Private Drive,f.

Said drive is hereinafter referred to as the
Such Private Drive constituted and presently

constitutes the only existing access to the residential structure.
The real property has an irregular contour and is partially covered
with scrub oak.

The Private Drive follows generally the location

of a former wagon trail used prior to 1931 to cross over the bottom
lands and Mill Creek Stream in order to exit onto Mill Creek Road.
The portion of the wagon trail lying north of the Mill Creek Stream
was abandoned as an access in order to sell the two parcels sold in
1961 as aforementioned.

The existing residence was first

constructed in 1931.

2.

Approximately two years ago the Defendant Trusts

undertook efforts to divide the subject property to create two
separate contiguous parcels.

In this connection, Defendant McNeil

was hired to perform certain surveying and/or engineering efforts
in order to assist in dividing the property.
instructed by the

Defendant McNeil was

Defendant Trusts through authorized

representatives that he should create on the southeastern side of
the property a parcel comprised of at least one-half acre, and that
Defendant McNeil should create a legal description for said parcel
of property, hereinafter referred to as the "Adjacent Lot".
Defendant McNeil was instructed to survey the parcel and determine
whether there would be a usable lot of one-half acre or more if the
southeast side of the existing driveway were used as a boundary.

3.

During the month of June, 1984, or thereabouts,

Defendant McNeil performed his surveying services and created a
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survey and legal description for the Adjacent Lot dated July 10,
1984.

Such survey included a certified description purporting to

include 0.56 acres.

Defendant McNeil intended and believed that

the legal description he created for the Adjacent Lot described a
parcel of real property approximately 0.56 acres in size and that
the property so described was situated south and east of the
Private Drive, and did not include in said description any part of
the Private Drive.

4.

During the middle of 1984, Defendant Trusts listed for

sale the residence and adjacent lot.

5.

On July 20, 1984, Defendant Trusts conveyed the

Adjacent Lot to Barbara Danielson for the purpose of erecting a
house.

After preparing house plans, Danielson aborted building

project and reconveyed Adjacent Lot to Defendant Trusts on October
4, 1985.

6.

Beginning on or about January, 1986, Plaintiffs began

negotiations with the Defendant Trusts to purchase the existing
residence on 1.11 acres of land.

During these negotiations,

Plaintiffs inquired of representative of the Defendant Trusts,
Herold L. Gregory and also of his wife Mary Ethel Gregory,
regarding the relation of the Private Drive to the property line
between the lots-

In response thereto, Plaintiffs were advised,

inter alia, that the east side of the Private Drive was the
dividing line between the lots (as indicated by former survey
stakes, most of which had been removed).

The said representative

of Defendant Trusts further represented that he or his wife had
directed the surveyor, Defendant McNeil, to create a legal
description for the Adjacent Lot (referring to it as the half-acre
lot), and that Defendant McNeil had prepared a survey designating a
boundary line as the southeasterly edge of the Private Drive.

7.

The Plaintiffs relied on those representations, among

other things, in purchasing the Brookburn Estate.

8.

On or about March 18, 1986, Plaintiffs and Defendant

Trusts entered into an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase
Agreement for the purchase of the residence parcel as described
therein, hereinafter referred to as "Estate", and further providing
for (i) an option to purchase, first right of refusal, applicable
to the Adjacent Lot, and (ii) a written restrictive aesthetic and
geologic easement across the fifteen feet nearest the said Private
Drive, on the Adjacent Lot, "as an aesthetic break between the
properties as well as a geologic protection against erosion onto
the (Estate) property".

A copy of the Earnest Money Agreement in

its entirety is attached hereto, marked Exhibit A, and incorporated
herein by this reference.

9.

As part of the aforementioned negotiations, Defendant
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Trusts rejected a request of Plaintiffs for an affirmative covenant
that the property had been divided in compliance with law, and
Defendant Trusts through their trustee explained that the
properties were described on separate tax notices, and seemed to be
already divided by description,

10.

On or about August lf 1986f Plaintiffs and Defendant

Trusts closed on the purchase transaction for the residence as per
legal description attached to the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer
to Purchase Agreement dated March 18, 1986.

Plaintiffs and

Defendant Trusts were at that time under the impression that the
Private Drive, (excepting that portion which constitutes an
easement over a corner of a neighboring lot which is not the
subject of this lawsuit) was included within the parcel conveyed.

11.

Pursuant to a "First Option to Purchase" contained in

said March 18, 1986 purchase agreement, Defendant Trusts on
September 1, 1986, gave written notice to Plaintiffs of their
intent to sell the Adjacent Lot to Defendant Bradshaw, and extended
to Plaintiffs the first right of refusal to purchase same.

A copy

of the letter providing notice to the Plaintiffs is attached hereto
and marked Exhibit B and incorporated herein by this reference.
Plaintiffs did not exercise their right of first refusal to
purchase the Adjacent Lot in accordance with the terms of the March
18, 1986 Agreement and such option expired on September 8, 1986.
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12.

Defendant Bradshaw relied upon the 1984 McNeil survey

in tendering his September lf 1986 offer which was accepted by
Defendant Trustsf which survey indicated that the Adjacent Lot
contained 0.56 acres of land with certain calls and dimensions
shown on such survey to extend generally to the southeasterly line
of the Private Drive.

13.

On or about September 3, 1986, Plaintiff Josephine M.

Grahn telephoned the wife of Defendant Dean Bradshaw and informed
her that Bradshaw might not be able to build on the Adjacent Lot
inasmuch as seller had not complied with Salt Lake County
subdivision ordinances.

As a result of such phone call, Defendant

Bradshaw related to the Defendant Trusts the conversation whereupon
Defendant Trusts on September 5, 1986 filed a request with Salt
Lake County Planning Commission for permission to divide the 1.67
acre parcel into a 1.11 acre and a 0.56 acre parcel as per the
calls and dimensions set forth on the 1984 McNeil survey and the
1985 property tax notices, consistent with the description
previously conveyed to Grahn.

14.

On October 11, 1986, Bradshaw discovered by

measurement on site that the Private Drive was not located where
indicated on the 1984 McNeil survey and as a consequence there was
inadequate land between such driveway and the southeasterly

7

boundaries to locate the residential structure which he had
designed for the Adjacent Lot.

Bradshaw forthwith advised

Defendant Trusts who contacted Defendant McNeil concerning the
discovery.

McNeil reviewed his survey and subsequently confirmed

that he believed he had made an error in locating the driveway on
the survey in that the property dimensions which he had originally
created actually extended across the Private Drive to the boundary
of the parcel later conveyed to Grahn; and accordingly, that the
major portion of the Private Drive is actually within the
description of the Adjacent Lot and not the Estate Parcel.

15.

On October 23, 1986, Defendant McNeil prepared a

revised drawing showing what he believed to be the relationship of
the existing drive to the Estate Parcel conveyed to Plaintiff and
to the Adjacent Lot subsequently conveyed to Defendant Bradshaw.

16.

Inasmuch as application had been made to Salt Lake

County based upon the 1.11 acre parcel and the 0.56 acre parcel
Defendant Trusts awaited subdivision approval by the County which
decision was postponed from time to time until granted on November
19, 1986.

17.

Thereafter, on November 20, 1986, on demand of

Defendant Bradshaw, Defendant Trusts conveyed the Adjacent Lot to
Defendant Bradshaw as per the requirements of the September 1, 1986
contract (Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase Agreement)
attached hereto as Exhibit C.

18.

On November 21, 1986, Defendant Trusts, through their

authorized representative Herold L. Gregory, informed Plaintiffs in
writing of the survey mistake discovered, offering to Plaintiffs a
choice of rescission due to mutual mistake, or volunteering to
build a replacement driveway on the Estate Parcel as conveyed, as
per letter, of a copy of which is attached as Exhibit D.

No one

informed "Plaintiffs of the problem until November 21, 1986,

19.

At no time prior to October 11, 1986 were any of the

parties, Plaintiff or Defendant, aware of the mutual mistake or
discrepancy in the physical location of the property line in
relation to the Private Drive.

20.

The subject property is zoned R-l-21 in accordance

with the zoning ordinance of Salt Lake County, Utah and in
accordance with Section 22-14-4 of such ordinance a minimum lot
area of not less than one-half acre is required.

21.

On or about November 23., 1986, Defendant Bradshaw

represented to the Plaintiffs that he intended to make changes to
the Adjacent Lot, and to break ground thereon on Monday, November
24, 1986, which changes would affect the Private Drive, and
further, that if Plaintiffs wished to stop him, they should
immediately obtain an injunction.
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22.

Plaintiffs have not yet moved into the Estate

property and d° n o t currently reside therein.

23.

The documents attached hereto as Exhibits E and F

represent respectively the July 10, 1984 survey by Defendant McNeil
and the October 23, 1984 drawing by Defendant McNeil as referred to
herein.

DATED this

day of December, 1986.
WOODBURY, BETTILYON & KESLER

ByWallace R. Woodbury
R. M. TAYLOR & ASSOCIATES, P. C.

Thomas E. Lowe
Attorney for Plaintiffs

Russell Walker

PULC-OSIM;/

Wallace R. Woodbury
Utah Bar #3544
Jeffrey K. Woodbury
Utah Bar #4172
WOODBURY, BETTILYON & KESLER
Attorneys for Defendant,
Herold L. Gregory
2677 East Parleys Way
Salt Lake City, UT 84109
Telephone: (801) 485-6963
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ALLEN R. GRAHN and JOSEPHINE
M. GRAHN, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs,
HEROLD L. GREGORY, Trustee,
for and on behalf of the
MARITAL AND FAMILY TRUSTS OF
THE ALBERT ECCLES FAMILY
TRUST, and DEAN BRADSHAW, an
individual, and SCOTT McNEIL,
an individual,

FIRST AMENDED ANSWER AND
CROSS-CLAIM TO AMENDED
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM
OF HEROLD L. GREGORY,
TRUSTEE, FOR AND ON BEHALF
OF THE MARITAL AND FAMILY
TRUSTS OF THE ALBERT ECCLES
FAMILY TRUST
Civil No. C-86-8833

Defendants.
HEROLD L. GREGORY, Trustee
for and on behalf of the
Marital and Family Trusts of
the Albert Eccles Family
Trust,

CROSS-CLAIM
Civil No. C-86-8833

Cross-Complainant,
vs.
SCOTT McNEIL, an individual,
and MCNEIL ENGINEERING, INC.
Cross Defendants.
COMES NOW Defendant Herold L. Gregory, Trustee, for and on

I -*

behalf of the Marital and Family Trusts of the Albert Eccles
Family Trust, (hereinafter in this Answer shall be referred to as
"Defendant")

by

and

through his attorneys, the

law

firm of

Woodbtiry, Bettilyon & Kesler, and answer Plaintiffs' Complaint
and Counterclaims as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
1.

Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state a cause of action

upon which relief can be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
2.

This

Defendant,

on

information

and

belief,

admits

allegations 1, 3, 4 and 5,
3.

This Defendant admits the Trusts were formed May 17,

1978, but denies the other allegations set forth in paragraph 2.
4.

This Defendant denies allegations of paragraphs 6 and

5.

This Defendant denies all allegations of paragraph 8,

7.

except that Defendant admits discussions with Plaintiffs during
January, February and March, 1986, concerning possible purchase
of all or part of Defendant's property.
6.

This

Defendant,

answering

paragraph

9,

denies

allegations except Defendant admits that such a private drive
exists and serves Defendant's property, and Defendant does not
object to reference as a "Private Drive."
7.
except

This
that

Defendant

denies

Defendant

admits

Defendant's belief

allegations
he

that the Private
2

of

mentioned
Driveway

paragraph
to

10,

Plaintiffs

was within

the

portion

of

Defendant's

property

which

included

existing

residence; and Defendant admits contracting with Defendant McNeil
in 1984 to survey and create a legal description for a usable
residential building site on the southeast portion of Defendants
property.
8.

This Defendant lacks informatior

allegations

of

paragraph

11,

and

from a belief as to

therefore

denies

the

allegations.
9.

This

Defendant

admits allegations

of paragraph 12,

except that he denies that the purpose of the alleged easement
was to protect the Private Drive.
10.

This

Defendant

denies

allegations

of paragraph 13,

except that Defendant admits closing and conveying to Plaintiffs
on August 1, 1986, the property specifically described in the
March 19, 1986 contract

(offer dated March

1, 1986) between

Defendant and Plaintiffs, a copy of which is attached hereto as
Exhibit "A".
11.

This

Defendant

admits allegations

of

paragraph 14,

except that Defendant denies any knowledge as to Plaintiff's
reliance and therefore denies such allegation.
12.

This Defendant denies allegations of paragraph 15•

13.

This

Defendant

denies

allegations

of

paragraph 16,

except that Defendant admits asking McNeil on October 17 to
create a "second drawing" showing generally the actual location
of the Private Driveway in relation to parcel sold to Plaintiffs,
which "Second Drawing" was created and dated October 23, 1986.
3

Such drawing was not a second survey.
14.

This Defendant denies allegations of paragraph 17.

15.

This

Defendant

denies

allegations

of

paragraph

18,

except Defendant admits conveying to Bradshaw on November 20,
1986, pursuant to a sale made to Bradshaw on September 1, 1986.
16.
except

This Defendant admits the allegations of paragraph 19,

that

Defendant

denies that Mary

Ethyl

Gregory

is an

authorized representative of the Defendant.
17.

This Defendant lacks sufficient information to form a

belief and therefore denies allegations of paragraph 20.
18.

This Defendant answers paragraphs 21, 28, 31 and 40, by

denying and admitting as elsewhere in this answer set forth.
19.

This Defendant denies the allegations of paragraphs 22

to 27 inclusive.
20.

This

paragraphs

29

Defendant
and

30

denies
and

the

further

allegations
affirmatively

contained

in

denies

any

fraudulent representations or intentional wrongdoing alleged in
paragraphs 32 and 33.
21.

This

Defendant

denies

allegations

of

paragraphs

35

through 39 and 42.
22.

This Defendant denies allegations of paragraph 44.

23.

This Defendant lacks sufficient information to form a

belief as to allegations of paragraph 40 and 41 and, therefore
denies same.
THIRD DEFENSE
24.

As a separate defense, this Defendant
4

affirmatively

alleges

that

there

misrepresentation

has

been

no

intentional

or

negligent

nor fraud of any kind on the part of this

Defendant.
25.

This Defendant alleges that he offered his 1.67 acre

property for sale commencing in 1984, including all or a part of
such property.
26.

Defendant contracted on March 19, 1986, to sell 1.11

acres of land to Plaintiffs on August 1, 1986, as per description
specifically included as part of said Contract, and did in fact
convey said land to Plaintiffs and otherwise closed the sale.
27.

Defendant believed that the existing Private Drive was

located on the southeast boundary of the 1.11 acre parcel of
property

and

so

indicated

to

Plaintiffs.

However,

said

representation was made upon Defendant's information and belief
based on the July 10, 1984 survey done by a Mr. Scott McNeil.
28.

Any and all representations made by Defendant were made

in good faith and were made with reasonable investigation and
diligence based upon Defendant's true belief at that time.
29.

Plaintiffs considered purchasing Defendant's property

for more than sixty

(60) days and could have discovered by a

survey the true boundaries for the 1.11 acre parcel.
FOURTH DEFENSE
30•

As a further affirmative and separate defense Defendant

should not be held liable for any misrepresentation that resulted
from a mutual mistake between the parties.
31.

Plaintiff,

assisted

by
5

legal

counsel

and

others,

investigated title of the property, perused the legal description
as incorporated into the purchase contract and labored under the
erroneous

impression

that

the

private

driveway

was

on

the

southeast boundary of the described property.
32.

This constituted a mutual mistake between the parties.
FIFTH DEFENSE

33.

As

a

separate

affirmative

defense,

this

Defendant

alleges Plaintiffs have purposefully and maliciously acted in bad
faith with superior knowledge as to the legal rights of Defendant
to divide his property and concealed from Defendant the potential
problems involved in dividing the subject property, with intent
that

Defendant

not

discover

the

potential

problems

such as

subdivision requirements.
34.

Plaintiffs are experienced in the business of property

acquisition and may have been aware of the boundary problems and
were aware of the zoning limitation requiring lots to contain not
less than one-half acre.
35.

Plaintiffs hired attorneys and consultants who reviewed

the legal descriptions, the title and the property.
36.

At no time did Plaintiffs disclose to Defendants that

they were aware of any subdivision or boundary problems, after
their investigations of the property.
37.

Defendant specifically referred to the adjacent lot as

the half acre parcel in showing and offering to Plaintiffs the
entire parcel or the 1.11 acre parcel.
38.

Plaintiffs

even

negotiated,
6

as

a

"first

right

of

refusal", to purchase the half acre lot, and knew Defendant would
not

divide

the property

in

such

a manner

as would

prevent

construction on the adjacent lot.
39.

Defendant agreed to an easement that would not have

been given had Defendant been aware of Plaintiffs' knowledge of
the property.
40.

Plaintiffs

were

purposefully

trying

to

cause their

contract to be enforced beyond its intent so as to deprive the
Defendant and others of the right to use adjacent lot.
SIXTH DEFENSE
41 • As

a

separate

affirmative

defense

this

Defendant

alleges that Plaintiffs have acted with unclean hands, therefore,
the court should equitably deny all relief to Plaintiffs pursuant
to their claims.
42.

Plaintiff attempted to discourage potential Buyers from

buying Defendant's remaining property (adjacent lot). Plaintiff,
Mrs.

Grahn,

Bradshaw

purposefully

from

purchasing

tried

to

discourage

the Adjacent

Lot by

Defendant

Dean

informing Mrs.

Bradshaw that Bradshaw would not be able to build on the property
because the property had not been properly subdivided.
43.

This

cause

of

action

is

just

a

continuation

of

Plaintiffs' efforts to deprive Defendant the full use of his
property by not purchasing it.
SEVENTH DEFENSE
44.

As a further and separate affirmative defense, this

Defendant contends the contract entered into in this Agreement is
7

voidable in that the conveyance was made in violation of the
subdivision statutes currently existing under the laws of the
State of Utah, and the Salt Lake County Subdivision Ordinance,
Section 19.
45.

Plaintiffs were

aware prior to the March

19, 1986

Contrcict that division of a parcel into aggregate of three or
more

lots

required

Plaintiffs

prior approval

intentionally

of Salt

or negligently

Lake County,

failed

to

so

and

advise

Defendant.
46.

Division by selling to Plaintiffs constituted dividing

of the Defendant's property into four lots.
47.

Salt Lake County has not approved a subdivision of the

property to permit the Private Drive to constitute the dividing
line between Estate parcel and adjacent lot.
48.

Such a dividing line as referred to in 47 above would

not be permitted to divide Defendant's land into two usable lots,
as such division would violate Section 22-14-4 of Salt Lake
County Zoning Ordinance.
EIGHTH DEFENSE
49.

As an additional affirmative defense, this Defendant

alleges that if the alleged "aesthetic easement" is maintained
southeast

of

Private

Drive

as

actually

existing,

it

will

constitute a restriction upon the alienation of property in that
it

renders

the

remaining

property

unusable, and therefore unmarketable.

8

of

Defendants

completely

NINTH DEFENSE
50•
every

As a further defense, this Defendant denies each and

allegation

of

Plaintiff's

Complaint

not

heretofore

specifically admitted or denied.
TENTH DEFENSE
51.

As a further separate and affirmative defense, this

Defendant states that he has or may have further and additional
affirmative defenses or claims which are known or not yet known
to this Defendant, including, but not limited to, accord and
satisfaction,
contributory

arbitration
negligence,

failure of consideration,
servant,

and

award,

discharge

in

assumption

of

bankruptcy,

risk,

estoppel,

fraud, illegality, injury by fellow

license, payment,

release, res judicata, statute of

frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, failure of Plaintiffs to
mitigate

damages,

unjust

enrichment,

and

other

constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.
asserts

each

and

every

affirmative

defense

matters

This Defendant
as

it

may

be

ascertained through future discovery herein.
WHEREFORE, having fully answered Plaintiffs' Complaint, the
Defendant

prays

that

Plaintiffs'

Complaint

against

him

be

dismissed, and that Defendant receive his costs of court incurred
herein, and such other and further relief as the court deems just
and proper.
COMES NOW Defendant Herold L. Gregory, Trustee, for and on
behalf of the Marital and Family Trusts of the Albert Eccles
Family Trust, by and through his attorneys, the law firm of
9

Woodbury, Bettilyon & Kesler, and allege and complain against the
Plaintiffs the Counterclaims as follows:
FIRST COUNTERCLAIM
52.

Defendant is, and at all times mentioned herein, a

trust organized and existing in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
53.

Plaintiff

is, and has been at all times mentioned

herein, a resident of Salt Lake county, State of Utah, and as of
a date prior to January 1, 1986 was the owner of a certain parcel
of

land

located

in

Salt

Lake

County,

State

of Utah, more

particularly described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto and by this
reference incorporated hereon.
54.

On

the

19th

day

of

March,

1986,

Plaintiffs

and

Defendant entered into an agreement whereby Plaintiffs agreed to
purchase from Defendant and Defendant agreed to sell Plaintiffs
the real property specifically described in said agreement by
metes and bounds, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit
"A".
55.

The

legal

description

for

said

property

was

substantially the same as described on the salt Lake County Tax
Notice,.
56.
Gregory

On or about the 10th day of July, 1984, Defendant
obtained

certified

survey

from
of

Scott

certain

McNeil, a
property

licensed

not

sold

engineer, a
to

Plaintiff

described on Exhibit "B" attached hereto and by this reference
incorporated herein.
57.

The above said survey mistakenly depicted an access
10

road herein called Private Drive as being located on the 1.11
acre property running along the alleged property line.
58.

The location of this Private Drive was made in error

inadvertently by Mr. McNeil when preparing such survey.

This

mistake was not known to any party at the time it was made and
was not discovered until after binding contracts of March 19,
1986 and September 1, 1986 were respectively signed and executed
by Defendant Gregory and by Plaintiffs and Defendant Bradshaw.
59.
sold

to

Exhibit

On the 1st day of September, 1986, Defendant Gregory
Defendant
f, ff

B

for

Bradshaw the parcel of
valuable

consideration,

land described
subject

only

in
to

Plaintiffs first right of refusal to purchase which was not
exercised.
60«, On or about the nth day of October, 1986, Defendant
Bradshaw began laying out on adjacent lot the location of the
home he planned to build and discovered that the location of the
road seemed to be incorrectly shown.
61.

Defendant

Gregory,

upon

hearing

of

this

mistake,

contacted Mr. Scott McNeil to determine whether an error had
occurred.
62.

Defendant McNeil subsequently rechecked his survey on

site and discovered that the location of the road had been placed
inadvertently in the wrong place.

McNeil prepared a new drawing

dated October 23, showing the actual location of the road.
63.

Plaintiffs hired attorneys and consultants who reviewed

the legal descriptions and investigated the property.
11

Plaintiffs

had

sufficient

knowledge

to

alert

them

to

the problems

in

dividing the property.
64.

Adjacent

Parcel

was

conveyed

to

Defendant

Bradshaw

pursuant to a binding sales contract on the 20th day of November,
1986, on real property described in such contract of September 1,
1986.
65.

Since the date Defendants discovered the mistake, they

have attempted to settle the mistake in an amicable manner.
66.

It was the intention and understanding of Plaintiffs

and Defendant that Plaintiffs were to purchase 1.1 acres of real
property containing the home and a private drive.

However, the

parcel description, although containing 1.11 acres of land, does
not contain said road as set forth therein.
67.

Defendant Gregory hereby comes before the Court to have

the contract rescinded and has offered to return to Plaintiffs
all sums paid pursuant to the contract, in return for appropriate
cancellations and reconveyance as a result of this inadvertent
and mutual mistake.
SECOND COUNTERCLAIM
68.

Defendant hereby realleges all of the allegations set

forth in paragraphs 1 through 67 as if more fully set forth
herein by this reference.
69.

Defendant Gregory.intended to sell Plaintiffs 1.1 acres

of real property containing a home and described on Exhibit "A".
70.

Defendant Gregory has substantially complied with the

terms of the Sales Contract, and hereby requests the Court to
12

equitably

determine

that the contract has been substantially

complied with in its terms and conditions in that it provides to
Plaintiff all of the real property described therein and the home
as described therein.
71.

Plaintiffs are not entitled to have any additional real

property other than that property described on Exhibit "A".
72.

This Defendant alleges that the Private Drive described

herein is not essential or unique to the value of the property
described.
73.

To

reform

the

March

19,

1986

Contract

would

do

irreparable damage to Defendant Trusts and to Defendant Bradshaw
because it would deprive each of the use of the Adjacent Lot, and
unjustly

enrich

Plaintiff s,

and

would

violate

applicable

subdivision laws.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF ON DEFENDANT GREGORY'S
COUNTERCLAIMS AGAINST PLAINTIFFS
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Defendant Gregory prays for judgment
cumulatively

or

alternatively

against

Plaintiffs

jointly

and

severally as indicated in either of the previous causes of action
as follows:
1.

That

the

Contracts

entered

into

by

and

between

Plaintiffs and Defendant Gregory be rescinded so as to require
all of the parties to reconvey their property and return said
monies so as to place each of the parties in the status quo as if
they had never sold the property; or
2.

In the alternative that the March 18, 1986 contract be
13

specifically enforced in accordance with its terms in that the
conditions

of

the

contract

were

substantially

fulfilled

by

conveying the real property as adequately described therein, and
permit Plaintiff to accept Defendant Gregory's offer to relocate
driveway on Plaintiff;s parcel to serve the existing residential
structure and to provide such other relief as the court deems
equitably necessary.
CROSS-CLAIM
COMES NOW Defendant Herold L. Gregory, Trustee, for and on
behalf of the Marital and Family Trusts of the Albert Eccles
Family Trust ("Defendant Trusts"), by and through his attorneys,
the law firm of Woodbury, Bettilyon & Kesler, and allege and
Cross-claim against Defendant Scott McNeil ("Defendant McNeil"),
and Defendant McNeil Engineering, Inc. (Defendant Corporation)
(collectively referred to as Defendant Engineers) as follows:
1.

Defendant Trusts between the years 1978 and March 1984

owned the approximately 1.67 acre parcel, commonly known as 2811
Brookburn Road, the property at issue in this action.
2.

Approximately two to three years ago, Defendant Trusts

undertook efforts to divide the subject property to create two
separate contiguous parcels.
3.

In connection with the above efforts, Defendant Trusts

hired Defendant McNeil, a certified and fully licensed engineer,
to perform certain surveying and/or engineering efforts in order
to assist in dividing the property.
4.

The survey and/or engineering efforts were performed by
14

Defendant Scott McNeil, and employees of Defendant McNeil.
5.

Later

through

Defendant

McNeil's

attorney

it

was

claimed that Defendant Corporation, a Utah corporation, performed
the engineering services work on this project.
6.

To

working

the

solely

best, of
with

Plaintiffs' recollection

Defendant

McNeil

and

not

they

were

Defendant

Corporation.
7.

Defendant McNeil was instructed by Defendant Trusts

through

authorized

representatives

that

he

should

create

a

usable lot of at least a one-half acre, on the southeastern side
of the property a parcel of property, hereinafter referred to as
the "Adjacent Lot".

Said Lot was to be southeast of the existing

driveway, if possible.
8

During

the

month

of

June

1984,

or

thereabouts,

Defendant McNeil performed his surveying and engineering services
and created a survey and legal description for the adjacent Lot
dated

July

10,

1984.

Such

survey

included

a

certified

description purporting to include 0.56 acres of the property and
using the southeast side of the existing driveway as a boundary.
9

On October 11, 1986, it was discovered that the survey

performed by Defendant McNeil was in error and that the division
did not result in a usable lot of one-half acre or more as
requested, nor was the southeast side of the drive included as a
boundary line of the property.
10.
Defendant

Defendant

McNeil

Trusts, breached

has

breached

the

agreement

his duty of care and
15

with

negligently

failed to perform services as requested and as he represented he
would do, and failed to perform a proper survey in a workmanlike
manner.
11.
any

To the extent that Defendant Corporation has provided

work

or

services,

Defendant

Corporation

breached

its

agreement, and its duty of care and has failed to perform said
work as per agreement and in a workmanlike manner required in the
industry.
12.

In the Complaint on file herein, it is alleged that

Plaintiffs

Allen

R.

Grahn and Josephine M. Grahn have been

damaged as a result of the improper survey and their subsequent
purchase

of

the

property

from

Defendant

Trusts,

and

that

against

Defendant

Defendant Trusts is liable for said injury.
13.

If

Plaintiffs

recover

a

verdict

Trusts for the allegations in their Complaint, such liability
will have been brought about solely by reason of the acts of
Defendant McNeil, and not by any actions of Defendant Trusts.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF ON DEFENDANT GREGORY'S
CROSS-CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT SCOTT MCNEIL
WHEREFORE, Defendant Trusts prays for judgment as follows:
1.

That Plaintiffs' Complaint against Defendant Trusts be

dismissed and that Defendant Trusts recover costs and attorneys
fees expended herein from Defendant Engineers.
2.
against

Should Plaintiffs or any Defendants recover a verdict
Defendant

Trusts,

or

Defendant

Trust

be

monetarily

damaged in any manner, that Defendant Trusts have judgment over
16

and against Defendant Scott McNeil for the same amount of such
verdict or damages, as the case may be, together with costs.
3.

Should Plaintiffs recover a verdict against Defendant

Trusts that

Defendant

Trusts have judgment

over and

against

Defendant McNeil Engineering, Inc., for the same amount, together
with costs.
4

For any other valuable and good consideration as the

Court deems necessary.
DATED this

^7

day of

. 1987.

m

WOODBURY, BETTILYON & KESLER

y K. Woodbury
ney for Cross-Cqafpl^inant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I certify that on the
day of
, 1987, I
personally mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer
and Counterclaim to Thomas E. Lowe, an attorney for Plaintiffs,
and a copy to Russell S. Walker, attorney for Defendant Bradshaw
by U. S. Mail, first class, postage prepaid at the following
address:
Thomas E. Lowe
John S. Adams
Robert M. Taylor
5525 South 900 east, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Russell S. Walker
50 South Main Street, #2000
Salt Lake City, UT 84144
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< nf

Allen Sims, Esq.
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH
Attorneys for Defendant, Scott McNeil
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, UT
84101

wbk-g\gregory•ans
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ALLEN R. GRAHN and JOSEPHINE
M. GRAHN, husband and wife,

:

Plaintiffs,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
CIVIL NO. C-86-8833

vs.
HEROLD GREGORY, Trustee, for
and on behalf of the MARITAL
:
AND FAMILY TRUSTS OF THE ALBERT
ECCLES FAMILY TRUST, and DEAN
:
BRADSHAW and CHRISTI BRADSHAW,
his wife, and SCOTT McNEIL,
:
an individual,
Defendants.

This matter came on for trial before the Honorable John A.
Rokich on September 24, 1987.

The plaintiffs were present, and

represented by Robert M. Taylor and John S. Adams.

Defendant

Herold L. Gregory, Trustee, and on behalf of the Marital and
Family Trusts of the Albert Eccles Family Trust, hereinafter
referred to as "trustee" was present, and represented by Jeffrey
K. Woodbury.
wife,

were

Defendant

Defendants Dean Bradshaw and Christi Bradshaw, his
present,

Scott

and

McNeil

represented

was

by

present, and

Russell

S.

Walker.

represented

by his

counsel Allen Sims.
The

Court

heard

the

testimony

of

witnesses,

admitted

documentary evidence, viewed the property which was the subject

GRAHN V. GREGORY

PAGE TWO

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

matter of this litigation, read the Memoranda on file herein,
heard oral arguments, and then took the matter under advisement
pending
received

the

receipt

the

of

supplemental

supplemental

Memoranda.

Memoranda, reviewed

The

the

Court

file, its

notes, the Memoranda on file and the documentary evidence.
The Court made inquiries from time to time as to the status
of this matter.

The Court was advised that the parties were

attempting to negotiate a settlement.

The Court finally called

plaintiffs1 counsel and requested that this matter be noticed up
for hearing and that their clients be present.

The hearing was

not held because of the illness of one of the attorneys.
Court was

advised

that

settlement

agreement,

Conclusions of Law.

the parties

nor

agree

could not enter

upon

Findings

of

The

into a

Fact

and

The Court advised counsel it could prepare

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law so that this case can be
concluded at least on the District Court level and the parties
can take whatever action they deem appropriate.
The Court held

a hearing on November 10, 1988 for the

purpose of reviewing the status of this case with counsel and
their clients.

The Court explained to counsel and the litigants

that the Court is not the reason for the delay in the resolution
of this case.

The delay is the result of settlement negotiations

and the parties being unable to agree upon the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law.

Since the parties could not agree, the
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Court, upon its own initiative, prepared Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law in accordance with its Memorandum Decision*
The Court submitted its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
to counsel for review.

Counsel have filed objections to the

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

The Court took notice

of the objections and modified or corrected paragraph 20 of the
Findings of Fact and paragraphs 2, 4 and 9 of the Conclusions of
Law.
The Court now being fully advised in the premises and having
rendered its oral decision and two written Memorandum Decisions,
now makes the following final Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiffs are and were at all relevant times residents

of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2.

The defendant Marital and Family Trusts of the Albert

Eccles Family Trust, Herold L. Gregory, Trustee, are owners of
certain

real

property

located

at

approximately

2811

East

Brookburn Road, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
3.

Defendants

Dean

Bradshaw

and

Christi

Bradshaw

are

individuals residing in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
4.

Defendant Scott McNeil is an individual residing in

Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

^?,
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The real property owned by the defendant trusts was

listed for sale.

The real property listed, after negotiation for

the sale and purchase thereof was divided into two parcels.
the

time

of

trial

the

Court

designated

for

At

identification

purposes the two parcels as Parcel One and Parcel Two.
6.

Trustee

represented

to

the

plaintiffs

that

the

southeasterly edge of the road was the boundary between Parcel
One and Parcel Two, and that a 15 foot aesthetic easement along
the southeasterly edge of the private road was to be included if
and when trustee sold Parcel Two.
7#

The private road provided ingress and egress to Parcel

8.

Trustee did engage defendant McNeil to survey a one-

One.

half acre lot on the southeasterly side of the private roadway
for a building lot for Barbara Danielson.

The Court designated

said lot as Parcel Two.
9.

Plaintiffs and trustee entered into an Earnest Money

Receipt and Offer to Purchase Agreement for Parcel One (including
the private road) on March 18, 1986, which transaction was closed
on August 1, 198 6.
10.

Defendants

Bradshaws

and

trustee

entered

into

an

Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase Agreement for the
purchase of Parcel Two.

The legal description used for Parcel

Two had been prepared by defendant McNeil.
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The Earnest Money Agreement entered into by defendants

Bradshaws

and

trustee

provided,

among

other

things,

that

plaintiffs Grahns had first right of refusal to purchase Parcel
Two.
12•
refusal

Trustee thereafter offered plaintiffs a first right of
to

purchase

Parcel

Two

which

was not

exercised

by

obtained

by

plaintiffs.
13.

The

description

to

Parcel

One

was

plaintiffs Grahn from the Salt Lake County Recorders Office.

The

description

and

designated

Parcel

One

as

being

1.11

acres

accepted by the trustee and defendants Grahn as acreage to be
sold and purchased.
14.

Plaintiffs

Grahn

and

trustee

understood

that

the

southeasterly edge of the road was to be the boundary and the
technical

description

did

not conform

to the

intent of the

plaintiffs Grahn and trustee.
15.

Plaintiffs Grahn, by including the road in Parcel One

received in excess of l.li acres of land.
16.

At the time defendants Bradshaw executed the Earnest

Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase Agreement for Parcel One,
they did not rely upon the survey as describing the boundaries,
but upon the physical boundary, the southeasterly side of the
private roadway.

GRAHN V. GREGORY
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The defendants Bradshaw did rely upon the reference

made by defendant McNeil that Parcel Two contained .5 acres.
18.

The defendants Bradshaw needed

.5 acres in order to

obtain a building permit from the Salt Lake County Planning
Commission.
19.

If Parcel Two did not contain

.5 acres, defendant

Bradshaws could terminate the agreement and trustee refund the
purchase price.
20.

Prior to defendants Bradshaws closing on the purchase

of Parcel Two, trustee discovered that the McNeil survey was in
error and the remapping of the survey of Parcel Two by defendant
McNeil showed that a portion of the private road was contained in
Parcel Two.
21.

Defendants

Bradshaw

did

not

have

an

enforceable

agreement with Rocky Mountain Refractories.
22.

The

legal

description

contemplated

to be used

for

Parcel Two was in error and did not conform with the intent of
the parties, that Parcel Two has located on the southeasterly
edge of the private road.
23.

Plaintiffs did not rely upon defendant McNeil's survey

of Parcel Two and were owed no duty by defendant McNeil.
24.

The Court makes no finding as to the trustee's claim

against McNeil at this time because counsel for trustee and
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McNeil have advised the Court that this issue may be resolved by
a stipulation betv/een those parties.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now
enters the following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
reformed

The
to

deed

between

include

the

trustee

private

and plaintiffs

roadway

as

should be

Parcel

One and

plaintiffs should pay for the excess acreage.
2.

Plaintiffs Grahn and trustee stipulate that $12,604.04

represents a fair value of the ground in excess of 1.11 acres.
Interest shall be paid on the $12,604.06 commencing on a date
determined by the Court.
3.

The

reformed

deed

shall

also

acknowledge

that the

fifteen (15) foot aesthetic and geologic easement shall remain as
agreed in the surviving provisions of the March 18, 1986 Earnest
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase Agreement, which easement
runs along the southeasterly side of the private road.
4.

Defendant Bradshaws are not bona fide purchasers and

therefore not entitled to specifically enforce the agreement for
the purchase

of

Parcel Two, and except

for the reformation

referred to hereinabove, the parties shall be placed in the same
position as before the Bradshaw transaction.

<TPr
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The transaction between trustee and defendants Bradshaw

should be rescinded.
6.

Bradshaws have no cause of action against plaintiffs

for the alleged prevention by injunction of the building of their
home on Parcel Two.
7.

Plaintiffs have no cause of action against defendant

McNeil for the erroneous first survey completed with respect to
Parcel Two.
8.

The defendant trusteefs claims against defendant McNeil

may be pursued in separate litigation in a future action as
provided by stipulation between defendant trustee and defendant
McNeil.
9.

The Court does not award attorney's fees to any of the

parties, but does award costs to the plaintiffs against all
defendants except defendant McNeil.

All other parties must bear

their own costs and fees.
Dated this

<-*L

day of Decemberf 1988.

&11

qOHtf A. ROKICH
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, postage
0
prepaid, to the following, this ^2 **^ day of December, 1988:

Robert M. Taylor
John S. Adams
Attorneys for Plaintiff
5525 South 900 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Jeffrey K. Woodbury, Esq.
2677 E. Parley's Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Allen Sims, Esq.
#8 E* Broadway, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Russell S. Walker, Esq.
50 S. Main, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
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EARNEST M O N E Y RECEIPT
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OFFER'TO PURCHASE

PROPERTY DESCRIPTION
V

The above stated EARNEST MONEY is given to secure and apply on the purchase of the property situated at

' rool-ijlirn'

City of

in t n e

>'.^1t.

l,:*Ve

County of

•'

:

' ' ""

' ••" " '

Utah.

»ct to any restrictive covenants, zoning regulations, utility or other easements or rights of way. government patents or state deeds of record approved by Buyer
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HECK APPLICABLE BOXES:
3 U N I M P R O V E D REAL PROPERTY

C^Vacant Lot

^ I M P R O V E D REAL PROPERTY

[^Commercial..

(a)

Included items.

0,Vacant Acreage

i '

'

-

:;..

\

. :

| ' 7

QjOther

. Presidential

CjCondo

Q Other

Unless excluded below, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the items shown in Section A if presently attached to the property

The following personal property shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title:

' • ''

:

'

r

' '

* — r- r' r>

(b) ..Excluded items. .The following items are specifically excluded from this «»!«»• "•» * M
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*(c) CONNECTIONS, UTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS. Seller represents that the property includes the following improvements in the purchase price
^public sewer C o n n e c t e d
_ .
Owell Qconnected (pother
O electricity Q connected
D septic tank (^connected
[^irrigation water/secondary system
Congress & egress by private easement
3 pthef sanitary system _ _ _ _

"1

Qpublic water . Qconnected
0 private water Qconnected

* «f «han»c

•*-•
• • - . . -

• "3

Q dedicated road

A-certified survey. O^hall be furnished at the expense <** -

(e)

Buyer Inspection. - Buyer has made'a visual inspection of the property and subject to Section 1 (c) above and 6 below, accepts it in its present physica
""? O

:
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prior to closing. Q shad not be furnishefl
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PURCHASE PRICE A N D F I N A N C I N G . . ; The total purchase price.for the property is

r / 1

'." _ ^ l n n l l a r g ($ " JJ p .5 /]

? 0 0 , n 0 which represents the aforedescribed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT:
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r^^C-CL
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:

" — L J _
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f / . • A ) which shall be paid'as follows

^ /J' ^ 7 72.-SO '

^Q^^gjD-gL^-Q ^Representing the approximate balance of CASH DOWN PAYMENT at closing.
^

O paved ,

Survey.

fncpprfrnn-'Ky

•

> * Q J ; ^ ; «•;

Q p r e w i r e o M - C - Ocurb and gutter
Qother rights

(d)

condition, except:

!.

* ^ftmpiiny

Q T V antenna /< Qtpaster antenna
Dvnatural gas Qconnected

0'
'''

^ -7 • ? . <v^T*pr»«ttnting the approximate balance of an existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumes
'2. • ^fD,
t/

*

D

Y buyer., which obligation bears interest at '

which include:

Qprincipal;

Ointerest;

Dtaxes;

% per annum with monthly payments of $
Oinsurance;

Dcondo fees;

Dother

Representing the approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrances to b«
. •• ... . * assumed by Buyer, which obligation bears interest at
:;...

"': .. which include:

Qprincipal;. Dinterest;
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% per annum with monthly payments of $

Dinsurance;.
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^-i^
f Buyer is required to assume an underlying obligation and/or obtain outside financing. Buyer agrees to use best efforts to assume and/or procure same and th«
r is made subject to Buyer qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and/or financing. Buyer agrees to make application within
> after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, to assume the underlying obligation and/or obtain the new financing at an interest rate not to exceed .
uyer does not qualify for the assumption and/or financing within * '
ie option of the Buyer or Seller upon written notice.
K j

'
j

* naff; after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, this Agreement shall be voidabi) *

Seller agrees to pay $
towards Buyer's total financing and;closing costs, including, but not limited to. loan discount points.
If this Agreement involves the assumption of an existing loan or obligation on the property, Section F shall apply.

^
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Yes (X)

Mo (0)

This is a legally binding contract. Read the entire document carefully before signing.

REALTOR

GENERAL PROVISIONS
(Sections)
A. INCLUDED ITEMS. Unless excluded herein, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the following items if presently attached to the property: pi
heating, air-conditioning and ^ntiiating fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in appliances, light fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures curtains and c
and rods, window and door sceens. storm doors, window blinds, awnings, installed television antenna, wall-to-wall carpets water softener automatic gar?
opener and transmitter(s). fencing, trees and shrubs.
B. INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated. Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer'1; own examination and judgment am
reason of any representation made to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition, size, location present value, future value
herefrom or as to its production Buyer accepts the property in "as is" condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6 In the event Buyet
any additional inspection, said inspection shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer.
C. SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the proper!
has not or will not be remedied prior to closing; (b) all obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, hens or other encurr
cf any nature shall be brought current on or before closing; and (c) the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and ap
shall be sound or in satisfactory working condition at closing.
D. C O N D I T I O N OF WELL. Seller warrants that any private well serving the property has. to the best of Sellers knowledge, provided an adequate s
water and continued use of the well or wells is authorized by a state permit or other legal water right.
E. C O N D I T I O N OF SEPTIC TANK. Seller warrants that any septic tank serving the property is. to the best of Seller's knowiedge. in good working o«
Seller has no knowledge of any needed repairs and it meets all applicable government health and construction standards.
F. ACCELERATION CLAUSE. No later than fifteen (15) days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3) days prior to
Seller shall provide to Buyer written verification as to whether or not any notes, mortgages, deeds of trust or real estate contracts ag3»nst the property req
consent of the holder of such instrument(s) to the sale of the property or permit the holder to raise the interest rate and / o r declare the entire balance du
event of sale. If any such document so provides and holder does not waive the same or unconditionally approve the sale, then within three (3) days after r
nonwaiver or disapproval or on the date of closing, whichever is earlier. Buyer shall have the option to declare this Agreement null and v c d by giving wntte
to Seller or Seller's agent. In such case, ail earnest money received under this Agreement shall be returned to Buyer. It is understood one agreed that if pr
for said "Due on Sale" clause are set forth in Section 7 herein, alternatives allowed herein shall become null and void
G. TITLE INSPECTION. No later than fifteen (15) days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3\ days prior to closmc
shall have the opportunity to inspect either an abstract of title brought current with an attorney's opinion, or n preliminary title reoort on the subject p
Buyer shall have a period of three (3) days after receipt thereof to examine and accept. If Buyer does not accept, Buyer shall give w - t t e n nonce thereof '
or Sellers agent, within the prescribed time period specifying objections to title Thereafter, Seller shall be requited, through ov.r-.v at closing, to •
defect(s) to which Buyer has obiected If said defect(s) is not curable through an escrow agreement at closing, this Agreement shali no 'Mil and void at t^.of the Buyer, and all monies received herewith shall be returned to the respective parties.
H. TITLE INSURANCE. If title insurance is elected. Seller authorizes the Listing Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment f or a standard f c
policy of title insurance to be issued by such title insurance company as Seller shall designate Title policy to be 'ssued shai! c o n t r a no exceptions o r
those provided for in said standard form, and the encumbrances or defects excepted under the final contract of sale If t.tle cannot !;r ~ade so insurable
an escrow agreement at closing, the earnest money shall, unless Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances be refunded to 2uver. and this As
shall thereupon be terminated. Seller agrees to pay any cancellation charge.
!. EXISTING TENANT LEASES. If Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or leases. Seller agrees to provide to Buyer no ater than fifteen •*
after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3) days prior to closing, a .copy of all existing leases (and any arrenuments thcretc -:
the property- Unless written objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller s agent within three (3) working days thereafter. Buyer sha'i take title i<ih|pc:
leases, if objection is not remedied within the stated time, this Agreement shall be null and void.
J
CHANGES OURING TRANSACTION. During the pendency cr this Agreement Sailer agrees that no changes -r any e x i s t - ' ; vases shs;! oe —raw ieases entered into r.c sha!l anv sur-startial alterations or Tvjrov-r.nierMs be made or under'aken v r h o u : :ne v - : r co:*sr;n< o' t •-. 3 .-:>-r

fin hrn,. n hi

«•>

n i w ^ t / v n ^ ' g opinion,(Sfttt,Sftfttinn H) S?(f

£*\hibi7

j ^ >; <••

A

(%£•
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t. INSPECTION OF TITLE. In accord*flC0,with Section G. Buyer shall have the opportunity to inspect the title to the subject property prior to closing.
eKs^alWafceClftte^bJect t o ; « t ^ ^
not-reviewed/any-condo*

iunr^cCA>BH;pc«w:wxigroDs:jbis:^gfeem$DK5.

VESTING OF TITLE.

Title shall vesCirt. Buyer as follows:

5.
>

SELLER WARRANTIES.

.M1f»n

t>

r m h r

r>r-.n

Jrv-.-'v

i n r

•',

In addition to warranties contained in Section C, the following items are also warranted:_lLll r-

7. ^SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES.
tatisfied prior to closing:
>"«afev T . ^ - M ^ i f ;»

6 "Conine

1 > \-

l^t

reun'dcr is legally divided nnd separate fror? tno ^-ioi.nirv

iriti?nga4ia f i^&9nrf^AA, Afi.iTff. h&ffiMftfo m g J L & ^ i n c

f>-v.v.r^

T

j r,

+• u,- t

*, r c H r*. T ; n •:
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This offer is made subject to the following special conditions and /or contingencies which must
'

3.' CLOSING OF SALE. This Agreement shall be closed on or.before ' a rrirrr] c»+» T
t"\ 9 ' J 1 £ _ at a reasonable location to be designated by
er, subject to Section Q. Upon demand. Buyer shall deposit with the Escrow Closing Office all documents necessary to complete the purchase in accordance
i this Agreement. Prorations set forth in Section R, shall be made as of QQla.te7pj<possessionEJjrtate"of closing Q-other-

9.

POSSESSION.

Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer on

10. GENERAL PROVISIONS.
eement by refe^ehce.
1 1.

' ^'^ " ^ t l

1 ,

,

:

,*. - c- ,m|p«.<; extended by written agreement of parties.

Unless otherwise indicated above, the General Provision Sections on the reverse side hereof are incorporated into this
.
_

AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE AND T I M E L I M I T FOR ACCEPTANCE.

I have until /&' ' ' * (AM-/ffri]fr / > ? / n *~ H f^/?
INEST MONEY to the Buyer. W

, 19

*
,

Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions. Seiler

'-> , to accept this offer. Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse and the Agent shall return the
^
/J
/
.
.
.
.
'
J .
r

/ -

lature of Buyer

'

Date
Date

£ignature;bf
^Tgnature;of Buyer
Buyt

Date

•CKONE
CCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above.
EJECTION. Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer.

(Seller's Initials)

OtJNTER' OFFER. Seller hereby accepts the foregoing offer SUBJECT TO. the ^exceptions or modifications as specified below or in the attached Addendum, and
resents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance. Buyer shall have, until
aerified below.

• • • ••

(A.M./P.M.)

. 19

to accept the terms

3

e

(AM-PM)

-

;

Signature of Seller

Signature of Seiler

:CK ONE:
uyer accepts the counter o,ffer
uyer accepts with modifications on attached addendum
s

;

(AM-PM1
COMMISSION.

j

" * Signature of Buyer

Signature of Buyer
:
/ * ° — "*> ' '^/7T ,
•—
—
• C -7*-T
a<;
•-.-*.
.
consideration for the efforts in procuring a buyer

The undersigned hereby agrees to pay to:

fmmisSion nf /Z *'

lature of Seller

/

'

'

»

•

*"

.

v

Date

Signature of Seller

(Brokerage)

_.

Date

D O C U M E N T RECEIPT
State Law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement bearing ail signatures. (One of the following alternatives must therefore
:ompleted).
(V Q l acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures:
NATURE OP SEILER -

«^_—<_—.

„,

.

^

SIGNATURE OF BUYER

_.
Date

f ...

.

Date

,

S'.- " >

Date

-

Date

B. D l personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures to be mailed on

_ — , 19

tified Mai! and return receipt attached hereto to the O Seller a Buyer. Sent by

—

_ — —

\ ''. *
|e three of a four page form

Seller's Initials ( ? v. )-(

)

Date __2

:

\ '.

Buyer's Initials (

)(

.

)

Date

ZJ.

by

K. AUTHORITY OF SIGNATORS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership
behalf wB//ants.his or her authority to do bo and to bind Buyer or Seller .

trust. ^st3te. or other entity, the'person exe:ui\,V<j :h,s Agreemcn

L. COMPLETE AGREEMENT — NO VERBAL AGREEMENTS. This instrument constitutes the c-ntiu.* Agreement between the parffes and supoisec
cancels rrny or d arl prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or agreements between tin; poitu'»«. There are no verbal agreements which
or affect this agreement. This Agreement cannot be changed f»xc*pt by mutual written agreement of 'he partes
M. COUNTER OFFERS. Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyer shall be.in writing and% .f attached hereto, shall mcnrpur.itu oil the provisions
AgronVicnt not expressly modified or excluded therein.
N. DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. In the event of default by Buyer. Seller may elect to either retain the tamest money as hqi
damages or to institute suit to enforce any rights of .Seller. In the event of default by Seller, or if this sale fails to close because of the nonsatisfaction
express condition 01 contingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue.of any default by Buyer), the earnest money <
shall be returned to Buyer Both parties agree that, should either party default in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained tha defaulting pari
pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee. which may arise or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement, or in pursui
remedy provided hereunder or by applicable law, whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise In the event the principal broker holding the •
money deposit is required to file an interpleader action in court to resolve a dispute over the earnest money deposit referred to herein, the Buyer and
authorize the principal broker to draw from the earnest money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bringing the interpleader action The i
of deposit remaining after advancing those costs shall be interpleaded into court in accordance with state law. The Buy**, and-Seller further agree that the-def
party shall pay tftetcourtcosts and reasonable attorney's fees-incurred by the principal broker in bringing such action*.
0.

ABROGATION.

Execution of a final real estate contract, if any, shall abrogate this Agreement.

P. RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the Seller until closing. In the event there is loss or damage to the pi
between the date hereof and ••••e date of closing, by reason of fire, vandalism, flood, earthquake, or acts of God. and the cost to repair such damage shall
ten percent (10%) of the purchase price of the property, Buyer may, at his option either proceed with this transaction if Seller agrees in writing to re
replace damaged propcrty ( prior to closing, or declare this Agreement null and void. If damage to property is less than ten percent ( l U /o) of the purchas
and Seller agrees in writing to opair or replace and does actually repair and replace damaged property prior to closing, this transaction shall proceed as i
Q. T I M E IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY. In the event that this sale cannot be closed by the date providedjierein due to interruption of trai
strikes, fire, flood, extreme weather, governmental regulations, acts of God. or similar occurrences beyond the control of 8uyer or Seller, then the closing dai
be extended seven (7) days bevond cessation of such condition, but in no event more than thirty (30) days beyond the closing date provided herein Thei
time is of the essence. This provision relates only to the extension of closing date. " C l o s i n g " shall mean the date on which ail necessary instruments are
and delivered by all parties to the transaction.
*•
R. CLOSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half ( 1 / 2 ) of the escrow closing fee. unless otherwise required by the lending institution
of providing title insurance or an abstract brought current shall be paid by Seller. Taxes and assessments for the current year, insurance, if acceptable to the
rents, and interest on assumed obligations shalhbe prorated as set forth in Section 8. Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mortgage or other re
shall be assigned to Buyer at closing.
S. REAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING. If this agreement is for conveyance of fee title, title shall be conveyed by warranty deed free of defects othe
those excepted herein. If this Agreement is for sale or transfer of a Seller's interest under an existing real estate contract. Seller may transfer by either (?.)
warranty deed, containing Seller's assignment of said contract in form sufficient to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporati
said existing real estate contract therein.
T.

AGENCY DISCLOSURE.

U.

BROKERAGE.

V.

DAYS.

Selling Brokerage may have entered into an agreement to represent the Seller.

For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term "Brokerage

shall mean the respective listing or selling real estate

For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term " d a y s " shall mean business or working days exclusive of legal holidays.
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THIS FORM HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE C O M M I

ECCLES, CAROLINE T r• (TR)'
2811 E BROOKBURN RD
SLC, UT

84109

Property description and l o c a t i o n :
BEG 25 RDS S & 942 FT E FR NV COR SEC 35 T I S
R IE SL MER E 5 - 5 8 FT S 2 2 0 FT M OR L TO CEN OF
MILL CREEK E'LY & SE•LY ALG SD CREEK 8 9 . 2 2 FTtf
S 6 4 . 6 FT; S'LY ALG CURVE TO R 3 8 . 4 5 FT;
S 2 8 ° 1 5 ' 2 9 " W 4 9 . 5 5 FT; SV' LY ALG CURVE TO R
8 3 . 0 1 5 FT; S 8 4 . 7 7 FT; V 1 0 2 . 1 2 5 FT; N 555 FT M
OR L TO CEN OF MILL CREEK; SE'LY ALG SD CEN LI
TO A FT S FR BEG; N 2 2 0 FT M OR L TO

EXHIBIT A

T h i s E x h i b i t s h a l l s e r v e a s an a d d e n d u m s t a t i n g
a d d i t i o n a l t e r m s of t h a t o f f e r t o p u r c h a s e in the a t t a c h e d
E a r n e s t Money S a l e s A g r e e m e n t d a t e d siai-th
/ g?
, 1986,
o f f e r e d by A l l e n R. Grahn and J o s e p h i n e M. Grahn,
identified
t h e r e i n as Buyer.
( I t i s the second such attachment.
That
p r e v i o u s E x h i b i t i s s u p e r s e d e d h e r e b y and s h a l l h a v e no
f u r t h e r f o r c e or e f f e c t .
The a t t a c h e d A g r e e m e n t , w i t h t h i s
E x h i b i t , s h a l l , form t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s ;
i t b e i n g a c k n o w l e d g e d by B u y e r t h a t t h e o f f e r
expiration
d a t e was e x t e n d e d , and t h a t t h i s E x h i b i t r e f l e c t s n e g o t i a t e d
amendments to Buyer's o f f e r . )
The t e r m s h e r e o f a r e h e r e b y
i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o the s a i d A g r e e m e n t , as i f more f u l l y s e t
forth therein.
To t h e e x t e n t t h a t a n y o f t h e t e r m s h e r e o f
a r e i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the t e r m s of t h e s a i d A g r e e m e n t ,
the
t e r m s of t h i s E x h i b i t s h a l l c o n t r o l .
Otherwise, all other
t e r m s o f t h e a t t a c h e d E a r n e s t Money S a l e s A g r e e m e n t s h a l l
remain the same.
A.
With
respect
to paragraph* 1 ( e ) ,
it
is
u n d e r s t o o d and a g r e e d t h a t t h e p a r t i e s i n t e n d t h a t B u y e r s 1
i n s p e c t i o n of the p r o p e r t y i s s o l e l y for the purpose of
d e t e r m i n i n g that the p r o p e r t y has not been s u b s t a n t i a l l y
h a r m e d o r o t h e r w i s e l o s t v a l u e p r i o r t o c l o s i n g due t o s u c h
t h i n g s a s , by way of e x a m p l e , w i t h o u t l i m i t a t i o n
intended,
v a n d a l i s m , f i r e , a c t s of God, or o t h e r c a u s e s f o r w h i c h
S e l l e r assumes the r i s k .
B.
The b a l a n c e o f $ 1 1 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 w h i c h i s r e f e r r e d
in PARAGRAPH 2 of t h e a t t a c h e d E a r n e s t Money S a l e s A g r e e m e n t
s h a l l be p a i d a s f o l l o w s :
s u b j e c t t o t h e t e r m s and
c o n d i t i o n s o f a s t a n d a r d l o n g form T r u s t Deed and T r u s t Deed
N o t e p r o v i d i n g f o r i n t e r e s t a t t h e r a t e o f 9% p e r annum on
t h e p r i n c i p a l b a l a n c e , and p a y m e n t s o f i n t e r e s t o n l y on a
m o n t h l y b a s i s in t h e amount of a p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 8 6 3 . 0 0 p e r
m o n t h , and a b a l l o o n p a y m e n t o f t h e t o t a l a m o u n t due p a y a b l e
on o r b e f o r e t h e f i f t h a n n i v e r s a r y d a t e o f t h e d a t e o f
c l o s i n g , and f u r t h e r p r o v i d i n g t h a t t h e s a i d a m o u n t m a y b e
p a i d at. any t i m e p r i o r t o c l o s i n g w i t h o u t p r e p a y m e n t p e n a l t y
of any s o r t .
In a d d i t i o n t h e r e t o ,
an a d d e n d u m s h a l l
be
p l a c e d w i t h t h e U t a h l o n g f o r m T r u s t Deed t o p r o v i d e a s
follows:
No s a l e o f t h e p r o p e r t y w h i c h i s t h e s ' u b j e c t of
t h i s T r u s t D e e d , or a n y p a r t t h e r o f , s h a l l b e p e r m i t t e d
u n t i l t h e i n d e b t e d n e s s s e c u r e d by t h i s T r u s t D e e d i s
r e p a i d i n f u l l , a n d , i n t h e e v e n t of s u c h a s a l e p r i o r
to such repayment
in f u l l ,
the o b l i g a t i o n
secured
h e r e b y s h a l l be in d e f a u l t and t h e e n t i r e
principal
b a l a n c e and i n t e r e s t t h e r e o n s h a l l b e c o m e
immediately
1

d u e and p a y a b l e , a t t h e o p t i o n o f t h e b e n e f i c i a r y o f
t h i s T r u s t D e e d , w h i c h o p t i o n s h a l l be e x e r c i s e d w i t h i n
f o r t y - f i v e (45) d a y s o f n o t i c e o f t h e s a i d s a l e t o t h e
said beneficiary.
C.
As r e f e r r e d t o i n PARAGRAPH 7 o f t h e a t t a c h e d
E a r n e s t Money S a l e s A g r e e m e n t , t h e o f f e r i s
specifically
subject
to
the following
special
conditions
and/or
c o n t i n g e n c i e s w h i c h must be s a t i s f i e d p r i o r t o c l o s i n g :
i.
This o f f e r i s s u b j e c t to Buyers s e l l i n g
and c l o s i n g on t h e s a l e o f t h e i r home l o c a t e d a t 3 7 3 5
E m i g r a t i o n C a n y o n p r i o r t o t h e c l o s i n g on t h e s a l e
which i s * t h e s u b j e c t of t h i s Agreement.
Provided,
h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e S e l l e r may c o n t i n u e t o o f f e r
the
p r o p e r t y d e s c r i b e d h e r e i n f o r s a l e and t o c o n s i d e r
o f f e r s to purchase the same, s u b j e c t to Buyers1 f i r s t
r i g h t of r e f u s a l .
Should S e l l e r
r e c e i v e an
offer
a g a i n s t the property which S e l l e r d e s i r e s to a c c e p t ,
then S e l l e r s h a l l have the d u t y to g i v e n o t i c e
thereof
t o B u y e r , w h i c h n o t i c e s h a l l b e a c c o m p a n i e d by a c o p y
of t h e o f f e r
and/or other a c c e p t a b l e proof
that a
bona f i d e
written offer
has been r e c e i v e d
by
the
Seller.
Seller
shall
represent,
in
connection
therewith,
that Seller desires
to a c c e p t the
said
o f f e r , s u b j e c t to Buyers' f i r s t r i g h t of r e f u s a l .
Prom
•the d a t e of r e c e i p t of s a i d n o t i c e , Buyer s h a l l have
s e v e n (7) d a y s w i t h i n w h i c h t o g i v e n o t i c e t o
the
S e l l e r , i n w r i t i n g , " o f B u y e r s ' w a i v e r of t h e a f o r e s a i d
c o n d i t i o n t h a t B u y e r s 1 home be s o l d and c l o s e d p r i o r , t o
c l o s i n g on B u y e r s 1 p u r c h a s e h e r e u n d e r .
T h e r e u p o n , .the
s a i d o f f e r of w h i c h S e l l e r g a v e Buyer n o t i c e
shall
f a i l , and Buyer and S e l l e r s h a l l c l o s e t h e s a l e c a l l e d
f o r in t h i s A g r e e m e n t w i t h i n s i x t y (60) d a y s of
the
d a t e of
the s a i d n o t i c e
at a reasonable
location
d e s i g n a t e d by t h e S e l l e r .
The s a i d s a l e s h a l l
take
p l a c e p u r s u a n t t o and u n d e r t h e t e r m s and c o n d i t i o n s
s e t f o r t h in t h i s o f f e r ,
e x c e p t that the
interest
p a y m e n t s c a l l e d f o r u n d e r t h e T r u s t Deed N o t e s h a l l n o t
c o m m e n c e f o r a p e r i o d l e s s t h a n f o r t y - f i v e (45) c l a y s
from t h e d a t e of c l o s i n g .
Should Buyer f a i l to remove
t h e s a i d c o n t i n g e n c y r e g a r d i n g t h e s a l e of B u y e r s ' home
in E m i g r a t i o n Canyon, then t h i s A g r e e m e n t s h a l l
fail
f o r f a i l u r e t o s a t i s f y t h i s c o n t i n g e n c y and t h e e a r n e s t
m o n e y d e p o s i t m a d e by B u y e r s h e r e u n d e r s h a l l
bo

refunded,

in

full.

ii.
T h i s o f f e r i s f u r t h e r c o n d i t i o n e d upon
the s u b j e c t p r o p e r t y being
free
of
unreasonably
r e s t r i c t i v e e a s e m e n t s o r r i g h t s of way in f a v o r of
others.
B u y e r s h a l l b e d e l i v e r e d t h e p o l i c y of t i t l e
i n s u r a n c e , or t h e p r e l i m i n a r y r e p o r t t h e r e t o , a t l e a s t
f i v e d a y s p r i o r to s c h e d u l e d c l o s i n g ; and Buyer s h a l l
n o t i f y S e l l e r p r i o r t o c l o s i n g o f -any b u r d e n s w h i c h
i

exist which cause this condition not to be satisfied,
closing shall be postponed, and Seller shall have ten
days from receipt of such notice to satisfy the subject
c o n d i t i o n by r e m o v a l of the b u r d e n ( s ) or o t h e r
adjustment acceptable to Buyer.
iii. This offer is further conditioned upon Buyer
confirming the existence of a right of way or easement
across that roadway leading to the property which has
been identified as being part of the adjoining property
of O.C. Tanner.
The purpose of this condition is to
satisfy the r e q u i r e m e n t of Buyers that reasonable
access to the property be thus available.
Seller does
not w a r r a n t the existence of such right of way or
easement.
D.
In addition to the foregoing, th'e following
conditions and terms are set forth herein as part of the
consideration
for the a t t a c h e d E a r n e s t M o n e y
Sales
Agreement, of which this Exhibit is a part.
With respect to the one-half acre lot adjoining
the lot which is the subject of this A g r e e m e n t , Seller
hereby grants to Buyer the first option to purchase the said
half acre lot. Seller agrees that, should Seller receive an
offer from any third party to purchase the said adjoining
half acre lot, Which Seller desires to accept, Seller shall
give notice of that desire, in writing, to the Buyer, along
with a copy of the said offer and, if required by B u y e r ,
other proof that Seller has received a bona fide offer to
purchase the said property.
The said notice shall indicate
and/or be deemed, pursuant to this Agreement, to be an offer
by Seller to sell the property to Buyer under the same terms
and conditions as those set forth in the said written offer,
attached to the notice.
Buyer shall have seven (7) days
w i t h i n which to accept the said offer by giving Seller
written notice of Buyers 1 desire to purchase under the said
terms and conditions.
Should Buyer fail to exercise Buyers'
option under this p r o v i s i o n , then Seller shall have the
right to sell the property within ninety (90) days of the
date of the expiration of Sellers* said option on terms and
conditions no more favorable than those originally offered
under this paragraph to Buyer.
Should the offer be amended
making the terms more favorable, or should the said offer
fail and a new offer be received, then the said a mend merit: or
offer shall be, once again, subject to the terms of this
provision.
The terms of this provision shall survive the
closing of the purchase of the property which -is the subject
of the main Agreement.
Should Seller sell the adjoining one-half
acre lot to any third party after Buyers' failure to
purchase
the s a m e u n d e r
the t e r m s of the next
preceeding paragraph, Seller further agrees hereby to
grant an easement <~\n<:\ restrictive covenant, in favor of
3

t h e o w i i e i: s o £ t h e 1 a i: i d !' w 1: i i c 1: :i i s 11 \ e s ~ - _. .... ,. -. . i
m a i n a g r e e m e n t , w h i c h c o v e n a n t s h a l l r u n w i t h the l a n d ,
to wjl__t_£ a r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t t h e t r e e s a n d b r u s h n o t b e
r e m o v e d (Acts o f G o d r e m o v i n g or n e c e s s i t a t i n g r e m o v a l
• of the s a m e e x c e p t e d ) from the o n e - h a l f acre lot from
a n y p o i n t w i t h i n f i f t e e n {I 5) f e e t o f t h e e x i s t i n g
d r i v e w h i c h s e p a r a t e s t h e t w o l o t s , it b e i n g u n d e r s t o o d
that t h e said t r e e s a n d b r u s h e £ £ e c t i v e l y s e r v e as a n
a s t h e t i c b r e a k b e t w e e n the p r o p e r t i e s , a s w e l l as a
geologic protection against erosion onto the property
w h i c h is* the s u b j e c t of the m a i n a g r e e m e n t .
Should
s u c h t r e e s a n d / o r b r u s h be r e m o v e d as a r e s u l t of an
act of G o d , the owner of the benefitted property shall
have t h e r i g h t:, b \ I t: i: i < ::»I : d i :i t y, t o r e - p 1 a n t t h e protect e d
are a .
E
W i t h r e s p e c t t o p a r a g r a p h 3. of t h e a t t a c h e d ,
i t i s a g r e e d t h a t S e l l e r s h a l l e v i d e n c e the t i t l e to the
property
( p r o v i d e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s of
that
section,
among o t h e r s )
by a c u r r e n t
p o l i c y of
title
i n s u r a n c e in t h e a m o u n t of t h e p u r c h a s e p r i c e , and n o t 1 D y a n
abstract.
S e e , a l s o G e n e r a l P r o v i s i o n H.
I L J 1 71T N EI S S W1 1E R E 0 F, 11 i e B u y e r s a n d S e 11 e r s 1 i e r e b y
a c k n o w 1 e d g e t h eir a g r e e m e n t
t h a t t he f o r e g o i n g
i s -a n
i n t e g r a l p a r t of the a f o r e m e n t i o n e d E a r n e s t M o n e y S a l e s
A g r e e m e n t which has also been fully execi 11ed by t:he p a r t i e s .

Buyer

Dated:

S e l l e V Datgd; /

z^Buy/r

3-/-S&

?~rf-£A

4

Dated:

3 v - dj

3215 Skycrest Circle •
Salt Lake City, UT 84108
1 September 1986

Mr. antf Mrs. Allen Grahn
3735 Emigration Canyon
Salt Lake City, UT 84108
Dear Allen *nd Josephine:
With reference to your option to purchase the one-half ..'.;
acre l^t adjacent to the lot you have recently-purchased
from uP' known ?s Brookburn, this is to inform you? that >';
on this date we have received an earnest money agreement
and offer to purchase said one-half aci*e lot and.) we -de -^
sire to accept said offer. A-copy of the agreement! is;^
attached hereto.
As you a.re awnr*, there is a period specified^^:which;i||
you may excrrr ^e your option. -If you should come ; to the
conclusion v/ithin said time period that you d6;|npt:,wisli;;;:
to exef^se your option, the buyer would greatlylfappre^.;
ciate your ro indicating as so.on as possible so" that her*;
may initiate his construction without unnecessary-delay;

Hero4\l L. Gre/ory v^rrustee
Alber-c^Eccles Family Trust
3215 Skycrest Circle
Salt Lake City, UT 84108
Receipt of notice acknowledged this 1st day of September
1986.

LrvnniLvji
YesfX)

No(0)

IVIVIVI. I g n b k d nunuuiviutY
EARNEST M O N E Y RECEIPT

I

•sf

f

IIAII:

13£L

*«fLf

The undersigned Buyer"" _

, hereby depogj>6 w i t h Brokerg

EARNEST MONEY, the amount of
the f o r m of

Cu

^l*t/<L-

Dollars

j2e*~£Gftg\4iA.

( £ S 2 3 C 2 5 =

which shall be deposited in accordance with applicable State U

/Uoto&-

'"-/•

Jkifl jgr"—"

Received b y £ S L

Wti„ u Number.

OFFER TO

I ,.x P R O P f ^ J Y DESCRIPTION

.fft*±

The above slated EARNEST MONEY is given to secure and apply on the purchase of the property situated a

.
. Uti
b^ect to any restrictive covenants, zoning regulations, utility or other easements or rights of wtiy. government patents or state deeds of record approved by Bu
accordance w i t h Section G. Said property is more particularly described as:

—

._

CHECK APPLICABLE BOXES:
" ^ U N I M P R O V E D REAL PROPERTY

.Wvacant Lot

© I M P R O V E D REAL PROPERTY

^Commercial

(a)

Included items.

^ V a c a n t Acreage <Q Other
CPResidential

_

Gfcondo

_

EPOther

Unless excluded below, this sale shall include al! fixtures "and any of the items shown in Section A if presently attached to the propei

The following .personal proper fy shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title: /i/&6L*

(b)

Excluded items,

j ^

AJe&E.

The following items are specifically excluded from this sale:

UNECTIONS, UTILITIES AMD OTHER RfGHTS. Seller represents that the property includes the following <f improvements, in the purchase pri
• public sewer Q connected
D w e l l • connected O other
Q electricity CI connected
D septic tank Q connected
0 irrigation water/secondary system
Q ingress & egress by private easement
Q other sanitary system _ _ _ .
D public water Dconnected
—
private water Oconnected

# of shares .
.Company.
„.__
D T V antenna • master antenna D p r e w n e j
• natural gas Unconnected
"

Q dedicated road • paved
J c u r b and gutte*
• other rights

.

prior to closing, G snail not be furnish

(d)"

Survey

(e)

Buyer Inspection.
fi. ' Buyer has made a visual inspection of the property and subject to Section 1 {c} above and 6 below, accepts it in its present physi

A, certified survey ^firShalI be furnished at the expense of _ ^ & j J L £ s i £ _

condition, except:.

5«KV0&
=4
2

PRICE A N D F I N A N C I N G .

PUR

S~CQ

The total purchase price for the property is

~&J

fr-V1/

I l\V<-<

^ ^ v h i c h represents the aforedescribed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT:

i ©presenting the approximate balance of an existing mortgage
by buyer, which obligation bears interest at _ _ _ _ _
Oprincipal;

Dinterest;

Otaxes;

l>\(9 L*~£

,

^representing the approximate balance of CASH DOWN PAYMENT afdCSins.

which include:

/

C4-V1_

A.

which shall be* paid a&Jbllov

Dollars (

U f 6 f\

( L C t ^ f> l & V ^ ^

"fa-

»#&"

trust', deed note, ureal estate coi itract or other encumbrance to be assum

% per annum with n oi ithly payments of $

Q insurance;

D c o n d o fees;

.

D other

.

.__.

„.

_ _ .

representing the approximate balai ice of an additional existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrances to
issumed by Buyer, which obligation bears interest at

*5^~

•vhich include:

Oprincipai;

Qinterest;

Dtaxes;

% per annum with monthly payments of $
Dinsurance;

•^presenting balance, if any, includii tg proceeds from a new

D c o n d o fees;

Q other _ _

_ .

. loan, to bo paid as follows:

•** *i
sdl^
rj.dtp^Other JL
*K&i*k
-&2JZx
Gl.occ.

TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE

&

•2.Q

l<h

^

if Buyer is required to assume an underlying obligation a n d / o r obtain outside financing, Buyer agrees to use best efforts to assume and/or procuTpsSme and t
fer is made subject to Buyer qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption a n d / o r financing, Buyer agrees to make application withtn
C5^
jys after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, to assume the underlying
a n d / o r obtain the new financing at an interest rate not to exceed
i g obligation
obiigat
days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, this Agreement snarl be voida
Buyer does not qualify for the assumption and / o r financing within ,
the option of the Buyer or Seller upon written notice,
Seller agrees to pay $
*
. towards Buyer's total financing and closing costs, including, but not limited to, loan discount points.
If this Agreement involves the assumption of an existing toan or obligation on the property, Section f shall apply,

wi Huiwiidde price (,
4 . I N S P E C T I O N OF TITLE. In accordance with Section G, Buyer shall have the opportunity to inspect the title to the subject property prio
Buyer shall take title subject to any existing restrictive covenants, including condominium restrictions {CC & R's). Buyer O hasSrnas not reviewed
minium CC & R's prior to signing this Agreement.
5.

VESTING OF TITLE.

Title shall vest in Buyer as follows: T J - 4 - l - ^

6.

SELLER WARRANTIES.

(J C^A^A

CJLA-

7 ^ U-*<-

*=*«£-

In addition to warranties contained in Section C, the following items are also warranted:.

Exceptions to the above and Section C shall be limited to the following:

7.

f p j . <~_

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES.

fiffr'lz*-

This offer is made subject to the following special conditions and/or
or <contingencies '

be satisfied prior to closing: J?L

JL2

fc*-y c-*-

£d> c^-U, '(Jjo&y^ A?J^<a

8. C L O S I N G OF SALE. This Agreement shall be closed on or before
at a reasonable location to be des
Seller, subject to Section Q. Upon demand, Buyer shall deposit with the Escrow Closing Office all documents necessary to complete the purchase in ;
with this Agreement. Prorations set forth in Section R, shall be made as of O d a t e of possessionJSHate of closing fJ>other

9.

POSSESSION.

Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer on C J ^ S A I A ,

10.
GENERAL PROVISIONS.
Agreement by reference.
11

Q.OO

Buyer iffers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditi<

i M ^ ge/3f~ 2.
.,19

EARNEST MONEY to the Buyer.

£—

. unless extended by written agreement of parties.

Unless otherwise indicated above, the General Provision Sections on the reverse side hereof are incorporate*

AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE A N D T I M E L I M I T FOR ACCEPTANCE.

shall have until

tJ

yp

-

.* y?

Signature of B u Y ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ V ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ & ^ C - * * - -

9 *+ . to accept this offer. Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse and the Agent shall
i # ifjips

<Scrtr/, lrr&
Date

Signature of Buyer

CHECK ONE
^JTCCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above.
DREJECTION. Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer

(Seller's Initials)

QCOUNTER OFFER. Seller hereby accepts the foregoing offer SUBJECT TO the exceptions or modifications as^pecified bejow or in tf^attached Adden

^^ACfJs
^ate
^Tme

Pfo^Ht

J^ca^A^^

S)

Yto

19

(A.M./P.M

presents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance. Buyer shall have until

<TfZi<fh^?sd^y.

^#,..^, ^ ? ^ ^ M 7 ^

s<£*?^**^

*£S&f^J^

_

Signature of Seller

, to accept

Signature of Seller

CHECK ONE:
/tfj Buyer accepts the counter offer
D Buyer accepts wUtLfnodifications on attache^dtiendum

Date f 7 f l f e
X

Time _ _ C x 2 ^ i j b T K M - P M )
COMMISSION.

^Q^t^L

Signature of Buyer

Signature of

. (Bn

The undersigned hereby agrees to pay to: .

a commission of

. as coqsideration for the efforts in procuring a buyer.

.

Date

Signature of Seller

Signature of Seller

D O C U M E N T RECEIPT
State Law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement bearing all signatures. (One of the following alternatives must tl
be completed).
A. D l acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures:
SIGNATURE OF SELLER

SIGNATURE OF BUYER
Date

Date

Date

Date

B. Q l personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing ail signatures to be mailed on .
Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the Q Sailer D Buyer. Sent±>y
Page three of a four page form

Seller's Initial

.. 19.

..

ueyei

',„"

;

:

--i(X)

i

•

. . '

;
|

%

•

No (0)

This is a legally binding contract, Road the ei (tire docuntent carefully before signing.

CB
REALTOR

GENERAL PROVISIONS
(Sections)

s
INCLUDED I T I M S , Unless excluded herein i, this sal© shall incfud® all fixtures, arid any of the following items if presently attached to the property pluml
heating, air-conditioning and ventilating fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in appliances, light fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains and drapi
and rods, window and "door scretms, storm doors, window blinds, awnings, installed television antenna, wall-to-wall carpets, water softener, automatic garage
opener and transmitters), fencing, trees and shrubs,
B. INSPEC I I O N . Unless otherwise indicated, Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and judgment and nc
reason of any representation made to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition, size, location, present value, future value, (nc
herefrom or as to its production. Buyer accepts the property in "as is" condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6. in the event Buyer de
any additional inspection, said inspection shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyei
C
SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has received'no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property w
has not or will not be remedied prior to closing; (b) all obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens or other encumbra
of any nature shall be brought current on or before closing; and (c) the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and applia
shall be sound or in satisfactory working condition, at closing.
D„ C O N D I T I O N OF WELL. Seller warrants that any private well serving the property has, to the best of Sellers' knowledge, provided an adequate supp
water and continued use of the well or wells is authorized by a state permit or other legal water right
E. C O N D I T I O N OF SEPTIC TANK,, Seller warrants that any septic tank serving the property is, to tl ie best of Seder's ki owledge, ii i g :i : ::l v :: 'king • jrder
Seller has no knowledge of any needed repairs and it meets all applicable government health and construction standards.
I
ACCELERATION CLAUSE. N a later^than fiftejinHlB^days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, but"'not less than three _(3) days prior t c c i a
Seller shall provide to Buyer written verification as to whether or not any notes, mortgages, deeds of trust or real estate contracts against trrepr'Qpecty reqtnn
consent of the holder of such instrument(s) to the sale of the property or permit the holder to raise the interest rate and/or declare the entire, bafa/ice due it
event of sale If any such document so provides and holder does not waive the same or unconditionally approve the sale, then within three (3) flays after riot*
nonwaiver or disapproval or on the date of closing, whichever is earlier, Buyer shall have the option to declare this Agreement null and void by giving written n
to Seller or Seller's agent. In such case, all earnest money received under this Agreement shall be returned to Buyer. It is understood and agreed that if prow
for said "Due on Safe" clause are set forth in Section 7 herein, alternatives allowed herein shall become null and void.
G.
TITLE INSPECTION. No later than fifteen (1 5) days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3) days prior to closing. £
shall have the opportunity to inspect either an abstract of title brought current with an attorney's opinion, or a preliminary title report or» the subject prcc
Buyer shall have a period of three (3) days after receipt thereof to examine and accept. If Buyer does not accept. 8uyer shall give written notice thereof to S
or Seller's agent, within the prescribed time period specifying objections to title. Thereafter, Seller shall be required, through escrow at closing, to cur*
defect(s) to which Buyer has objected,. If said defect(s) is not curable through an escrow agreement at closing, this Agreement shall be i nil and void at the oi
of the Buyer, and all monies received, herewith shall be jeturnadJo the •..respective; parties,. h ,
H
TITLE INSURANCE, "If title" insurahce is elected; Sellef authorizes* the Listing' Brokerage^ to. ,ojder,a preliminary commitment for a standard form I
policy of title' insurance -to'*be issued by;such title insurance company as Seller snail-designate: Title policy'tb be issued shalloon tain no exceptions other
those provided for in-salcT standard form; and the encumbrances or defects excepted.under the'final contract.of sale. If title cannot be made so insurable:-thn
an escrow agreement at closing, the earnest money shall, unless Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and this Agroei
shall thereupon be terminated. Seller agrees to pay any cancellation charge.
I. EXISTING fENANT LEASES. If Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or leases, Seller agrees to provide to Buyer no later than fifteen ( I S
after Seller s acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3) days prior to closing, a copy of all existing leases (and any amendments thereto} afta
the property Unless written objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller's agent within three (3) working days thereafter, Buyer shall take title subject tc
leases, if objection is not remedied within the stated time, this Agreement shall be nt ill and • raid,

n-' -

CHANGES DURING TPaNSA*"**!CN
Qunng the pendency of this Agreement
*J*.M<. . -M-M' '*« "f.f <;*
- , •. I»T,,- nr* tr rnfo^ii«pi«: *p -nari,.. -

Seller agrees that no changes in any existing leases shall be mace
'"pf taken without the written consent of the Bt iver

K. AUTHORITY OF SIGNATORS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, or other entity, the person executing this Agreemei
behalf warrants his or her authority to go so and to bind Buyer or Seller.
L COMPLETE AGREEMENT — NO VERB At AGREEMENTS. This instrument.constitutes the entire Agreement between the parties and su perse
cancels any and all prior negotiations. represVntatwnsrwarfahtiesV understandings ora'greerWents between the parties. There are no verbal agreements whict
or affect this agreement. This Agreement cannot be changed except by mutual written agreement of the parties.
M. COUNTER OFFERS. Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyer shall be in writing and. if attached hereto, shall incorporate all the provisions
Agreement not expressly modified or excluded therein.
N. DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. In the event of default by Buyer. Seller may elect to either retain the earnest money as lie
damages or to institute suit to enforce any rights of Seller. In the event of default by Seller, or if this sale fails to close because of the nonsatisfactiori
express condition or contingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue of any default by Buyer), the earnest money
shall be returned toJkiyer. Both parties agree that, should either pa.rty deffault in^any of tfie covenants or ^agreem^nts herein; contained, the defaulting pai
pay ajl costs and expenses, including a rqasonatye attorney's fe*./irfcich may,arise or accrue, from enforcing or terminating this Agreement, or in pursu
remedy provided hereunder or by^ applicable law. whether such remedy is pursued by filing* surt fir othervyisef. In'the event theprincipal, broker holding the
money deposit is required to file Sri Interpleader action in court to resolve :a dispute* overthe earnest mdney deposit referred to herein,'Hhe Buyer an<
authorize the principal broker to draw from the earnest money deposit an"amount necessary to advance the costs of bringing the interpleader action. The
of deposit remaining after advancing those costs shall be interpleaded into court in accordance with state law. The Buyer and Seller further agree that the de
party shall pay the court costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the»principal broker in bringing such action.
0.

ABROGATION.

Execution of a final real estate contract if any, shall abrogauuhis Agreement.

P. RISK OF LOSS. Ail risk of toss or damage to the property shall be borrfe by the Seller until closing. In the event there is loss or damage to the f
between the date hereof and the date of closing, by reason of fire, vandalism; flood; earthquake, or acts of God, and the cost to repair such damage shall
ten percent (10%) of the purchase price of the property. Buyer may, at his option either proceed with this transaction if Seller agrees in writing to r<
replace damaged property prior to closing, or declare this Agreement null and void. If damage to property is less than ten percent (10%) of the purch8!
and Seller agrees in writing to repair or replace and does actually repair and replace damaged property prior to closing, this transaction shall proceed as
Q. TIME IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY, in the event that this sale can riot be closed by the dat^-^rbvided herein due to-interruption of tri
strikes, fire, flood, extreme weather, governmental regulations, acts of God,, of 'similar4, occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller, then the closing da
be extended seven (7) days beyond cessation of such condition, but in no event more tnan "thirty (30) days beyond the closing date provided herein. The
time is of the essence. This provision relates only to the extension of closing date. "Closing" shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments are
and delivered by all parties to the transaction.
R. CLOSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half (1/2) of the escrow closing fee. unless otherwise required by the lending institution
of providing title insurance or an abstract brought current shall be paid by Seller. Taxes and assessments for the current year, insurance, if acceptable to the
rents, and interest on assumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in Section 8. Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mortgage or other r
shall be assigned to Buyer at closing.
S. REAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING. If this agreement is for conveyance of fee title, title shell be conveyed by warranty deed free of defects oth
those excepted herein. If this Agreement is for sale or transfer of a Seller's interest under an existing real estate contract. Seller may transfer by either (a)
warranty deed, containing Seller's assignment of said contract in form sufficient to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporat
said existing real estate contract therein.
T.

AGENCY DISCLOSURE.

U.

BROKERAGE.

V.

DAYS.

Selling Brokerage may Have entered into an agreement to represent the Seller.

For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term "Brokerage" shall mean the respective listing or selling real estate

For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term "days" shall mean business or working days exclusive of legal holidays.
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THIS FORM HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMI

j 2 i ^ SkycrcHt ••Jlrule
Salt Lake City, UI 84108
21 Woveaber 1986
"•Mr. arte lire. Allen, Grahn
5 7 3 > i-^ i S r '* 11 o n C a ny o a
wait L-lvC i t) , i IT 6V] : I:
dear

Allen anc 3- ssephine:'

We need to call your at teat Ion, to a mutual
mistake in connection wita the property located at
2811 Erookcurn .Road whi c: > j t >i i are in the process of
acquiring £i-o~ us
, As you know, the total pi oper fcj consiste I • :)l
two different parcels. I-ased upon a previous Burvtj1 f
we presumed that the driv eway to the ler^er (one acre)
piece was the boundary. la f j e t , however, tae new
survey shows that the laae is mostly on tne one-half
• acre piece* The error w; *> I n locatin. "she driveway•
••othi n,L, ic chan^ .eci la the le^al descriptions.
You still have the aa-e
amount of property that was
deeded to y :>u. iio»,everf the buyer of the oae-hal f
acre piece needs to nave your driveway aoved so thet
he can procei : d vl \ ;: i the construction of hi s home •

1

Ji: can Love t.Se driveway for :/MU,

2)

-e wiii hjve to refund your ao^ey ana taKe •
baca tr.L property..
. ' w 'j aa ^ .would you like to do to resolve this
situation?
„ u u ,in i cry sorry tin is happened , a n 3 " *e hope
the matter -: an be ceso1v€d
to everyone's satisfaction.
Sincere.*

HeroId L. Gregory, Trustee
Albert Eccles Fa ally Trust

fjbtA9h&***1

«C4Lt r .

» *

YOUR HONOR.
JOSEPHINE M. GRAHN,
CALLED AS A WITNESS IN HER OWN BEHALF,
HAVING FIRST BEEN DULY SWORN, WAS
EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED UPON HER OATH
AS FOLLOWS:
DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. ADAMS:

Q

WOULD YOU STATE YOUR NAME AND PRESENT ADDRESS

FOR THE RECORD.

A

JOSEPHINE MAXWELL GRAHN, 2811 BROOKBURN ROAD,

Q

HOW LONG HAVE YOU RESIDED ON BROOKBURN ROAD?

A

SINCE JUNE 13, 1987.

Q

IS THAT THE PROPERTY WHICH IS THE SUBJECT OF

THIS LAWSUIT?

A

YES, IT IS.

Q

ARE YOU PRESENTLY EMPLOYED, MRS. GRAHN?

A

YES.

Q

WHERE ARE YOU EMPLOYED?

A

BONNEVILLE SCIENTIFIC.

Q

WITH RESPECT TO THE PROPERTY IN WHICH YOU PRESENTLY'

LIVE ON BROOKBURN ROAD, DID YOU PURCHASE THAT'HOME FROM THE
ECCLES FAMILY TRUST?

A

YES.

Q

AND HOW DID YOU FIRST BECOME AWARE OF IT OR BECOME
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YOU W O U L D ,

'H

-AGE

*hi^i
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-

-

"

DO YOU SEE THAT?
A

YES.

Q

THAT INDICATES: "A CERTIFIED SURVEY SHALL BE

FURNISHED AT THE EXPENSE OF" AND THEN THERE'S AN ASTERISK,
AND "PRIOR TO CLOSING."

THE ASTERISK LINE INDICATES

"EXISTING SURVEY ACCEPTABLE."
DID YOU DISCUSS WITH ANY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
TRUST THE UNDERTAKING OF A NEW SURVEY?
A

WE REQUESTED A NEW SURVEY AND THEY SAID.—

Q

WHO DID YOU REQUEST THAT FROM?

A

MARY ETHEL GREGORY.
THE COURT:

WHAT WAS THE NAME?

THE WITNESS:

MRS. GREGORY.

Q

(BY MR. ADAMS) WHAT DID SHE SAY?

A

SHE SAID, "WE HAVE A PERFECTLY GOOD SURVEY HERE

ALREADY AND IT SEEMS LIKE A WASTE OF MONEY TO EXPEND MORE
MONEY ON ANOTHER SURVEY."
AND I REALLY DIDN'T SEE ANY REASON TO GO AGAINST
THAT.
Q

DO YOU KNOW WHAT SURVEY SHE WAS REFERRING TO?

A

IT'S THE 1984 SURVEY FOR BARBARA DANIELSON.

Q

LET ME HAVE YOU LOOK AT WHAT HAS BEEN MARKED

AS PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 9 AND ASK IF THIS IS THE SURVEY -EXCUSE ME -- PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 1 AND ASK YOU IF THAT'S
THE SURVEY TO WHICH YOU ARE REFERRING.

A
TO.

I KNOW THAT THAT IS THE SURVEY WHICH SHE REFERRED

I NEVER DID ACTUALLY SEE THE SURVEY.
Q

NOW, IT NOTES THAT THIS PARTICULAR

PLAT."'-- '
DANIELSOIN

'JK

•

IBII

i

l-TFI

I, TS Oh

-jRVEY
DRR

SURVEY,

F ' -£ BARBARA
~ •>

li ID YiiU DISCUSS AT TriF TIME THAT YOU
Hh1 'I- i Wll ' I I II'1' I »IJI.' M i l
A

WE DIDN'T DISCUSS

IT.

?

SHE SAID, "WE HAVE THE

SURVEY THAT WE HAVE USED TO SEPARATE THE PARCELS."
I ASSUMED

IT WAS THE WHOLE PROPERTY AND NEVER

CHECKED INTO IT MORE CAREFULLY.
Q

ON WHAT DAY DTD YOU MAKE Th

A

WHEN WE REQUESTED THE SURVE'

?
-~«Cz^

."

SHE SAID, "WE ALREADY HAVE A PERFECTLY GOOD iuRVE'i GONE

Q
" < - ; - *

-

- , .-

" •

AGREtMt"N*

'.'-

it

LEGAL ;ESC'!"»T

_.oG* -'.G/- ' \ •

*'''!

_£'i"i. "ESCRI P~ ICf.

^1, "A**:

ROAD.
1 .. . I DO .

~ ' -- ' 5
. " ~ : r M ;•• o

;i£

•-;- AN

T. ECCLES, 2811 EAST BROOKBURN
?

A

-.A

A

1
2

IT WAS SHE WHO GAVE

THE INSTRUCTIONS.
Q

3
4

THAT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING.

AND AFTER THIS SURVEY WAS DONE, AND AFTER —

THE

PARCEL WAS ACTUALLY DEEDED TO YOUR SISTER; WAS IT NOT?

5

A

YES.

6

Q

AND AFTER THE PARCEL WAS DEEDED TO YOUR SISTER,

7

THE ROAD WAS MAINTAINED AS AN ENTRANCE TO THE MAIN ESTATE

8

PARCEL; IS THAT CORRECT?

9

A

YES.

10

Q

THEN, DID THERE COME A TIME WHEN BARBARA

11

DANIELSON DEEDED THE PROPERTY BACK TO THE TRUST?

12

A

YES.

13

Q

CAN YOU TELL ME WHY THAT OCCURRED?

14

A

SHE DECIDED SHE WAS UNABLE TO BUILD HER HOME'

15

BECAUSE BUILDING WAS TOO EXPENSIVE, AND. SHE DEEDED IT

16

BACK.

17
18

Q

AND WAS THAT PRIOR TO THE TIME THAT YOU HIRED

MR. TAYLOR TO LIST THE PROPERTY FOR SALE?

19

A

NO.

20

Q

THAT WAS AFTERWARDS?

21

A

YES.

22

Q

AT THE TIME THAT THE GRAHNS MADE THEIR EARNEST

23

MONEY AGREEMENT, OR SUBMITTED THEIR EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT

24

TO THE TRUST, THE TRUST OWNED ALL OF THE PARCEL; DID IT

25

NOT, THAT IS BOTH PARCEL 1 AND PARCEL 2?

1

1 S 7

1

HOME?

2

A

3

I ANSWERED

MV

-rcc;-rTMr,Mv

M V -rtrcTTviONY IS THAT

-. f A,

Q

I
5

THAT'C N n T

MR.

TAYLOR?

6

A

Nfi, WOT MECESSARM. t nil II

7

Q

Ml

9 I

A

' ^ \

'n '

Q

I M i n i / IIHI'.rHth! ul 1 IH i I I

•

TaYl

..OR

c

HOWED

-EXT C O N V E R S A T I O N YOU HAD WITH

.DSEPHINE GRAn

. r HAVE BEEN A F T E R THEY W E N T
?

13

B

A

AFTE-

'

H R O U G H THE HOME WITH

Q

AFTER SHE W E N T THROUGH THE HOME WITH MR.

A

I

Q

(<

DID

».. <: •-0,„ ..c'...^
YES .

Q

AND

TAYLOR?

;.
' —w

CONVERSATION
l'i I

A

HER.

- A N ...

OFFER

IN JANUARY
Ill I

- THE PROPER I i''

WAITING?
A

YES.

Q

LET M E SHOW YOU W H A T HAS BEEN

24 I PLAINTIFF'S E X H I B I T N O . 2 AND ASK YOU IF
25

EARNEST MONEY

, 3 ECCGN i I'!:

""--"

AGREEMENT.
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A

YES.

Q

WAS THAT SUBDIVISION EVER APPROVED?

A

YES.

Q

DID YOU SUBMIT ANY SURVEYS WITH THAT SUBDIVISION

REQUEST?

A

YES.

Q

CAN YOU TELL ME WHAT YOU SUBMITTED?

A

THE SURVEY WE LOOKED AT.
THE COURT:

MR. ADAMS, DID THIS TRANSPIRE AFTER

THE GRAHN CLOSING OR AFTER THE BRADSHAW Ci_OSING?
MR. ADAMS:

AFTER THE GRAHN CLOSING.

DID I SAY,

"BRADSHAW '?
THE COURT:

NO.

YOU SAID, "GRAHN."

I JUST

NO.

THIS IS AFTER THE GRAHN CLOSING,

WANTED TO MAKE SURE.
MR. ADAMS:
YOUR HONOR.

Q

CBY MR. ADAMS)

WHEN YOU INDICATED THAT YOU

SUBMITTED THE SURVEY WE DISCUSSED, YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT
PLAINTIFF ' S EXHIBIT NO. 1; IS THAT CORRECT?

A

YES.

Q

WAS THE SUBDIVISION APPROVED BASED UPON THAT

SURVEY?

A

YES.

Q

DO YOU KNOW ABOUT WHEN IT WAS APPROVED?

A

BY THE PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION IN
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LARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT;

RIGHT?

A

YES.

AND THAT

MR. ADAMS:

I ASK

-~

- - -:"~:CKEN AS A LEGAL

CONCLUSION.
I.?
13 I

THE WITNESS:
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THE COURT:

FINE.

MRS. GREGORY, YOU MAY STEP

DOWN.
MR. WOODBURY:

EXCUSE ME.

I DO HAVE A COUPLE

THINGS TO CLARIFY THE TESTIMONY THAT WE -THE COURT:

YOU MAY PROCEED ACCORDINGLY.
CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. WOODBURY:

Q

NOW, MRS. GREGORY, I THINK YOU STATED THAT YOU

ANSWERED A QUESTION WHERE YOU STATED CERTAIN INSTRUCTIONS
THAT WERE GIVEN TO THE SURVEYOR AT THE TIME THAT HE
SURVEYED THE PROPERTY.

DID YOU GIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE

SURVEYOR?
A

NO.

Q

SO, YOU DON'T KNOW WHAT INSTRUCTIONS WERE

SPECIFICALLY GIVEN TO THE SURVEYOR
A

NO.

Q

—

A

NO.

Q

OKAY.

~

YOURSELF, DO YOU?

NOW, WITH RESPECT TO THIS AESTHETIC

EASEMENT THAT WAS GIVEN, CAN YOU TELL ME HOW THAT AROSE?
A

JOSEPHINE AND I HAD BEEN TALKING MANY TIMES ON

THE PHONE , AS SHE EXPLAINED, ABOUT VARIOUS WARRANTIES AND
CONCESSIONS, OR WHATEVER YOU CALL THEM, THAT THEY WANTED
TO INCLUDE IN THEIR EARNEST MONEY ADDENDUM.

AND WE HAD

TALKED ABOUT DIFFERENT THINGS, BUT AT THIS POINT SHE ASKED
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i

1

I THOUGHT:

THAT ISN'T TOO 8AD.

2

THERE, HALF AN ACRE.

3

PLACE BEAUTIFUL.

4

WAS —

THERE'S PLENTY OF PROPERTY

AFTER ALL, IT'S JUST TO KEEP THE

IT'S NOT TO DO ANYTHING ELSE.

I REALLY WAS

SO, I

SYMPATHETIC.

5

Q

SO, DID YOU TALK TO YOUR BROTHER AND SISTER?

6

A

YES, I DID.

7

Q

AND YOUR HUSBAND?

8 I

A

YES.

9
10
11
12
13

AND I EXPLAINED IT AND MY POINT OF VIEW,

AND IT WAS AN IMPORTANT THING TO KEEP THE PLACE
AND REVERE THIS MEMORY OF ALL THIS.
Q

YOU WERE TRYING TO HELP THE GRAHNS TO GET THIS

PROPERTY, WERE YOU NOT?
A

YES, I REALLY WAS.

I WAS VERY -- JOSEPHINE AND

14

I HAD A WARM RAPPORT AND I KNEW WHAT SHE FELT.

15

SIMILARLY ABOUT THE BEAUTY OF THE PLACE.

16
17

BEAUTIFUL

Q

WE FELT

NOW, IN YOUR OPINION DOES THAT EASEMENT EXIST AND

STAND EVEN TODAY AS A VALID

EASEMENT?

18

A

WELL, IT STATES THAT THE -- VALID EASEMENT TODAY?

19

Q

LET ME ASK THE QUESTION.

I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU

20

HAVE TESTIFIED TO MR. ADAMS, HE ASKED DID YOU EVER GIVE

21

THAT EASEMENT?

22
23
24
25

A

DID YOU GIV€ THAT EASEMENT?

WE GAVE

IT IN THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT, BUT

WE DID NOT RECORD IT.
Q

NOW, HAD YOU TOLD THE BRADSHAWS

BEFORE THEY

PURCHASED THEIR PROPERTY ABOUT THIS EASEMENT?
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A

YES.

Q

SO, THEY WERE FULLY AWARE?

A

OH, THEY WERE.

IN FACT, WHEN I TOLD MR. BRADSHAW

ABOUT IT I SAID, "YOU KNOW, THERE'S A 15-FOOT EASEMENT
THERE.

I'M SORRY.

I HAVE REGRETTED IT SINCE I MADE IT,

BUT IT'S THERE AND IT'S BINDING BECAUSE IT'S SIGNED IN
THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT.

BUT EVEN THOUGH I DON'T LIKE

IT, I AM BOUND TO GO BY IT AND WE INTEND TO AND THIS IS IT."
AND HE SAID, "WELL, I DON'T CARE ABOUT THE
EASEMENT BECAUSE I CERTAINLY AM NOT GOING TO TAKE AWAY ANY
TREES OR SHRUBS.

I'M GOING TO PUT MORE IN AND MAKE IT

MORE BEAUTIFUL, IF ANYTHING."
Q

NOW, WHEN YOU GAVE THIS EASEMENT, YOU GAVE THE

EASEMENT RELYING ON THE SURVEY?
A

OF COURSE.

Q

KNOWN AS PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 1; IS THAT CORRECT?

A

SHOWING THE DRIVEWAY AS THE BOUNDARY, IS THAT

THE ONE?
Q

IS THAT THE ONE OF THE PROPERTY?

IS THAT CORRECT?

A

YES, OF COURSE, OR WE --

Q

OR YOU WHAT?

A

WELL, OF COURSE IF WE HAD KNOWN THAT THERE WAS

—

THAT THE DRIVEWAY WAS NOT THE BOUNDARY, WE NEVER WOULD HAVE
SEPARATED THE PIECES AS FAR AS THAT GOES.
Q

BUT WHAT DOES THE EASEMENT DO TO THAT PROPERTY?

1 Q C

A

WELL, IT RENDERS IT UNBUILDABLE.

Q

WHY IS THAT?

A

BECAUSE THE DRIVEWAY IS ACTUALLY ALMOST 20 FEET

FARTHER EAST AND SOUTH, AND THE BOUNDARIES ARE CLOSER TO
THAT LOT.

AND THEN IF WE GIVE A 15-FOOT EASEMENT BESIDE,

THERE IS NO WAY HE COULD PUT A HOUSE ON THERE.
Q

NOW, MRS. GREGORY, WITH RESPECT TO THE FIRST

RIGHT OF REFUSAL, WOULD YOU PLEASE LOOK AT PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT NO. 2, PLEASE.

I ASK YOU TO READ FOR THE COURT

THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF THAT AGREEMENT WHICH SETS FORTH -A

NOW, WHICH PAGE ARE YOU ON?

Q

YES.

A

SORRY.

Q

ON PAGE 3 OF THE ADDENDUM IN THIS PARAGRAPH

ON THE ADDENDUM.

THE ADDENDUM?

EXCUSE ME.

RIGHT HERE.
WHEN I SAY THAT, YOUR HONOR, THAT'S ACTUALLY
THE FOURTH PARAGRAPH ON THE PAGE.

IT'S THE LARGEST

PARAGRAPH ON THE PAGE DOWN AND IT'S UNDER ITS SUBPARAGRAPH
UNDER PARAGRAPH 'D.'
PLEASE GO AHEAD, MRS. GREGORY, AND READ.
A

IT STARTS "WITH RESPECT"?

Q

YES.

A

"WITH RESPECT TO THE ONE-HALF ACRE LOT ADJOINING

THE LOT WHICH IS THE SUBJECT OF THIS AGREEMENT, SELLER
HEREBY GRANTS TO BUYER THE FIRST OPTION TO PURCHASE THE
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Q

SO, YOU WON'T HAVE TO WARRANT ANYTHING OVER THE

ROAD THAT YOU WERE DEEDING TO HIM?

v

A

RIGHT.

Q

NOW, MRS. GREGORY, WITH RESPECT TO PROPERTY THAT

OU WERE DEEDING TO MR. BRADSHAW —

AND I ASK YOU TO LOOK

AT PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NO. 1 AGAIN.

DO YOU KNOW TODAY,

AND HAVE YOU EVER HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THAT PROPERTY
DESCRIPTION OVERLAPS OR CONFLICTS WITH THE PROPERTY
DESCRIPTION GIVEN TO THE GRAHNS?

A

NO.

Q

NOW, YOU WERE ASKED IF YOU HAD EVER INFORMED THE

COUNTY THAT THERE WAS A PROBLEM WITH THE LEGAL DESCRIPTION
ON THAT SURVEY WITH RESPECT TO THE BOUNDARY.

DO YOU KNOW

OF ANY PROBLEM WITH THE LEGAL DESCRIPTION WITH RESPECT TO
THE BOUNDARY OF THAT PROPERTY?

A

NO.

Q

IS IT YOUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE LEGAL

DESCRIPTION IS OKAY ON THAT, IT'S JUST THE LOCATION OF
! THE ROAD THAT CAUSED THE PROBLEM?

A

EXACTLY.

Q

SO, IT WAS YOUR IMPRESSION FROM A LEGAL

SUBDIVISION ON THE SIZE OF THE LOT THAT WAS GIVEN THAT
THE COUNTY, IN FACT, HAD THE PROPER BOUNDARY OF THE
PROPERTY; IS THAT CORRECT?

A

YES.

1 Q 7

Q

HAS ANYBODY TOLD YOU ANYTHING OTHERWISE SINCE

THAT TIME?
A

NO.

Q

AS FAR AS YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE LEGAL, OR

OF THE TECHNICAL BOUNDARY DISPUTE, TELL ME IN YOUR OWN
WORDS WHAT YOU FEEL IS THE PROBLEM, THE BOUNDARY-DISPUTE
PROBLEM.
A

WELL, WHAT I FEEL IS THE BOUNDARY-DISPUTE PROBLEM

IS THE ROAD IS PICTURED ON THE PARCEL 2 IN THE WRONG PLACE
INSTEAD OF JUST THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN 1 AND 2.
Q

AND FROM ALL OF YOUR CONVERSATION WITH

MR. MC NEIL AND THE OTHERS, THAT IS YOUR IMPRESSION AS TO
WHAT THE PROBLEM IS; IS THAT CORRECT?
A

YOU KNOW, I DON'T REALLY UNDERSTAND IT.

I JUST --

Q

YOU STILL DON'T UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEM; IS THAT

CORRECT?
A

I REALLY DON'T.

Q

OKAY.

I DON'T.

YOU JUST KNOW THAT THERE'S A PROBLEM; IS

THAT CORRECT?

—

A

I CERTAINLY DO.

Q

NOW, WITH RESPECT TO THE SURVEY GIVEN OR PROVIDED

WELL, WITH RESPECT TO THE SURVEY PROVIDED AS PLAINTIFF'S

EXHIBIT NO. 12, OR THE DRAWING, I SHOW THAT TO YOU AND CAN
YOU TELL ME THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH YOU CAN REMEMBER
THAT THAT WAS GIVEN TO YOU?

1
2

Q

AND DO YOU RECALL WHO THAT FRIEND OR NEIGHBOR

WAS THAT HE WAS WORKING FOR?

3

A

BARBARA DANIELSON.

4

Q

DID YOU SEE MRS. DANIELSON IN PREPARATION FOR

5 | MAKING THE SURVEY?
6

A

YES.

7

Q

WHAT INSTRUCTIONS DID SHE GIVE YOU, IF ANY,

8
9

WITH RESPECT TO MAKING THAT SURVEY?
A

I WAS TO DO A TOPOGRAPHIC SURVEY SUFFICIENT

10

ENOUGH FOR THEM TO LOCATE THE HOUSE, AND ALSO DIVIDE OFF

11

A HALF-ACRE PARCEL OFF THE FULL PIECE OF PROPERTY OWNED

12

BY HER MOTHER AND DAD.

13
14

Q

DID SHE INDICATE TO YOU AT ALL WHERE THAT HALF

ACRE SHOULD BE LOCATED?

15

A

IN THE SOUTHEAST CORNER.

16

Q

DID SHE INDICATE TO YOU WITH RESPECT TO WHERE

17

THE ROAD SHOULD BE LOCATED IN RESPECT TO THAT HALF-ACRE

18

PARCEL?

19

A

I WAS TO STAKE TO THE SOUTH OR —

EXCUSE ME --

20

TO THE SOUTH AND EAST OFF THE ROA"D, USE THE ROAD AS THE

21

BOUNDARY.

22
23
24
25

Q

WHAT DID YOU DO IN PROCEEDING WITH RESPECT TO

COMING UP WITH THIS SURVEY?
A

THE FIRST THING I DID WAS GO TO THE COUNTY

RECORDER'S OFFICE AND PICK UP ALL THE LEGAL DESCRIPTIONS

1

OF NOT ONLY THE OVERALL PIECE OF PROPERTY, BUT ALL THE

2

NEIGHBORING PIECES OF PROPERTY.

3

THE SURVEY, MEANING I DREW UP THE LEGAL DESCRIPTION AS

4

IT WAS —

5

NEIGHBORING PROPERTIES TO SEE HOW THEY FIT TOGETHER.

6

THEN I TRIED TO TIE ALL THE PROPERTIES INTO THE SECTION

7

CORNER, WHICH WAS NOT IN EXISTENCE.

8

INTO THE COUNTY MONUMENT SYSTEM AND IN THE SUBDIVISION

9

AFTER THAT I LINED OUT

AS I READ IT, AND THEN DREW UP ALL THE
AND

SO, WE HAD TO TIE IT

I TO THE EAST.

10

Q

WHAT DID YOU DO NEXT?

u

A

SUBSEQUENTLY I SENT OUT MY FIELD CREW CONSISTING

,2 I OF DALE BENNETT AND A HELPER AND HAD THEM BRING —

MAKE

13

SET REFERENCE POINTS, MEASURE TO THE REFERENCE POINTS,

14

BRING BACK THE INFORMATION.

*1

CALCULATED THE CO-ORDINATES SO WE COULD GO BACK —

?»

HE COULD GO BACK OUT AND SET THE PROPERTY CORNERS.

**

—

AND THEN DALE AND I TOGETHER
OR SO

Q

DID HE, IN FACT, GO BACK AND DO THAT?

A

YES, HE DID.

Q

AND DID THAT SURVEYING WORK CULMINATE IN WHAT

**S BEEN MARKED AS PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 1?
A

YES.

Q

WHAT DID YOU DO WITH PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 1 AFTER

PINALIZED IT?
A

I GAVE IT TO MRS. DANIELSON.

«*'•* i

<*

WHEN WAS THE NEXT CONTACT THAT YOU HAD WITH
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TO UNDERSTAND?
A

NO.

Q

OKAY.

MOW, LET ME ASK THIS QUESTION ALSO.

WHEN

MRS. DANIELSON -- SO THAT I UNDERSTAND IT CLEARLY, WHEN
MRS. —

OR WHEN MR. BUTLER GAVE YOU THE INSTRUCTIONS AS

TO WHAT TO DO TO SURVEY THAT PROPERTY —
THIS QUESTION FIRST.

LET ME ASK YOU

EXCUSE ME.

WAS IT MRS.' DANIELSON OR MR. BUTLER THAT GAVE
YOU THE INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO SURVEY THIS PROPERTY AND
WHAT TO DO WITH RESPECT TO SURVEYING THE PROPERTY?
A

INITIALLY I WAS CONTACTED BY DENIS BUTLER BY

PHONE AND IT WASN'T IMMEDIATELY AFTER THAT, BECAUSE I
DID SOME RESEARCH FIRST, BUT THEN WE DID MEET UP ON THE
SITE TOGETHER AND BASICALLY OUTLINED WHAT MY RESPONSIBILITIES WOULD BE.
Q

OKAY.

NOW, THE OUTLINE OF YOUR RESPONSIBILITIES,

AS I UNDERSTOOD IT, WERE THAT YOU WERE TO TRY -- ONE OF
YOUR RESPONSIBILITIES WAS TO TRY AND CREATE A HALF-ACRE
PARCEL ON THIS SIDE OF THE ROAD; IS THAT CORRECT?
A

THAT'S CORRECT.

Q

AND ONE OF THE OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES WAS TO

HAVE THE ROAD BE THE BOUNDARY?
A

THAT'S CORRECT.

Q

IS THAT CORRECT?

A

YES.
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AND THEN WAS A THIRD RESPONSIBILITY TO CREATE A

Q

TOPOGRAPHICAL MAP TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE WAS A
BUILDABLE LOT THERE?

IS THAT CORRECT?

A

THAT'S CORRECT.

Q

SO, THOSE WOULD BE THE THREE THINGS THAT WERE

REQUIRED OF YOU AT THAT POINT IN TIME; IS THAT CORRECT?

A

YES.

Q

OKAY.

NOW, WHY WAS IT THAT THEY NEE DED A

HALF-ACRE PARCEL, FROM YOUR UNDERSTANDING?

1

A

DENIS WAS -- DENIS BUTLER WAS GOING TO DESIGN •

A HOUSE FOR BARBARA DANIELSON.

Q

AND THEY WOULD EVENTUALLY HAVE TO GO THROUGH AND

GET A PERMIT FROM SALT LAKE COUNTY?

A

YES.

Q

AND IS IT A REQUIREMENT IN SALT LAKE COUNTY THAT

| YOU HAVE /t\ HALF-ACRE PARCEL TO BUILD A HOUSE IN THIS AREA?

A

THE REQUIREMENTS WILL VARY ACCORDING TO Trie ZONES

YOU'RE IN •
|

Q

NOW, YOU STATED THAT YOU WENT TO THE COUNTY AND

i SIGNED AND OBTAINED THE LEGAL DESCRIPTIONS OF THE PROPERTY
AND THE SURROUNDING PROPERTIES; IS THAT CORRECT?

A

THAT'S CORRECT.

Q

WERE THERE ANY PROBLEMS WITH RESPECT TO THE LEGAL

DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY BEFORE YOU —

YOU KNOW,WEN YOU

LAID THEM OUT INITIALLY BEFORE YOU ACTUALLY TRIED TO DO THE
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DRAWING ITSELF?
A

ANY TIME YOU HAVE AN OLD DESCRIPTION, YOU KNOW,

YOU GOT TO WORK OUT PROBLEMS.

THIS WAS AN OLD LEGAL

DESCRIPTION WITH RODS AND CHAINS AND YOU KNEW THERE WOULD
3E PROBLEMS THAT WAY.

THERE WAS ALWAYS A PROBLEM IN THAT

THERE WAS TEN FEET, A TEN-FOOT STRIP BETWEEN BROOKBURN
ROAD OR THE BOUNDARY OF BROOKBURN ROAD AND THE OVERALL
PARCEL.
Q

AND DID YOU HELP THE PARTIES OR THE TRUST OR

MRS. DANIELSON OBTAIN THE DEED TO GET THAT PROPERTY QUIT
CLAIMED?
A

YES.

Q

TO THE TRUST?

A

YES.

AT THAT TIME IT WASN'T A TRUST, SO I WAS

ONLY WORKING WITH —
Q

THAT WAS MY NEXT QUESTION.

COULD YOU TELL ME HOW,

WHEN YOU WENT TO OBTAIN THE RECORD, HOW THE BROOKBURN
PROPERTY WAS LEGALLY HELD?

DO YOU REMEMBER?

A

I DON'T REMEMBER.

Q

DO YOU REMEMBER WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS IN THE NAME

OF A TRUST?
A

I DON'T REMEMBER.

Q

OKAY.

I COULD FIND OUT.

BUT IN ANY EVENT YOU UNDERSTOOD THAT YOU

WERE TO OBTAIN OR TO DIVIDE OFF AN AVAILABLE LOT CONSISTING
OF AT LEAST A HALF AN ACRE WITH THE ROAD AS A BOUNDARY SO
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Q

DO THEY OVERLAP?

A

NO.

Q

THERE ISN'T AN OVERLAPPING WITH RESPECT TO THOSE

TWO LEGAL DESCRIPTIONS?
A

NO.

Q

NOW, SINCE THE TIME THAT YOU ORIGINALLY DID THIS

SURVEY, YOU HAVE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY- TO GO BACK AND SURVEY
BOTH PARCELS?
A

YES.
MR. WOODBURY:
THE COURT:

THANK YOU.

MR. WALKER.
CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. WALKER:
Q

LET ME ASK YOU WITH REGARD TO THE DISTANCE BETWEEN

POINT 'A' AND POINT ' C *

HOW MUCH DIFFERENCE DOES THE TWO-

DEGREE ERROR MAKE IN THE TWO SURVEYS AS FAR AS FOOTAGE?

DO

YOU KNOW?
A

IT DEPENDS ON HOW FAR AWAY YOU GET FROM POINT «A.'

THE FURTHER AWAY, THE GREATER THE AREA.
Q

IT MAGNIFIES.

GOING BACK AFTER HAVING DONE THIS SURVEY, DO YOU

KNOW WHAT THE DISTANCE IS BETWEEN POINT 'A' AND POINT ' C
ON THE ORIGINAL SURVEY?
A

NO.

Q

OKAY.

IT WOULD BE WHAT?

TWO HUNDRED FEET.

AND THEN GOING BACK AND REDOING THE SURVEY

AGAIN, WHAT WAS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 'A' AND »C

IN THE
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1

POINT TO THAT, WHERE THAT IS.

2

A

3

RIGHT THERE.

CALL THAT 'D.'

AND THAT'S AS FAR

AS WE COULD GET.

4

Q

AFTER THAT IT'S FOLIAGE?

5

A

YES.

6 I

Q

WOULD YOU DESCRIBE

7

A

EXTREMELY.

8 I

Q

DID YOU RECEIVE ANY

9

IT AS DENSE?

INSTRUCTIONS FROM BARBARA

DANIELSON AS TO WHAT YOU WERE TO DO IF YOU COULDN'T GET A

10

HALF-ACRE

H

THE PRIVATE DRIVE?
THAT

12

Y0U

13

IN THAT AREA YOU DESCRIBED AS SOUTH AND EAST OF
WERE THERE ANY CONTINGENCY

INSTRUCTIONS

RECEIVED?

A

NO.

BECAUSE THERE'S PLENTY OF ROOM FOR A HALF

Q

EVERYBODY ASSUMED THAT AT THE TIME WITHOUT

j
14
15
16
17
18

ACRE.

ACTUALLY HAVING THE SQUARE FOOTAGE KNOWN; IS THAT CORRECT?
A

THAT'S CORRECT.

WE WOULD HAVE -- HAD THERE NOT

BEEN ROOM, WE WOULD HAVE ASKED FOR

19 j

MR. SIMS:

20

THE COURT:

DO YOU HAVE ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS,

MR. ADAMS:

NO, YOUR HONOR.

21
22

THANK YOU.

INSTRUCTIONS.

THAT'S ALL I HAVE.

MR. ADAMS?
I WONDER

IF IT MIGHT

23

BE APPROPRIATE, WE DO HAVE ONE WITNESS-SCHEDULING PROBLEM --

24

THAT WE MAY TAKE A TEN-MINUTE RECESS AND LET ME DISCUSS

25

THIS WITH COUNSEL.

THIS TIME.
THE COURT:

MR. ADAMS HAS SOME QUESTIONS.

GO

AHEAD, MR. ADAMS.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. ADAMS:
Q

MR. REYNOLDS, AS I' UNDERSTAND YOUR PRIOR

TESTIMONY, PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 1 WAS SUBMITTED TO THE
PLANNING COMMISSION AS A PART OF THE SUBDIVISION APPROVAL;
IS THAT CORRECT?
A

REFERRING TO THIS?

Q

REFERRING TO PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 1, THAT IS THIS.

A

YES.

Q

AND WAS THE BOUNDARY OF THE ROAD, THAT IS THIS

ROAD BEING THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE TWO PARCELS, A
SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN APPROVAL OF THAT SUBDIVISION PLAT?
A

. IT WAS VERY CRITICAL.

Q

CAN YOU TELL ME WHY IT WAS CRITICAL?

A

BECAUSE OF THE STEEPNESS OF THAT SITE AND THE

VEGETATION ON IT THE PLANNING COMMISSION WAS VERY CONCERNED
THAT THERE BE AS LITTLE DISTURBING OF THE SITE BY REMOVING
VEGETATION AS POSSIBLE.

AND THE ROAD WAS THERE.

VERY NARROW, BUT IT DID —

IT WAS

HAD BEEN SERVING ADEQUATELY THE

EXISTING HOME AT THE BOTTOM ON THE PARCEL TO THE WEST, AND
TO DISTURB THAT -- THEY TALKED ABOUT AND -- AND WE TALKED
AS STAFF OF SOME OF THE ALTERNATIVES AND IT ENDED UP BEING
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1

THAT'S WHAT YOU AGREED?

2

A

PARCEL 1, THAT'S RIGHT.

3

Q

PARCEL 1 IS THE PROPERTY THAT YOU DESCRIBED AS

4

THE ONE-ACRE PROPERTY; IS THAT CORRECT?

5

A

YES, THAT'S CORRECT.

6

Q

AND THE PARCEL 2 IS THE HALF-ACRE PARCEL; IS THAT

7

MY UNDERSTANDING?

8

A

YES.

9

Q

WAS IT IMPORTANT TO YOU THAT THEY CONTAIN

10

APPROXIMATELY THOSE ACREAGES?

11
12

A

15

IMPORTANT THAT THE HALF ACRE

CONTAIN A HALF ACRE BECAUSE OF ZONING REQUIREMENTS.

13
14

IT WAS EXTREMELY

Q

WAS IT IMPORTANT ALSO THAT IT BE BIG ENOUGH TO

BUILD ON?
' A

ABSOLUTELY.

16

Q

IS THAT CORRECT?

17

A

YES.

18

Q

AT THE TIME YOU SOLD THE PROPERTY TO THE GRAHNS,

19

DID YOU INTEND TO GIVE THEM MORE PROPERTY THAN THE ACRE

20

PARCEL?

21

A

NO.

22

Q

YOU ONLY

23

INTENDED TO GIVE THEM AN ACRE PARCEL;

IS THAT CORRECT?

24

A

YES.

25

Q

NOW, I ASK YOU THIS.

YOU ALSO INTENDED TO GIVE

300

THEM THE ROAD; DID YOU NOT?

A

IT WAS OUR UNDERSTANDING, BASED ON THE SURVEY,

THAT THE ROAD WAS -- THE EAST SIDE OF THE ROAD WAS THE
DIVIDING BOUNDARY.

Q

SO, IF I UNDERSTAND YOUR TESTIMONY, THAT YOU

UNDERSTOOD THAT YOU WERE GIVING THEM THE ROAD BECAUSE ITWAS WITHIN THE ONE-ACRE PARCEL THAT YOU WERE SELLING; IS
THAT CORRECT?

A

YES, THAT WAS OUR UNDERSTANDING.

Q

BUT IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAT YOU SELL THAT

! ONE-ACRE PARCEL THAN IT WAS THAT YOU SELL THE ROAD; IS THAT
i CORRECT?

A

Q

Y

E

S

.

••••.-.•'•

AND THAT WAS BECAUSE YOU NEEDED A BUILDABLE

PARCEL, SECOND PARCEL; IS THAT CORRECT?

A

CORRECT.

Q

NOW, MR. GREGORY, IF YOU HAD KNOWN THAT THERE

WAS LESS THAN A HALF-ACRE PARCEL ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THAT
ROAD, WOULD YOU HAVE DIVIDED THE PROPERTY AND SOLD THE
PROPERTY^>

i
!

A
Q

NO, ABSOLUTELY NOT.
YOU WOULD HAVE SOLD THE PROPERTY AS ONE PARCEL,

ONE WHOLE: PARCEL?

'

A

YES.

Q

YOU WERE MISTAKEN AS TO THAT PROPERTY; IS THAT
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Q

BUT YOU WERE WILLING TO GIVE THEM A COPY OF THE

EXISTING SURVEY THAT YOU HAD?
A

OH, YES.

Q

DID THEY EVER ASK FOR A COPY OF THAT SURVEY?

A

NO.

Q

THEY HAVE NEVER ASKED YOU FOR A COPY OF THE

SURVEY, IS YOUR RECOLLECTION?
A

NEVER.

Q

NOW, I ASK YOU TO READ PARAGRAPH 6 FOR THE

COURT ON THE SECOND PAGE OF THAT AGREEMENT.
A

OKAY.

OH, YES.

"SELLER WARRANTIES.

IN ADDITION TO

WARRANTIES CONTAINED IN SECTION »C,' THE
FOLLOWING ITEMS ARE ALSO WARRANTED:

THE

LOT PURCHASED HEREUNDER IS ILLEGALLY
DIVIDED AND SEPARATE FROM THE ADJOINING
LOT LISTED BY SELLERS ACCORDING TO SALT
LAKE COUNTY PLANNING AND ZONING RECORDS."
Q

OKAY.

DO YOU REMEMBER THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT

AROSE WHERE YOU AGREED TO THE TERMS OF THE LANGUAGE IN
IN THAT PARAGRAPH?
A

YES.

THE GRAHNS WERE VERY INSISTENT THAT WE

INCLUDE IN THERE THE STATEMENT THAT IT WAS LEGALLY
SUBDIVIDED, AND WE SAID, WE DON'T KNOW.

WE HAVE NO REASON,

WE HAVE NO BASIS ON WHICH TO SAY OR TO WARRANT THAT IT IS
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SUBDIVIDED.

HOWEVER, WE DO HAVE -- WE HAVE --

IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT THE HALF ACRE HAD BEEN
TRANSFERRED TO MRS. DANIELSON AND BACK AND SINCE THAT
TIME WE HAD BEEN RECEIVING
TWO PIECES OF PROPERTY.

SEPARATE TAX NOTICES ON THE

THEREFORE, WE ASSUMED THAT IT

WAS LEGALLY DIVIDED ACCORDING TO THE COUNTY'S RECORDS.
Q

DID MR. TAYLOR EVER MAKE ANY

TO YOU WITH RESPECT TO THAT
A

YES.

REPRESENTATIONS

PARAGRAPH?

HE SAID, "WELL, THEY WANT VERY MUCH TO

HAVE YOU WARRANT THAT IT'S LEGALLY DIVIDED.

SO, IF YOU

WILL WORD IT IN THAT MANNER, THEN THERE WILL BE NO -YOU WON'T BE LIABLE."
Q

AND YOU RELIED ON MR. TAYLOR'S

REPRESENTATION

WITH RESPECT TO THAT?
A

THAT'S RIGHT.

Q

BEFORE SIGNING THE AGREEMENT?

A

THAT'S CORRECT.

Q

NOW,

A

YES.

Q

CAN YOU TELL ME THE DATE YOU SIGNED THAT AGREEMENT?!

A

MARCH

Q

OKAY.

IS THAT YOUR SIGNATURE ON THE AGREEMENT?

19TH, 1986.
NOW,

I ASK YOU TO LOOK AT —

NOW, MR. GREGORY,

IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING

GAVE AN EASEMENT PURSUANT TO THAT AGREEMENT;
A

STRIKE THAT.
THAT YOU

IS THAT CORRECT?)

YES, SIR.
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1 I
2

Q

5
6
7
8
9
10

11
12

IN YOUR MEETINGS WITH THE SURVEYOR

OTHERWISE YOU WERE

3 I WAS ANY

4

NOW,

INFORMED, OR DID YOU FEEL THAT THERE

INTERSECTION BETWEEN THE PARCEL NO. 2 AND

PARCEL NO. 1, OR OVERLAPPING?
A

WE, OF COURSE, WONDERED ABOUT THAT, BUT, NO,

WE DID NOT ASSUME THERE WAS.
Q

DID ANYONE ELSE TELL YOU THAT THERE WAS

OVERLAPPING BETWEEN THE TWO, THE TWO DEEDS?
A

YES.

I THINK MR. MC NEIL SAID THERE WAS AN

OVERLAP.
Q

TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE YOU DON'T KNOW THAT THERE

WAS ANY OVERLAP?

13

A

THAT'S RIGHT.

14

Q

OKAY.

15
16 I
17
18

AND

AND THAT WAS THE WARRANTY

DEED SIGNED

BY YOU; IS THAT CORRECT?
A

YES, SIR.
MR. WOODBURY:

NOW, LET'S HAVE THIS MARKED AS

DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT NO. 16.

19

(.WHEREUPON, EXHIBIT 16-D WAS
INTRODUCED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)

20
21
22

MR. WOODBURY:

LET THE RECORD REFLECT THAT

I'M

SHOWING DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT NO. 16 TO OPPOSING COUNSEL.

23

MR. ADAMS:

WE HAVE NO OBJECTION, YOUR

24

THE COURT:

MR. WALKER?

25|

MR. WALKER:

NO OBJECTION.

HONOR.

HOME AND THEY HAD UNTIL AUGUST 1ST TO DO THAT AND THAT WE
COULD SEE THE PROPERTY AND MAKE AN OFFER AND THAT WOULD
GIVE THEM —

I CAN'T REMEMBER HOW LONG, A WEEK OR SO,

SOMETHING LIKE THAT, TO CLOSE ON THEIR OFFER BEFORE THEY
COULD ACC EPT OUR OFFER.

Q

OKAY.

SO THEN WHAT HAPPENED?

A

SO THEN WE WENT AND WE SAW THE PROPERTY AND

j

MR. AND MRS. GREGORY SHOWED IT TO US.

Q

SHOWED YOU THE PROPERTY AT THAT POINT I"i TIME?

A

YES.

Q

DID YOU MAKE AN OFFER TO THEM?

A

NO.

BECAUSE WE THOUGHT THE WAY HOUSES WERE

SELLING THAT IT MIGHT BE TO OUR BEST ADVANTAGE TO WAIT
UNTIL AUGUST 1ST AND HOPE THAT THE OTHER PEOPLE'S PROPERTY
WOULDN'T SELL AND THEY WOULD BECOME DISCOURAGED, AND THEN
WE COULD BUY IT.
DID YOU EVER GO BACK TO THE PROPERTY ANOTHER TIME

Q

AFTER THAT?

i

A

LOTS OF TIMES.

Q

WHEN WERE THOSE TIMES?

A

WE WERE GOING ON SATURDAYS AND SUNDAYS AND

WILL YOU DESCRIBE THOSE.

EVENINGS -- AND SIT DOWN AND SKETCH THE HOUSE AND HE WOULD
SKETCH

3
— MY HUSBAND WOULD TRY TO COME UP WITH A F LAN,

POSSIBLY.

Q

DID YOU EVER GO THROUGH THE HOUSE AGAIN p
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Q

WHAT WAS THE PURCHASE PRICE OF THAT PROPERTY?

A

$63,000.

Q

HAD YOU SEEN A SURVEY OF THE PROPERTY AT THE TIME

YOU SIGNED THAT?
A

YES.

Q

I SHOW YOU WHAT HAS BEEN MARKED AS PLAINTIFF'S

EXHIBIT NO. 1 AND ASK IF YOU CAN IDENTIFY THAT.
A

YES.

WE WENT TO —

THIS IS THE SURVEY THAT WE WERE GIVEN WHEN
I GUESS WE WENT TO LOOK AT THE LOT AND THEN

WE CONTACTED THE GREGORYS AND THEY OBTAINED THAT SURVEY
FROM MRS. DANIELSON AND WE TOOK IT HOME WITH US TO SEE IF
THE HOUSE THAT WE HAVE BEEN WORKING ON FOR THE LAST FEW
YEARS WOULD FIT ON THE PROPERTY.
Q

OKAY.

NOW, TELL ME ABOUT THIS HOUSE THAT YOU

HAVE BEEN WORKING ON FOR THE PAST THREE YEARS.
A

WELL, MY HUSBAND WANTS TO BUILD A HOME THAT HE

CAN SPEND, I GUESS, THE REST OF HIS LIFE WORKING ON
ARTISTIC DETAILS.

AND SO HE'S BEEN WORKING ON THE

RENDERING OR THE FRONT AND, YOU KNOW, DIFFERENT THINGS HE
WANTS TO DO IN THE ROOMS FOR ABOUT SIX YEARS, AND I IN MY
SPARE TIME WORK ON A FLOOR PLAN THAT I WANT THAT WILL FIT
INSIDE HIS DIMENSIONS.
Q

AND YOU HAVE THIS HOME THAT EFFECTIVELY YOU HAVE

3EEN DESIGNING FOR THAT PERIOD OF TIME; IS THAT CORRECT?
A

YES.

^ftq

BE ADMITTED.

1

|

THE COURT:

2

WHY DON'T YOU MARK IT AND WE'LL HAVE

IT ADMITTED.

3

THE CLERK:

17-D.

cn

4

MR. WOODBURY:

6

MR. SIMS:

7

THE COURT:

!

DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT NO. 17.

NO OBJECTION.
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT NO. 17 IS

ADMITTED.

8

(WHEREUPON, EXHIBIT 17-D WAS
RECEIVED INTO EVIDENCE.)

9

j

10

Q

11

(BY MR. WOODBURY)

MRS. BRADSHAW, I SHOW YOU WHAT

12 1

HAS BEEN MARKED AS DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT NO. 17 AND ASK YOU

13

IF YOU KNOW WHAT THAT IS.
A

14

THAT IS THE MODEL THAT WE MADE BEFORE WE BOUGHT

THE HOME -- OR BOUGHT THE PROPERTY.

15

Q

16

OKAY.

AND YOU WORKED ON THAT TOGETHER; IS THAT

CORRECT?

17
18

A

YES.

1

19

Q

AND IS IT BASICALLY IN THE CONDITION NOW AS IT

WAS WHEN YOU ORIGINALLY MADE IT?

20
21

A

YES.

22

Q

COULD YOU PUT TREES OR ANYTHING THERE SOMEHOW,

23 1

YOU KNOW -A

24

WE HAD TO PUT TREES ON IT TO CONVINCE WARREN

REYNOLDS THAT THE INTEGRITY OF THE PROPERTY WAS NOT GOING

25

!

372

TO BE DESTROYED.
Q

SO, YOU USED THIS MODEL FOR GOING THROUGH

PLANNING AND ZONING MEETINGS AND THINGS LIKE THAT AS WELL;
IS THAT CORRECT?
A

YES.

Q

AND THE WAY YOU BUILT THIS TO SCALE WAS FROM THE

PLAN THAT IS KNOWN AS PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NO. 1; IS THAT
CORRECT?
A

CORRECT.

Q

SO, IN ANY EVENT YOU BECAME CONVINCED THAT YOU

COULD BUY THIS PROPERTY; IS THAT CORRECT?
A

YES.

THE MODEL CONVINCED ME.

Q

THAT IT COULD BE PLACED; IS THAT CORRECT?

A

YES.

Q

NOW, YOU THEN MADE THE OFFER ON THE PROPERTY; IS

THAT MY UNDERSTANDING?
A

YES.

Q

AND THE OFFER WAS ACCEPTED?

A

EVENTUALLY.

THE GRAHNS HAD AN OPTION TO PURCHASE

THE PROPERTY BEFORE US.
Q

OKAY.

SO, YOU UNDERSTOOD THAT THEY HAD A SEVEN-

DAY OPTION TO PURCHASE THE PROPERTY; IS THAT RIGHT?
A

RIGHT.

Q

IS THAT YOUR UNDERSTANDING?

A

YES.
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UNLESS S HE KNOWS WHAT THE GREGORYS HAD IN MIND.
THE COURT:

THE OBJECTION IS SUSTAINED.

YOU CAN

ASK HER TO -- REPHRASE YOUR QUESTION.
(BY MR. WOODBURY)

Q

OKAY.

WERE YOU TOLD ANY

OTHER REASON WHY THE AGREEMENT WAS NECESSARY-3

A

I DON'T RECALL EXACTLY.

I THINK I"* WAS THAT THE

GREGORYS NEEDED PROTECTION IN CASE OF

—

q

BECAUSE THERE WAS A PROBLEM WITH THE ROAD?

A

YES.

i

OR WE KNEW ABOUT THE PROBLEM WITH THE ROAD, j
i

OKAY.

0

NOW, MRS. BRADSHAW, I WOULD LIKE YOU TO

i
1

1 READ

- - (DR

LET ME ASK YOU ONE OTHER QUESTION .

DISCOVERED THE MISTAKE —
IF I DID .

WHEN YOU

MAYBE I ASKED THIS AND EXCUSE ME

WHEN THEY DISCOVERED THE MISTAKE ON THE PROPER-

TIES ,.DID MRS. GREGORY OR MR. GREGORY OFFER TO LET YOU SACK

OUT OF THE DEAL AT THAT TIME?

A

YES.

Q

WHY NOT?

A

BECAUSE WE HAD PUT IN AN INCREDIBLE AMOUNT OF

BUT WE DIDN'T WANT TO.

TIME AND ENERGY AND MONEY AND WE WERE LIVING IN A HOUSE
THAT HAD BEEN VACANT THAT WAS GOING TO BE TORN DOWN, WITH

THE ROOF CAVING IN, AND WE HAD SACRIFICED SO MUCH FOR THE
PROPERTY WE DIDN'T WANT TO GIVE IT UP.

Q

OKAY.

IF THE GREGORYS WOULD HAVE REFUSED TO

LET YOU (:LOSE ON THE PROPERTY, WOULD YOU HAVE: INSTIGATED
LEGAL ACTIONS TO TRY AND GET THE PROPERTY?
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1

ABOUT THE EASEMENT THAT EXISTED TO THAT PROPERTY; IS THAT
CORRECT?
A

YES.

0

AND WHAT WAS YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THAT EASEMENT?

A

JUST THAT YOU CAN'T BUILD ON THAT EASEMENT OR

REMOVE THE TREES.
Q

FOR APPROXIMATELY 15

—

A

FIFTEEN FEET.

Q

AND IT WAS PRIMARILY ADDED NOT TO REMOVE

VEGETATION ON THAT PROPERTY; IS THAT CORRECT?
'A
Q

YES.
OKAY.

AND YOU WANTED TO BUY THE PROPERTY THAT

DAY?
A

.YES.

Q

IS THAT MY UNDERSTANDING?

A

YES.

Q

WHY IS IT YOU WERE SO ATTACHED TO THE PROPERTY?

A

BECAUSE I HAD BEEN LOOKING FOR PROPERTY FOR

APPROXIMATELY EIGHT YEARS AND I JUST HAD A GREAT FEELING
WITH THE PIECE OF PROPERTY, THE STREET, AND THE AREA.
Q

OKAY.

NOW, YOU HEARD YOUR WIFE TESTIFY THAT YOU

APPARENTLY SAW THE SURVEY BEFORE THE PURCHASE OF THE
PROPERTY AS WELL; IS THAT YOUR UNDERSTANDING?
A

YES.

Q

AND YOU BUILT THE MODEL ABOUT THE TIME YOU WERE

7 n -i

-——————————————_____________________________________________________

MAKING •[HE OFFER ON THE PROPERTY ALSO; IS THAT CORRECT?

A

YES.

Q

AND THAT YOU HAVE WANTED TO -- YOU WANTED TO

j

BUILD YOUR DREAM HOUSE ON THIS PROPERTY; IS THAT CORRECT?

A

YES.

Q

NOW, WHEN WAS THE FIRST TIME YOU CONTACTED AN

'

1

ARCHITECT FOR HIM TO START PREPARING PLANS ON THIS PROPERTY?

A

WELL, IT MUST HAVE BEEN RIGHT -- I THINK I

STARTED TALKING TO HIM JUST WHEN —

AS SOON AS I FOUND OUT
1

j THE LOT WAS AVAILABLE.

Q

SO, YOU STARTED TALKING TO HIM ALMOST RIGHT AWAY;

IS THAT CORRECT?

A

YES.

Q

AND WHEN DID HE START TO WORK ON.THOSE PLANS?

A

AS SOON AS I GOT THE MAP FROM THE GREGORYS.

Q

WAS IT A WHILE BEFORE YOU DISCOVERED THE MISTAKE

ON THE PROPERTY?

A

OH, YEAH.

Q

I NOTICE THESE PLANS WERE DATED OCTOBER 28TH,

A

YES.

1986.

1
|

Q

IS THAT CORRECT?

A

YES.

Q

IS THIS JUST A LATER DRAFT OF THE PLANS THAT YOU

HAD THAT HE HAD BEEN DRAWING FOR YOU OVER A PERIOD OF TIME? j

i
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1

LITTLE BEYOND THE SCOPE OF DIRECT.

2 I
3

THE COURT:

AS I SAID, GO AHEAD AND DO

WHAT YOU HAVE TO DO.

4

5

FINE.

MR. WALKER:
I.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

6

BY MR. WALKER:

7

Q

8

OKAY.

MR. BRADSHAW, CAN YOU TELL THE COURT IN YOUR

OWN WORDS YOUR FEELINGS WITH REGARD TO THIS PARTICULAR

9 1 HALF-ACRE PIECE OF PROPERTY.
10j
11

A

WHEN

I FIND SOMETHING

I LIKE, I KNOW

KNOW, I BECOME ATTACHED VERY QUICKLY.

IT.

YOU

I MEAN, IT'S MORE

12j THAN JUST AN EMOTIONAL -- I THINK TOTALLY VISUALLY ABOUT
13

EVERYTHING, SO THE MINUTE I KNEW

14j I —

I COULD WORK WITH IT,

IT WAS A CONSTANT THOUGHT PROCESS OF BUILDING THE

15j HOUSE ON THAT PIECE OF PROPERTY, LANDSCAPING
16 I WORKING, TERRACING
17
18|

COULD DO WITH
Q

IT EXACTLY.

IT VISUALLY,

I KNEW EXACTLY WHAT I

IT, SO IT WAS PRETTY MUCH MY ULTIMATE DREAM.

HOW LONG HAD YOU BEEN IN THE MARKET TO FIND A

19j PIECE OF PROPERTY TO BUILD THIS HOME ON?
20|

A

WE HAD BEEN LOOKING F O R , —

REAL SERIOUS LOOKING,

21 j I DON'T KNOW, MAYBE THREE YEARS.
22
23
24

Q

IN YOUR OPINION HOW UNIQUE

IS THIS PIECE OF

PROPERTY?
A

I HAVE YET TO FIND A PIECE OF PROPERTY ON A HILL

25 I WHERE YOU CAN SEE A HOUSE AND NOT SEE YOUR NEIGHBORS IN

Un n

1

S A L T LAKE C I T Y , ON A C R E E K .

2

P I E C E OF P R O P E R T Y .

3
4

Q

IT WAS J U S T A V E R Y U N I Q U E

WHEN YOU M E A S U R E THE PROPERTY —

WELL, LET ME

BACK UP A L I T T L E B I T .

5

AS FAR AS THE C O N S T R U C T I O N P R O C E S S , YOU WERE

6

O U T D I S C U S S I N G IT W I T H C E R T A I N S U B C O N T R A C T O R S ,

7

UNDERSTANDING.

8 I
9
10

A

YES.

IS MY

I CONTACTED QUITE A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT

INDIVIDUALS, CONTRACTORS AND SUBCONTRACTORS.
Q

AND

Y

° U H A V E R E F E R R E D TO, IN AN A F F I D A V I T

THAT

n

IS ON FILE W I T H T H E C O U R T / A B O U T A M R . C R A I G O S T L E R .

12

COULD YOU TELL US A B O U T YOUR FIRST D I S C U S S I O N S WITH HIM.

13

A

W E L L , I W A S I N T E R E S T E D IN B U I L D I N G A K I N D OF A

14

DIFFERENT TYPE OF P R O C E S S THAT THEY DO IN E U R O P E , AND I

15

CONTACTED ONE OTHER COMPANY THAT WAS O U T - O F - S T A T E AND I

16

SOMEHOW GOT THE NAME OF ROCKY MOUNTAIN R E F R A C T O R Y , WHO

t7

WAS INVOLVED IN DOING T H A T SIMILAR P R O C E S S .

18

T H E M UP AND I W A S G I V E N O S T L E R ' S NAME TO T A L K T O , A N D HE

19

SOLD ME ON THE P R O D U C T .

20
2i
22

Q

AND COULD YOU MAYBE DESCRIBE YOUR

SO, I CALLED

UNDERSTANDING

OF WHAT THAT PRODUCT WAS L I K E .
A

W.ELL, IT IS K I N D O F A —

IT'S K I N D OF A H I G H - T E C H

23

CEMENT THAT HAS THIS INSULATED PROPERTY OF A B O U T 22 'R !

24

FACTORS TO IT, AND SO IT ENCOMPASSES A G R E A T LABOR-SAVING

25 I E F F O R T , PLUS IT G I V E S Y O U A F I R E P R O O F ,

SOUNDPROOF,

^0 1

1
2

A

HOUSE FOR TESTING AND MONITOR THE PRODUCT.

3
4

NO.. JUST THAT THEY WOULD BE ALLOWED TO USE THE

Q

DID YOU DISCUSS THE PRICE

IN ESSENCE, THE VALUE

TO YOU OF THIS PRODUCT?

5

A

NO, NEVER DISCUSSED THE VALUE.

6

Q

WHY DIDN'T YOU?

7

A

BECAUSE I WAS STILL TO GET IT FREE.

8

QUESTION HIM ON ANYTHING.

9

MR. WALKER:

10
11

I DIDN'T

THE COURT:

NO OTHER QUESTIONS, YOUR HONOR.
MR. WOODBURY, DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING

FURTHER?

12

MR. WOODBURY:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. SIMS:

15

NO, YOUR HONOR.

MR. SIMS?
JUST A COUPLE QUESTIONS.
CROSS-EXAMINATION

16

BY MR.

17

Q

SIMS:

MR. BRADSHAW, YOU INDICATED THE SITE PLAN,

18

DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT NO. 18-D, IS DATED 10/28/86.

IS IT

19

YOUR TESTIMONY THAT YOU PUT A LITTLE PRESSURE ON YOUR

20

ARCHITECT

21

TO

IN ORDER TO COME UP WITH THE DRAWING IN ORDER

—

22

A .

DAILY PRESSURE.

23

Q

NOW, THIS LATEST VERSION OR THIS PARTICULAR

24

VERSION WAS A -- WERE THERE EARLIER VERSIONS OF THIS SITE

25

PLAN?
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Q

WHAT DO YOU DO FOR A LIVING?

A

I'M A PERFORMER AND AN INSTRUCTOR.

Q

WHEN YOU SAY, PERFORMER, WHAT KIND OF PERFORMER?

A

I'M A JAZZ PIANIST.

I PLAY AT SNOWBIRD, AT THE

DOUBLETREE HOTEL AND AT THE PUTTING GREEN.
Q

ARE THOSE WHAT YOU WOULD SAY JOBS AS FAR AS --

ARE THOSE PERMANENT JOBS?
A

ONE WOULD HOPE THEY'RE PERMANENT.

REGULAR, REGULAR ENGAGEMENTS.

THEY'RE

AND THEN I --

Q

YOU SET WEEKLY DATES IN WHICH YOU PERFORM?

A

AND I PLAY WEEKLY, YES.

Q

AND YOU ALSO SAID YOU ARE AN INSTRUCTOR.

DO YOU INSTRUCT?
A

WHAT

WHERE DO YOU INSTRUCT?

I TEACH PIANO CLASS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH

AND I TEACH HUMAN RELATIONS AT THE SALT LAKE COMMUNITY
COLLEGE SKILL CENTER.
Q

NOW, MRS. DANIELSON, COULD YOU PLEASE -- YOU ARE

FAMILIAR WITH THE HEROLD ECCLES OR -- NOT HEROLD ECCLES,
ALBERT ECCLES FAMILY TRUST; ARE YOU NOT?
A

YES.

Q

MR. ECCLES WAS YOUR FATHER; WAS HE NOT?

A

YES.

Q

AND IS YOUR MOTHER MRS. ECCLES?

A

YES.

Q

DO YOU REMEMBER WHEN IT WAS THAT YOUR FAMILY

hl5

PURCHASED THE PROPERTY KNOWN AS BROOKBURN PROPERTY ?

A

I WAS A BABY.

I DON'T PERSONALLY REMEMBER IT,

BUT I KNOW THE STORY VERY WELL.

IS THAT WHAT YOU --

Q

WHY DO YOU KNOW THE STORY VERY WELL?

A

BECAUSE I WROTE THEIR BIOGRAPHIES, BOTH MOTHER'S

AND FATHER'S, WHICH INCLUDED 50 YEARS ON BROOKBURN .
0

SO, DID YOU DO A LOT OF RESEARCH ON THE SUBJECT?

A

YES.

0

WHEN WAS THE PROPERTY PURCHASED?

A

1930.

Q

OKAY.

DIARIES AND SO FORTH.

AND DO YOU KNOW WHY YOUR FATHER P URCHASED

THE PROPERTY AND WHAT ITS CONDITION WAS WHEN HE PURCHASED
THAT PROPERTY?
A

YES.

HE WAS A PARTNER IN A REAL ESTATE COMPANY

WHO DEALT IN DEVELOPMENT AND SALES AND MORTGAGES, AND AT
THE TIME (OF THE DEPRESSION THE BUSINESS WENT BANKRUPT.
HE AND MOTHER LOST EVERYTHING, EVEN THEIR HOME

HE

FOUND THE PROPERTY IN EAST MILLCREEK AND USED HIS REAL
ESTATE COMMISSION AS A DOWN PAYMENT AND PAID $40 A MONTH
TO A MAN 1MAMED HARRIS.

Q

SO, HE PURCHASED THE PROPERTY?

A

YES.

Q

BACK IN THE 1930'S?

A

YES.

Q

AND DID YOU BUILD A HOME ON THAT PROPER!Y?
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A

YES.

HE DIDN'T HAVE ANY MONEY TO PAY ANYONE TO

BUILD IT AND HE DIDN'T KNOW HOW TO BUILD.

HE HAD NEVER

DONE ANY BUILDING, BUT THEY NEEDED A HOUSE, SO HE BUILT
IT.

SO, HE WORKED NIGHTS WORKING ON THE HOME, AND HE

STARTED AT 5:00 IN THE MORNING WITH THE LANTERN.

AND THEN

HE WOULD GO TO THE OFFICE, AND THEN GO AND WORK AT NIGHT
WITH THE LANTERN, AND HE WORKED ALL DAY SATURDAYS.
Q

NOW, YOU WERE RAISED IN THIS HOME; WERE YOU NOT?

A

V

Q

v

ES.
OU HAVE MANY FOND MEMORIES WITH RESPECT TO THE

HOME, I'M SURE; IS THAT CORRECT?
A

YES.

0

AND YOU ARE VERY ATTACHED TO THE PROPERTY; ARE

YOU NOT?
A

YES.

Q

NOW, IN YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE PROPERTY, DO YOU

KNOW WHEN YOUR FATHER FIRST CONVEYED A PARCEL OF THE
PROPERTY AWAY, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE?
A

I DON'T REMEMBER SPECIFICALLY, BUT IT WAS THE

EARLY *60'S, ABOUT '61 OR -Q

WHAT WAS THE PURPOSE OF THAT CONVEYANCE?

A

hE DEEDED A HALF ACRE ON THE NORTH SIDE OF THE

CREEK TO MY SISTER AND HER HUSBAND, THE GREGORYS.
0

AND WHEN WAS THE NEXT CONVEYANCE?

A

THE NEXT CONVEYANCE, THE NEXT ONE, WAS 1964.
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i

Q

YOU WEREN'T ABLE TO AFFORD TO BUILD THE HOME?

A

NO.

Q

IS THAT CORRECT?

A

YES.

Q

OKAY.

A

THE TRUST.

Q

MRS. DANIELSON, WHY DID THE TRUST PAY FOR IT?

A

BECAUSE IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO THE TRUST.

NOW, WHO PAID FOR THE SURVEY?

YOU

i SEE, WHEN I DEEDED IT BACK TO THEM, THEN WE COULD USE
THAT IN TRYING TO SELL THE

ra

ROPERTY, THAT WE COULD SELL

IT AS TWO PARCELS.
Q

DO YOU REMEMBER TELLING MR. MC NEIL THE PURPOSE

OF YOUR ACQUIRING THE PROPERTY AND HOW YOU WERE ACQUIRING
THE PROPERTY FROM THE FAMILY TRUST?
A

I DON'T REMEMBER TELLING HIM ALL THE DETAILS,

BUT I REMEMBER TELLING HIM THAT IT WAS TO SEPARATE A
PIECE FROM THE TRUST, YES.
Q

OKAY.

NOW, WAS IT FROM THIS SURVEY,

MRS. DANIELSON, THAT THE TRUST DETERMINED THAT THEY HAD
A BUILDABLE HALF-ACRE LOT ON THIS SIDE OF THE ROAD?

WAS

IT NOT?
A

YES.

Q

WERE THERE ANY OTHER SURVEYS DONE ON THAT PARCEL,

TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE?
A

NO.
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